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1 Introduction 
In May 2004, the first cohort of former transition countries in central and eastern Europe 
joined the European Union. Unlike Denmark and the United Kingdom, these countries do not 
have the choice to opt-out. New entrants will join the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
and—at some point in the future—adopt the euro. As part of the preconditions for entering 
EMU, the Maastricht criteria demand candidate countries to stay for two years in the 
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM 2). ERM 2 implies that inflation targeting 
countries like the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and, more recently, Slovakia have to 
conduct monetary policy under an intermediate exchange rate regime, i.e., they have not only 
to target inflation, but also—at least to some extent—the exchange rate. 
Inflation targeting has gained importance as an attractive framework for monetary policy. 
According to its proponents it is supposed to meet financial markets’ criteria of prudent 
monetary policy (Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen 1999, Loayza and Soto 2002, 
Woodford 2003a). Besides the focus on price stability, inflation targeting emphasizes the 
institutional framework. That institutional framework builds on independence, transparency, 
and accountability. The background for such an institutional setting is the problem of 
dynamic inconsistency and the problem of the inflation bias (Kydland and Prescott 1977, 
Barro and Gordon 1983). Both problems originate from incentives to the central bank to 
create surprise inflation in order to increase employment. As a consequence of rational agents 
recognizing these incentives, central banks that conduct monetary policy in a discretionary 
way end up with suboptimally high inflation rates. Based on its rigors institutional 
framework, inflation targeting helped to anchor inflation expectations and thereby reduce 
inflation persistently. 
In addition, intermediate regimes have been discredited because experience in both Latin 
American and East Asian emerging market economies in the 1990s revealed shortcomings in 
pegged exchange rates. Speculative attacks forced the break down of soft pegs and led 
leading economists to the conclusion that only the “corner solutions” (Fischer 2001) could be 
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sustainable.1 It may be argued that the breakdown of the old ERM system with narrow bands 
for bilateral exchange rate fluctuations already led to wider bands, which—so far—have not 
been tested. However, the experience with speculative attacks in Latin America and East 
Asia demonstrate that even more generous bands for the exchange rate may be challenged by 
the market and are almost impossible to be defended without external support, which the 
European Central Bank is not obliged to provide to a significant extent.2 Hence, accession 
countries may face increasing macroeconomic risks during transition into EMU if the 
potential trade-off between inflation and exchange rate targeting materializes. 
However, critics of the concept of inflation targeting call this new monetary policy strategy 
just “conservative window-dressing” (Romer 2001: 509). Others claim that independent of 
the label attached to monetary policy the importance of the exchange rate for macroeconomic 
institutions in emerging market economies demands for intermediate regimes (Williamson 
2000). While the goals of monetary policy in industrialized countries are well described by 
domestic price and output stability, internal monetary stability in emerging market economies 
may be argued to depend largely on the prevailing global situation, which goes beyond 
domestic conditions and can hardly be influenced by them. Thus, central banks in emerging 
market economies would have to take the exchange rate into account in order to sustain 
macroeconomic stability. If this would be the case, ERM 2 would even reduce 
macroeconomic risks for former transition countries on their way into monetary union. 
All in all, the existence of a trade-off between inflation and exchange rate targeting is open to 
debate. The different strategies chosen by the former transition countries in central and 
eastern Europe provide a case in point. While the most advanced country, Slovenia, already 
made its way into EMU and the smaller Baltic countries sustained their currency boards and 
hard pegs in order to join the euro as soon as possible, the larger countries like the Czech 
                                                 
1 Hard pegs are not discussed in this study. The crisis in Argentina revealed that hard pegs other than monetary 
unions still contain a high risk and demand a high degree of fiscal consolidation (Mussa 2002). As a 
consequence of the collapse of the Argentine currency board and the fact that dollarization and monetary union 
are either not desirable or not feasible, hard peg regimes lost their charm. For European countries, this aversion 
seems to be less relevant since even the currency board arrangements in some smaller EU countries are 
supposed to end up as soon as possible in the monetary union (Ghosh, Gulde, and Wolf 2000). 
2 Article 4 of treaty of Maastricht explicitly states that exchange rate policy is subordinated to maintain price 
stability in the euro area.  
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Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia implemented inflation targeting regimes. For this 
latter group of countries, which may still be classified as emerging market economies, the 
way to a hard peg in a monetary union leads through the possibly insecure terrain of a soft 
peg in ERM 2.  
In this respect the chapters of this study answer three questions: 
• What explains the choice of inflation targets in European emerging market economies 
(Chapter 2)? 
• What is the role of the exchange rate in European emerging market economies’ 
monetary policy reaction functions under inflation targeting (Chapter 3)? 
• What are the costs and benefits of an additional exchange rate target under an 
intermediate exchange rate regime like ERM 2 (Chapter 4)? 
 
Chapter 2 demonstrates that some central and eastern European countries (CEEC) have 
reached a stage in transition where they can credibly commit to low inflation rates. The 
analysis in this chapter assumes that inflation outcomes are determined by nonmonetary 
factors because this is what constrains central banks in their monetary policy as it would be 
technically possible for central banks to eliminate inflation by monetary restriction. Hence, 
the assumption made is that the choice of an explicit or implicit intermediate target is 
penultimate and reflects a central bank’s preferences over inflation and output as well as the 
political and economic environment and expectations that it faces. Thus, when a central bank 
chooses, e.g., a pegged exchange rate, it implicitly chooses to import the inflation target from 
the country providing the anchor currency. Against this background, a panel estimation of 19 
transition countries reveals the factors underlying the choice of their implicit inflation targets.  
For the period between the years 2000 and 2005 inflation rates differ substantially between 
the central and eastern European countries and the western CIS countries Belarus, Moldova, 
Russia and Ukraine (CIS-West). While the CEEC and also the eastern CIS countries have 
been able to reach and maintain inflation rates below 10 percent, the CIS-West countries 
have all converged at a higher rate of about 10 percent. Panel regressions linking inflation 
outcomes to a set of independent variables reveal that the central banks in Russia, Ukraine, 
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Belarus and Moldova may aim at comparatively high inflation rates mainly to make up for, 
and to perhaps exploit, lagging internal and external liberalization in their economies.  
We conclude that moves to liberalize the economy and encourage more openness could 
directly help to support lower inflation targets in the medium term, and indirectly reduce 
incentives for central banks to pursue inflationary policies. Moreover, efforts to improve 
central bank independence could also pay dividends in durably reducing CIS-West inflation. 
In this context, eliminating the multiple objectives CIS-West central banks now face and 
providing for a stronger mandate to target inflation would be a good start. For the CEEC, 
these results imply that the reform process, they have undergone during accession to the EU, 
created the preconditions for supporting ambitious inflation targets, which, in turn, are a 
necessary precondition for adopting the euro area inflation target under ERM 2. 
 
Chapter 3 analyzes to which extent the central banks of emerging market economies in 
central Europe and Latin America that adopted an inflation targeting framework consider the 
exchange rate in their monetary policy reaction function. As a first step, we demonstrate that 
a generalized reaction function can be derived, which represents four alternative monetary 
policy strategies: inflation targeting, Taylor rule, monetary conditions index, and managed 
floating. These strategies cover the range between pure inflation targeting combined with 
fully flexible exchange rates and managed exchange rates implying a balanced role of 
inflation and exchange rate targeting. The generalized reaction function, an extended Taylor 
rule that takes into account inflation, the output gap, and the exchange rate, is the basis for 
the estimation of a vector autoregressive model (VAR). The advantage of this approach is 
that it does not only investigate the reaction function but also the transmission mechanism of 
inflation, output, and the exchange rate shocks to the interest rate. Additionally, it allows us 
to distinguish between the announced monetary policy of targeting only inflation (de jure 
policy) and the actually conducted policy (de facto policy) with respect to additionally 
targeting the exchange rate. 
The results reveal that there is a significant but diminishing role for exchange rate targeting 
linked to the progress of complementary economic reforms implemented by a country. In 
Chile, the forerunner of inflation targeting in emerging market economies and a country with 
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a comparably long tradition in prudent macroeconomic policies, monetary policy is 
predominately committed to reducing and later keeping inflation down. The exchange rate 
seems to be managed only during periods of pressure from “contagion” crises. This stage has 
not yet been reached by the central European countries. The Czech interest rate responds to 
inflation on the very short horizon, slightly later to output and to the exchange rate on the 
medium horizon. Poland, like Brazil and Colombia, reveal a clear regime change towards 
inflation targeting, but with still some importance attached to the exchange rate. Monetary 
policy in Hungary and Mexico remains highly driven by the development of the exchange 
rate. Obviously, the value given to an external anchor for domestic monetary policy differs 
among inflation targeters. 
 
Chapter 4 analyzes optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian three-country model. The 
chapter focuses in particular on potential costs of targeting the exchange rate to the euro 
while being integrated to a third country to various degrees. Recent empirical research points 
to the relevance of the integration of production structures by outsourcing and offshoring for 
the transmission of business cycle shocks and the conduct of monetary policy (Burstein, Kurz 
and Tesar 2008, Imbs 2004, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, and Yosha 2003, Kose, Otrok and 
Whiteman 2003, Kose, Prasad, and Terrones 2003). This is especially relevant for the 
countries that will join the euro area, which will have to stay for two years in ERM 2, and 
which will, therefore, have to target inflation and the euro exchange rate simultaneously. 
These countries are significantly integrated with third countries through the production chain. 
We examine how shocks originating from the third country affect not only the accession 
country directly but also monetary integration under ERM 2 in a New Keynesian framework. 
The underlying research program is rooted in the real business cycle (RBC) theory with 
explicit microfoundations, i.e., rationally optimizing agents who make forward-looking 
decisions and thereby take into account dynamic and intertemporal effects. In contrast to the 
pure RBC theory, these models incorporate Keynesian building blocks with nominal 
rigidities in prices and wages and imperfect competition in goods and factor markets. This 
new class of models, known as “New Neoclassical Synthesis” (Goodfriend and King 1997), 
“New Keynesian” (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 1999) or “Neo-Wicksellian” (Woodford 
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2003b), are taken to the open economy in the “New Open Economy Macroeconomics 
(NOEM)” (Lane 2001, Sarno 2001, Bowman and Doyle 2003). 
We assess the cost of a central European inflation targeting central bank to move to an 
intermediate regime like ERM 2 and thereby target additionally the exchange rate. We 
contrast two different loss functions. The first—traditional—loss function is based on the 
variability of output and inflation. Under the second loss function, the central bank has to 
keep the exchange rate within the bands given by ERM 2 and include additionally the 
variability of the exchange rate. By minimizing the loss function of the central bank we 
derive the corresponding optimal monetary policy rule. The results show that a Taylor rule 
augmented for an exchange rate term is a good simple rule if the loss function assumes an 
additional benefit of exchange rate smoothing in line with a strategy of monetary integration 
into the euro area under ERM 2. However, the loss increases with the degree of integration of 
the accession country with the third country.  
All in all, the study reveals important aspects about the potential for implementing inflation 
targeting frameworks in European emerging market economies and the possibilities to 
sustain this framework in the phase of accession to the euro area. An extended Taylor rule 
appears to be the most adequate rule to guide monetary policy during various stages of 
economic reform and transition. Such a rule supports balancing alternative targets for 
monetary policy as long as insufficient internal and external liberalization does not permit 
ambitious inflation targets and fully flexible exchange rates. Such a rule also allows 
balancing inflation, output, and exchange rate targets in intermediate exchange rate regimes 
like ERM 2 even given different degrees of integration with third countries. These results are 
consistent with a rather medium-term strategy observed in the larger new EU member 
countries among the CEEC. In these countries’ monetary strategy targeting the exchange rate 
to some extent already plays a significant role for entering ERM 2. 
2 The Central Banks’ Choice of Inflation Targets: What Explains 
Persistent Inflation Differentials across European Emerging Market 
Economies? 
2.1 Introduction 
Over 2000-05 a substantial gap opened in the inflation performance of different groups of 
European emerging market economies (Figure 2.1). Inflation in the central and eastern 
Europe countries (CEEC)3 has declined to below 10 percent and remained there. The eastern 
CIS countries (CIS-East) have also reached inflation rates below 10 percent. However, 
Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine (the CIS-West) have all converged on a higher 
inflation rate—around 10 percent.  
Studies of inflation for individual countries in the CIS-West have emphasized the role of 
monetary policy and the exchange rate framework (Appendix Table A2.1). For Belarus and 
Ukraine the link has been made between monetary aggregates and inflation (Pelipas 2006, 
Lissovolik 2003, Leheyda 2005), whereas for Russia inflation has been seen as determined 
by exchange rate policy (due to unsterilized foreign exchange intervention) (Granville and 
Mallick 2006, Ohnsorge and Oomes 2004). These individual country studies have not 
examined what has motivated the central banks to choose their monetary regimes. Cross-
country studies have modeled inflation outcomes as the result of central banks’ choice 
problems (Appendix Table A2.2). Cottarelli, Griffiths, and Moghadam (1998) examine the 
influence of various incentives on inflation outcomes in transition economies, but in a much 
earlier time period (1992-95). Mafi-Kreft and Kreft (2006) confirm the well-known role of 
hard pegs like currency board arrangements in reducing inflation, and find that central bank 
independence and the prospect of early accession to the EU reduced inflation in the CEEC in 
contrast to the CIS. Aisen and Veiga (2006) focus on the relation between inflation and 
political instability in a comprehensive sample of developing and advanced countries.  
 
                                                 
3 CEEC comprises the new member states of the European Union only. However, for the purpose of our study 
we also include Croatia because of its status as a candidate country. 
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Figure 2.1: Inflation in CEEC and CIS in Percent, 2001-05 
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In this chapter we apply the cross-country choice/incentive approach to help illuminate 
possible explanations for the divergent CIS-West and CEEC inflation paths. Continuing high 
inflation in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova suggests that incentive problems may not 
have been resolved. Our set of explanatory variables covers the key costs and benefits of 
inflation for transition economies, and key institutional features in them. Our panel also 
covers eastern CIS countries, which provide a useful control given their lower inflation rates 
and lagging institutional development relative to the CEEC. The rest of the chapter is 
organized as follows. The second section examines CPI measurement issues, and rejects the 
notion that the inflation differential could simply be a statistical artifact. The third and fourth 
sections discuss the approach to modeling the inflation choice of a central bank, the specific 
variables to be used in our model, and the panel estimation technique. The fifth section 
discusses the estimation results and the sixth section uses them to examine the source of 
higher inflation rates in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, and whether high inflation 
could persist. The final section discusses policy implications for these countries. 
 
2.2 Could the Inflation Differential Simply Be a Statistical Artifact? 
Measuring the true rate of CPI inflation is not straightforward for any country. In the U.S., 
the Boskin Commission (Boskin et al. 1996, 1998, Gordon 2000, 2006) found an upward bias 
in the consumer price index driven by four effects:  
• quality effect; 
• substitution effect; 
• new goods effect; 
• outlet effect. 
The quality effect stems from changes in the quality of a good that may lead to price 
increases that are misconceived as price inflation. The substitution effect relates to changes in 
consumption patterns: In response to relative price increases, consumers may switch to 
similar but cheaper products. The new consumption pattern is not always reflected in updated 
weights for the consumer price index. The new goods effect arises when new goods are 
included in the CPI consumption basket only with a delay. Finally, the outlet effect stems 
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from the difficulties faced by official price collectors in reflecting consumers’ moves towards 
shopping at cheap outlets such as hypermarkets. 
Direct studies of mismeasurement bias in transition countries are few, and do not seem to 
indicate any unusual transition mismeasurement effect. Filer and Hanousek (2003) find that 
Czech inflation may be overestimated by more than 4 percent due to neglected new goods 
and the quality bias, but no studies are available on Russia, Ukraine, Belarus or Moldova. 
Accounting for the level of inflation, the Czech estimate is broadly in line with relative 
magnitudes measured for advanced economies (Table 2.1). We thus look more directly at the 
possibility of a larger bias in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova. 
Table 2.1: Estimates of Inflation Bias in Advanced Economies and the Czech Republic 
                 in Percentage Points per Year 
 
Differences in CPI-basket related biases do not appear to play a significant role in the 
inflation differential. The CPI baskets do differ considerably between the CEEC and 
CIS-West, with the latter showing a much higher share of food (Table 2.2). And a common 
feature of the household surveys used to generate the CPI basket is that expenditures on food 
are overrepresented (IMF 2005a, Revenko 2006). However, even if inflation were to be 
measured with weights closer to the standardized weights used in EU new member states, 
CIS-West inflation rates would remain high relative to the CEEC (Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.2: Weights of Sectors in CPI, 2001-05 
 Food Nonfood Goods Services 
 2001 2005 2001 2005 2001 2005 
Czech Republic 0.29 0.30 0.41 0.39 0.31 0.32 
Estonia  0.33 0.30 0.39 0.41 0.28 0.29 
Hungary  0.29 0.28 0.41 0.43 0.30 0.29 
Latvia 0.36 0.33 0.38 0.39 0.25 0.28 
Lithuania  0.44 0.36 0.39 0.40 0.17 0.24 
Poland  0.36 0.28 0.40 0.44 0.23 0.28 
Slovak Republic  0.30 0.25 0.44 0.42 0.26 0.33 
Slovenia 0.26 0.24 0.44 0.43 0.30 0.33 
EU-Baltic & Central 0.33 0.29 0.41 0.41 0.26 0.29 
Bulgaria  0.47 0.42 0.36 0.37 0.17 0.21 
Romania 0.46 0.45 0.40 0.40 0.14 0.15 
EU-Southeast 0.47 0.43 0.38 0.38 0.15 0.18 
Belarus 0.64 0.54 0.19 0.25 0.17 0.21 
Moldova 0.57 0.46 0.26 0.30 0.17 0.24 
Russia 0.55 0.46 0.31 0.33 0.14 0.21 
Ukraine 0.64 0.64 0.14 0.17 0.22 0.20 
CIS-West 0.60 0.52 0.22 0.26 0.17 0.22 
Source: Eurostat, SSCU, IMF estimates.    
Note: No disaggregate data available for Croatia.    
 
Table 2.3: Inflation Based on Different Weights,  
     Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, 2001-05 
 
Similarly, different price mismeasurement biases do not seem to be a relevant issue. For 
example, the Global Retail Development Index developed by A.T. Kearney (2006) indicates 
low market saturation in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, and no evident change 
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relative to central and eastern European countries over the past few years. While outlet bias 
could become more of an issue in the future—international retailers have started to move into 
these countries with modern hypermarkets and discount stores—it is unlikely that it 
contributed significantly to a higher relative bias in their past inflation. 
Finally, IMF assessments of data quality do not point to any significant differences in CPI 
data techniques or quality. Eurostat supervised the implementation of western European 
standards in the CEEC. IMF Reports on the observance of standards and codes (data 
modules) indicate only minor shortcomings relative to international standards in compiling 
the CPI in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova.4  
 
2.3 Modeling the Inflation Differential 
To better understand the inflation differential, we construct an empirical model of inflation 
outcomes in transition countries. We estimate a cross-country panel following the approach 
of Cottarelli, Griffiths, and Moghadam (1998), Mafi-Kreft and Kreft (2006) and Aisen and 
Veiga (2006). To the extent that this cross-country model reproduces the inflation 
differential, we can assess the factors that may be pushing central banks in Russia, Ukraine, 
Belarus and Moldova to choose higher inflation rates, and even ask whether any change 
could be expected in these factors, and thus the differential, going forward.  
The empirical model takes its cue from the standard central bank choice problem laid out in 
the time consistency literature (see, for example, Barro and Gordon 1983). Thus the central 
bank may be understood as having targets for inflation and unemployment, which may not be 
consistent. These in turn reflect underlying structural features of the economy, and possibly 
trade-offs against other less formal central bank aims (e.g. financial stability).5 The central 
                                                 
4 See http://www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/rosc.asp for details on CPI statistical techniques used in Russia, 
Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. Moldova does not follow international standards for proper techniques in 
imputation of missing and new observations. To the extent missing observations are associated with scarcity of 
an item in question, this may understate the CPI, which would imply the inflation differential is understated. 
5 See Rodríguez Palenzuela, Camba-Méndez, and Garcia (2003) for a full discussion of factors affecting the 
choice of optimal inflation rate. See Cukierman (1992) for a discussion of the various motives that may impinge 
on a central banks’ inflation choice. Besides employment, these can include fiscal revenues, external 
competitiveness and financial stability.  
(continued…) 
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bank is also understood to have a short-run incentive to use surprise inflation to raise output, 
and a more pronounced incentive would be associated with higher inflation expectations in 
equilibrium as agents internalize the central bank’s choice problem.6 Finally, the central bank 
is understood to have certain weights on output and inflation stabilization in its welfare 
function. The political and institutional environment in which monetary policy operates helps 
determine these. In this approach, the actual inflation outcome also reflects a variety of 
unanticipated shocks to aggregate demand and supply. That is, in the short run a central bank 
may not be able to offset inflation impulses. 
The model’s focus on the factors underlying the inflation choice is not to imply that 
intermediate targets do not matter. The assumption we make is that the choice of 
intermediate target is penultimate, and reflects a central bank’s preferences over inflation and 
output, as well as the political and economic environment and expectations that it faces. Thus 
when a central bank chooses a pegged exchange rate, it effectively chooses to import an 
inflation process, and our model attempts to shed light on this latter choice.7 
Turning to the inflation choice, to capture structural features that may bear on transition 
central banks’ unemployment and inflation targets, we use a number of variables. A key 
feature of the transition has been the need to shift labor from overstaffed state enterprises and 
collective farms to more productive uses (see, e.g., Schiff et al. 2006).8 Central banks may 
have resisted unemployment due to massive sectoral labor shifts by ensuring significant 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
6 The short-run trade-off will depend, among other things, on the variance of nominal relative to real shocks 
(but not directly on the level of inflation). Thus a sustained attempt by a transition country central bank to 
exploit the output-inflation trade-off would essentially eliminate it. For this reason, we confine our sample to 
the post-hyperinflation period. More generally, when the game between the central bank and agents is in an 
equilibrium, there is no further incentive for the central bank to shock the economy with unanticipated inflation, 
and thus to change the relative variances. What matters then are other structural influences on the trade-off, 
which help determine the level of inflation at which the incentive disappears. We model these. 
 
7 Technical factors may constrain a central bank’s choice of monetary regime. However, those central banks, 
which lack the capacity to manage a flexible exchange rate regime, are not doomed to import an inflation 
process; they can always manage inflation via an adjustable peg. 
8 In transition economies, structural changes—obsolescence of capital and disorganization on one side of the 
transition recession and massive productivity gains on the other—are likely to have been much more important 
than cyclical issues over the last 10 years. For these reasons it is difficult to estimate the output gap or other 
capacity measures for these economies, and indeed data in these areas is very incomplete. Our variables for 
structural unemployment pressures are thus reasonable controls for capacity pressures.  
(continued…) 
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credit growth to the economy via a loose monetary policy. Directed credit from the banking 
system was in fact a consideration in Belarus and Ukraine at least during the first half of the 
sample period (see IMF 2005b,c). We use the EBRD’s index of enterprise restructuring, and 
the share of agriculture in GDP to capture this potential influence on inflation.9 As transition 
proceeds, and productivity and wages in the traded goods sector rise, so too would wages in 
the nontradables sector, putting pressure on the overall price level. We capture this (the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect) via labor productivity growth in the manufacturing sector, 
interacted with the exchange rate regime.10 A central bank may be also concerned about 
distortions to after tax real factor returns created via the interaction of inflation with the tax 
code. We construct a dummy variable for the presence of a flat income tax—which should be 
less distortionary—to capture this possible influence.  
Other influences on targets are fiscal sustainability, external sustainability, and developments 
of the financial market. If the government is constrained by a large debt stock—with interest 
payments crowding out other budget expenditures and rollover considerations creating a flow 
financing problem—fiscal dominance may hold. A central bank may prefer to maintain loose 
credit conditions, accentuating fiscal impulses to aggregate demand, rather than risk that 
monetary tightening produced default, and all the economic turmoil that could bring. We take 
the stock of government debt as a ratio to GDP as an indication of fiscal sustainability, and 
use a one-period lag to address potential endogeneity problems.11 A central bank may attempt 
to reduce a persistent current account deficit by devaluing the currency. This, via pass-
                                                                                                                                                       
 
9 Other authors like Cukierman, Edwards, and Tabellini (1992) argue that the agricultural sector is difficult to 
tax and therefore consider it to be a fiscal motive. This interpretation makes some sense for developing 
economies with low revenue ratios and large informal agricultural sectors. For the transition economies that we 
consider, where the agricultural sector is much more organized (e.g., collective farms) and where tax ratios are 
generally in the 30–40 percent of GDP range, it is not a very compelling interpretation. 
10 Existing empirical evidence suggests that if anything this should work against an inflation differential. Égert, 
Halpern, and MacDonald (2006) suggest that among the CEEC the highest Balassa-Samuelson effect may be 
found in Hungary and Poland (up to 2 percent) and the lowest in the Czech Republic and Latvia (close to zero). 
Égert (2005) finds the effect to be 0.7 percent for Russia and for 0.5 percent for Ukraine.  
11 Many of the transition economies have had large contingent liabilities at one point or another. The so-called 
lost savings in the CIS from the early 1990s hyperinflation are an example. These liabilities would provide an 
additional incentive towards inflation, since these have typically not been indexed. Data limitations preclude 
their use. 
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through of higher import prices, will raise the inflation rate in the near term.12 The pay-off is 
a reduced risk of external crisis in the medium term (which would involve overshooting 
depreciation, very high inflation, and large output losses). We use the current account 
balance as a share of GDP, lagged one period, to capture this effect. A greater degree of 
financial market development could reduce the need for a central bank to keep monetary 
conditions loose in support of high credit growth. We take the EBRD’s bank reform index 
and securities market development index as possible measures.13 At the same time, central 
banks may independently seek to smooth interest rates or exchange rates to keep 
intermediation smooth. We use the standard deviation of interest and exchange rates to 
capture this potential influence. 
To capture the incentive a transition country central bank may have to inflate in the short run, 
known as the output-inflation trade-off, we use several variables identified as important in 
the literature, namely the degree of openness, competition, and price liberalization. The real 
benefits of surprise inflation decline with openness, since competitiveness and net exports 
suffer (Romer 1993). We measure openness by the EBRD’s trade and foreign exchange 
system liberalization index. Additionally, Rogoff (2003) notes that competition tends to 
make prices and wages more flexible, reducing the real effects of unanticipated monetary 
policy. There is thus less incentive for central banks to inflate. We use the EBRD’s 
competition policy index to capture this potential influence. When prices and wages are rigid, 
the real effects of unanticipated monetary policy become larger (though effects may also 
show up as shortages of goods). We focus on price rigidities here since we do not have good 
labor market data for many transition economies (wage indexation, contract duration, and 
centralization of wage bargaining). There are good economic reasons why price rigidities 
may exist even in market economies (e.g., menu costs), but these are likely dominated by 
                                                 
12 If all prices are raised in proportion to the exchange rate depreciation, there would be no real depreciation, 
and no incentive to use this channel. This could occur in a fully dollarized economy, but none of the transition 
economies fits this mold for the time period in question. 
13 Financial dollarization is one reflection of financial market development that could impact inflation 
outcomes, for instance by creating an incentive for a central bank to minimize exchange rate movements (this 
would prevent impacts on agents’ balance sheets, but would also transmit external disturbances to the 
economy). However, dollarization can also reflect expectations of inflation (see Levy Yeyati 2006), and due to 
this endogeneity issue, is not modeled here. 
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pure price liberalization considerations in our set of formerly planned transition economies. 
We use the EBRD’s price liberalization index as a measure.  
We aim to capture the weight a central bank places on inflation in its objective function by 
controlling for key features of the institutional environment. Political instability, like frequent 
elections and unstable governments, may reduce a central bank’s horizon, and enhance its 
focus on output and employment outcomes. In equilibrium, this would lead to higher 
inflation expectations and inflation. A preliminary look at World Bank data suggests that 
while this could explain inflation, it will not likely explain the gap: Table 2.4 shows a clear 
gap between the CEEC and the CIS countries, but in a direction that favors higher inflation in 
the CEEC. A greater degree of central bank independence may lead a central bank to target a 
very low level of inflation, and to put more weight on inflation outcomes (ignoring potential 
short-run trade-offs with output). To control for endogeneity concerns—that low inflation 
leads central banks towards a stronger institutional framework—we take the initially 
prevailing degree of central bank independence. Data are drawn from Cukierman, Miller and 
Neyapti (2002), and measure only the legal degree of independence, which may differ from 
independence in practice.14 EU accession, and the requirements this imposes on economic 
policies, may directly encourage low inflation (for instance, the conditions for adoption of 
the euro) and indirectly help import monetary policy credibility. We capture this influence 
via a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 once accession talks begin.  
 
                                                 
14 Up-to-date data on central bank independence is in any event unavailable. IMF staff reports on Article IV 
consultations (Bassett 2003, IMF 2005b, 2005c, 2006) as well as the assessments by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit (EIU 2005, 2006) suggest that central bank independence is still lacking in the CIS-West. 
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Table 2.4: Government Stability in Transition Countries, Averages 1999-2003 
  EU-Baltic EU-Southeast 
  & Central & Croatia 
CIS-West 
Years chief executive in office 1/  4.20 2.80 5.40 
Changes in effective executive 2/  0.30 0.27 0.15 
Herfindahl index for the government 1/  0.56 0.73 0.56 
Government fractionalization 1/  0.45 0.27 0.44 
Party fractionalization index 2/  0.76 0.75 0.70 
1/ Database of Political Institutions, World Bank. 
2/ Cross National Time Series Data Archive. 
  
Finally, we link inflation choices to outcomes by controlling for the following key (in the 
transition context) exogenous shocks to aggregate demand and supply.15 Improvements in the 
terms of trade will provide a boost to domestic demand, which may prove hard for a central 
bank to offset. For instance, rising export prices will tend to work their way back to factor 
prices, potentially fueling cost-push inflation. Looking at the data, there is an asymmetry in 
terms of trade developments between the CEEC and CIS-West, suggesting this could be an 
issue (Figure 2.2). Changes in the harvest are potentially important supply shocks for 
economies where the agricultural sector still looms large. And these can quickly drive up 
overall prices, given the weight of food in transition countries’ CPI. A preliminary look at the 
data, however, suggests that the pattern of production across country groupings does not vary 
greatly (Figure 2.3). Changes in administered prices will raise the price of the existing level 
of output as long as there are downward nominal rigidities in non-administered prices. They 
are a direct supply shock, which cannot easily be offset by central banks in the short run. In 
the absence of cross-country data on the impact of individual administered price increases, 
we capture this potential impact indirectly, via the change in the share of administered prices.  
                                                 
15 Other unanticipated demand shocks could come via the government (unforeseen and rapid fiscal loosening), 
or via consumers and investors (unrelated to terms of trade gains, and showing up in large unexpected capital 
inflows). Given lags in fiscal policy formulation and implementation, we do not see unanticipated fiscal shocks 
as a key issue. Given our annual data, we would also expect monetary policy to be able to react to slower-to-
materialize consumption and investment shocks, leaving in practice a small unanticipated component.  
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2.4 Empirical Methodology and Results 
For our inflation measure, we follow Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti (2002) and Mafi-Kreft 
and Kreft (2006) and use the depreciation rate in the real value of money: 
(2.1)  d
ti
d
ti
tid
,
,
, 1 π
π
+= ;               i = 1,…, N  and  t = 1,…, T, 
where dti ,π  is the CPI inflation rate in decimals in country i at time t. Using the depreciation 
rate of money rather than the logarithm of inflation avoids deflationary periods dropping out 
of the sample. The data for our variables cover 19 transition countries for the years 
1995-2004. One advantage of limiting the sample to transition countries is the element of a 
natural experiment—the countries in question share an economic and cultural legacy that 
would otherwise be difficult to control for. The country coverage, in particular the inclusion 
of the CIS-East, provides for variation along important data dimensions. The sample period 
does exclude the early 1990s, to avoid the complications presented by the hyperinflations that 
occurred in many transition countries. Appendix Table A2.3 gives full details about data 
sources. Panel unit root tests allow us to assume that the rate of depreciation of money is 
stationary (Table 2.5). Thus, we do not run into spurious correlations from neglected 
cointegration relationships. Tests for unit roots in other variables cannot reject stationarity. 
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Table 2.5: Panel Unit Root Tests for the Rate of Depreciation of Money 
Method Statistic Probability Observations Result 
Null: Assumption of a common unit root process 
   Levin, Lin, and Chu t -6.21 0 171 I(0)  
   Breitung t-statistic -2.24 0.01 152 I(0)  
  
Null: Assumption of an individual unit root process  
   Im, Pesaran, and Shin W stat -3.69 0 171 I(0)  
   ADF – Fisher χ2 83.15 0 171 I(0)  
   PP – Fisher χ2 197 0 190 I(0)  
  
Null: Assumption of no common unit root process  
   Hadri Z-statistic 6.84 0 209 I(1)  
 
We estimate a panel in levels with time fixed effects. Setting X as the vector of explanatory 
variables, β as the vector of parameters to be estimated, ν as the time specific effect, and ε is 
the error term, we have 
(2.2)  .,
'
,, tittiti Xd ενβ ++=  
A country fixed-effects model could minimize the risk of omitted variables bias, but would 
discard information on the levels of the variables, and for our purpose it is important to 
preserve this information in cross-sectional differences. Time fixed effects allow us to 
capture the common part of the ongoing transition process, and the cross-sectional 
correlation stemming from international financial markets and contagion during the financial 
crises in Russia and earlier in Bulgaria and Romania. We consider models without time fixed 
effects and with country fixed effects as part of our robustness checks.  
We use an estimator with panel corrected standard errors. Ordinary least squares (OLS) is 
optimal if error processes are homoskedastic and all error processes are independent of each 
other. However, in our sample we know that panel heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlation are likely to arise. Serial correlation (inflation persistence) may also be present 
due to indexation, and could be modeled in a dynamic panel16 
                                                 
16 We drop the fixed effect, tν , in the following exposition. 
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(2.3)  titititi Xdd ,
'
,1,, εβ ++= −  
by including a lagged dependent variable, di,t-1. The lagged dependent variable is correlated 
with the error term, εi,t, in both fixed effect and random effect estimations. Arellano and 
Bond (1991) suggest to estimate the panel in first differences 
(2.4)  titititi Xdd ,
'
,1,, εβρ Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ − . 
New correlations show up now between the first differences of the lagged dependent 
variable, Δdi,t-1, and the error term, Δεi,t, and autocorrelation of the error term. Arellano and 
Bond (1991) develop a GMM estimator that solves the problem with the help of instrumental 
variables. First, one needs to disentangle the explanatory variables, X, into strictly exogenous 
variables, X exo, and endogenous variables, X end, 
(2.5)  ti
end
ti
exo
tititi XXdd ,2
'
,1
'
,1,, εββρ Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ=Δ − . 
The Arellano-Bond dynamic panel estimator uses the following instruments: levels of the 
dependent variable, di, lagged two and more periods; levels of the endogenous variables, 
X end, lagged two and more periods; first differences of the strictly exogenous variables, X exo, 
which are used as their own instruments. 
When the dependent variable and/or the independent variables are persistent, a system GMM 
estimator is preferable following Blundell and Bond (1998). This estimation combines the 
moment conditions implied by the first differences equation with the additional moment 
conditions implied by the levels equation. Underlying assumption is that the explanatory 
variables are uncorrelated with the individual effects (see Arellano and Bover 1995). Then, 
lagged differences of the explanatory variables and of the dependent variable may be valid 
instruments for the level estimation. 
However, in our set up we would run into the problem of weak instruments, since the 
instrumental variables are to some extent correlated with the time fixed effects (see Stock, 
Wright, and Yogo 2002). The small number for our cross section also does not lend itself to a 
dynamic framework (see Roodman 2006).  
Instead, we may assume that the errors follow an autoregressive process of order one, AR(1), 
(2.6)  tititi ,1,, ηερε += − . 
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We rewrite the model (2.3) with ρ  as the AR parameter, η  is an independent and identically 
distributed error process and L denotes the lag operator  
(2.7)  
L
Xd tititi ρ
ηβ −+= 1
,'
,,  
(2.8)  1,,
'
,, −++= titititi Xd ερεβ  
(2.9)  tititititi XdXd ,
'
1,1,
'
,, ηβρρβ +−+= −− . 
From (2.9) we see that two models (2.3) and (2.7) include both a lagged dependent variable. 
The difference between the two models is in the speed of adjustment to a level change in X. 
If X has rather an immediate one-time impact like a regime change, the adjustment is quick 
(small ρ ) and the two formulations do not differ. The AR parameter may be estimated and 
thereby the problem of serial correlation can be eliminated by applying the procedures 
suggested by Cochrane and Orcutt (1949) and Prais and Winsten (1954). 
The error term is assumed to be heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated, with a 
different but stable variance for each of the N countries. Thus, the Gauss-Markov assumption 
of I2σ=Ω  is violated and the covariance for an OLS estimate of β  is not anymore given by 
( ) 1−′XX  but  
(2.10)  ( ) ( )( ) 11 −− ′Ω′′ XXXXXX . 
Similar to the procedure suggested by White (1980), Beck and Katz (1995) derive panel 
corrected standard errors by using the T replicates of the OLS residuals and then taking the 
square root of  
(2.11)  ( ) ( ) 11 −− ′⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⊗′′′ XXXI
T
EEXXX T , 
where E is the vector of error terms and ⊗  the Kronecker product. If the underlying residuals 
are contemporaneously correlated and panel-heteroskedastic, the contemporary covariances 
are the diagonal elements (see Beck 2008, Beck and Katz 2004, and Kittel 1999). We thus 
follow Beck and Katz (1995) and Edwards (2001) and use panel corrected errors and 
consider dynamic panel models as part of our robustness checks. 
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2.5 The Empirical Model 
Our baseline specification was chosen for its reasonably high explanatory power, its 
parsimony and for the robustness of the results (Table 2.6, column 1). The baseline model fits 
the data and captures the overall inflation gap reasonably well (Figure 2.4). It considers the 
role of structural features, for factors underlying the output-inflation trade-off, and 
exogenous shocks in accounting for different inflation outcomes. Figure 2.5 visualizes the 
magnitudes of the variables by reporting their absolute contribution to fitted inflation in 
percent. The variables do not vary much over time—at least in the full sample of countries. 
On average the largest contributors are the constant explaining around 40 percent of inflation 
and price liberalization with 35 percent. These two variables actually offset each other to a 
large extent due to opposite signs. Openness contributes about 12 percent, fiscal 
sustainability 6 percent, and the terms of trade 5 percent. Different from the other variables is 
the declining contribution of the time fixed effect from 8 percent down to zero. In what 
follows, we discuss each set of explanatory variables, bringing in results using the additional 
variables discussed in the third section in turn.  
Figure 2.4: Fitted versus Actual Inflation, 1996-2004 
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Figure 2.5: Factors Explaining Inflation, 1996-2004 
 
The empirical model suggests that a central bank’s incentive towards higher short-run 
inflation is a key reason for observed outcomes (Table 2.6, columns 1-3). Countries that have 
not gone as far in liberalizing their internal markets, and countries that have not opened up as 
much externally tend to have higher inflation. The estimated impacts are robust across 
specifications and highly significant. They are also considerable in magnitude: all else equal, 
an improvement of one point on the price liberalization index reduces inflation by about 12-
13 percent, and an improvement of 1 point in the openness index reduces inflation by about 
4½ percent. To make this concrete, the increasing price regulation in Belarus between 1997 
and 2004 (from 4.00, representing comprehensive price liberalization, to 2.67, representing 
less than significant progress and a large role for non-market state procurement) would have 
added some 16 percent to inflation, all else equal. Raising openness from 3 to 3.67, and 
removing remaining trade restrictions, as Ukraine did between 2001 and 2005, would have 
lowered inflation by about 3 percent, all else equal. Results with the competition variable—
which is strongly correlated with the other two—were not robust, but were signed in the 
expected manner when the other two were excluded from the estimation. 
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Table 2.6: Results from Panel Regressions: Role of Output-Inflation Trade-Off  
                 and Exogenous Factors 
 
 
Unanticipated shocks to supply and demand are important determinants of cross-country 
inflation outcomes (Table 2.6, columns 1-2 and 4-5). An improvement in the terms of trade 
of 10 percent raises inflation by about 0.8 percent, and this effect is significant and robust 
across various model specifications (interacting the terms of trade with the exchange rate 
regime did not modify this effect). The harvest has the right sign when added to the model, 
but was not significant. Finally, a decrease in the share of administered prices increases 
inflation (by about 0.7 percent for every 10 percent decrease in the change in the share). 
However, we cannot use this model to understand the inflation gap, since the one-fifth of the 
sample that drops out is heavily concentrated in the western CIS countries. 
The evidence on the institutional environment is mixed (Table 2.7). Consistent with Aisen 
and Veiga (2006), the addition of a political stability measure to the model raises explanatory 
power substantially. Moving one step from a stable government such as the one in Russia 
(scoring 11) toward a less stable government such as the one in Poland (scoring 6) increases 
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inflation by about 1 percent. However, the larger model including political/institutional 
variables omitted one country (Georgia), and did not prove as robust, making it less adequate 
as a baseline.17 De jure central bank independence, when used in place of political stability in 
the model, is correctly signed; however, with the same approach, our EU accession dummy is 
incorrectly signed (Table 2.7, columns 2 and 4). Both are imprecisely estimated. Intuition 
suggests that these variables are related to the openness index (which has a strong 
institutional component), and when this control for incentives is removed from the model, 
central bank independence becomes significant and EU accession takes the expected sign 
(Table 2.7, columns 3 and 5). In sum, our data and model suggest that pressures on central 
banks matter, and institutions may matter, but the latter may not be necessary to control 
inflation, if the incentive to inflate is small. 
Table 2.7: Results from Panel Regressions: Role of Institutions 
 
 
                                                 
17 Since average political stability in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova does not differ greatly from average 
political stability in central and eastern European states, the analysis of the gap is not materially effected by 
using the more parsimonious model as a baseline. 
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Fiscal considerations appear to create a stronger motivation for higher inflation, but other 
influences on optimal inflation and output targets do not add to the empirical model 
(Table 2.8). The level of lagged government debt is correctly signed, varies little in 
magnitude, and is significant at the 1 percent level across the whole range of specifications. 
An increase in the government debt ratio of 10 percent would be associated with inflation 
being 2 percent higher in the subsequent period. Financial market development—a more 
reformed banking system or a more developed securities market—points strongly to lower 
inflation across countries, but only when used without price liberalization and openness in 
the model, with which it is strongly correlated (columns 8-11 and Appendix Table A2.4).18 
Results with variables capturing unemployment pressures—the index of enterprise 
restructuring and the agricultural share—are similar: only when price liberalization is not in 
the model are they correctly signed (but even so they are still insignificant)(columns 3-6). 
Pure optimal inflation considerations—the Balassa-Samuelson effect, and tax-related labor 
supply distortions—have no significance (columns 1-2). Finally, considerations of external 
sustainability are correctly signed, but insignificant (column 7). Progress with other structural 
reforms has been highly correlated in transition economies with progress in internal and 
external liberalization, and separate effects, if they exist, cannot be distinguished in our 
sample.  
The overall results are reasonably robust across country groupings, time, and alternative 
econometric specifications. Dropping eastern CIS countries does not affect the main 
conclusions. The coefficients keep their sign, but the terms of trade turn insignificant 
(Appendix Table A2.5, column 2). However, this is not unexpected considering that it 
implies to exclude Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, oil-producing countries where terms of trade 
movements have been important. The model still fits the data reasonably well once we 
constrain the sample to the post-crises years, 2000-04, and for the most part signs and the 
size of coefficients are reasonably robust (Appendix Table A2.5, column 3). The exception is 
the government debt variable. However, this again is not unexpected, since the earlier period 
contained all of the government debt crises. Including country fixed effects does not effect 
                                                 
18 We do not find interest or exchange rate smoothing to be important influences. These results are available on 
request. 
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the signs or significance of any of the variables. However, with the fixed effects largely 
negative, the size of the price liberalization and government debt impacts become larger. 
Excluding the time fixed effects (i.e., implementing a random effects model) does not affect 
the signs of any of the variables. However, the terms of trade, which can be understood as a 
type of time effect particular to certain countries in the sample, are no longer significant. 
Again, these results are understandable (see Appendix Table A2.5, columns 4-5). Moving to 
a dynamic panel19 does not affect the significance of the fiscal sustainability and internal 
liberalization variables (see Appendix Table A2.5, columns 6-7). External liberalization and 
the terms of trade retain their sign and magnitude, but are no longer significant. The size of 
each coefficient falls, as would be expected. Lagged inflation is significant, but the 
coefficient of below 0.3 is small compared to other studies where lagged inflation is above 
0.6 (see Aisen and Veiga 2006). This latter result is not surprising given the size of our 
dataset and the large number of instrumental variables required in the dynamic panel set up.  
 
                                                 
19 All dependent variables are treated as strictly exogenous, since in other specifications the number of 
instruments exceeds the cross section dimension. The Arrelano-Bond test (not reported) indicates that all the 
dynamic panel regressions are free of serial correlation. 
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Table 2.8: Results from Panel Regressions: Role of Structural Features 
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2.6 What Does the Model Say about the Inflation Differential? 
The empirical model provides a vehicle through which to address the possible sources of the 
inflation differential. The difference between the CIS-West and EU (Baltic and Central) 
average for each variable, ,x  times the coefficient, βx, over the fitted inflation gap gives the 
contribution of each variable in percent:20 
(2.11)  
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Using this decomposition, it can be seen that the key motivations for higher inflation in 
Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova appear to have been evolving of late (Figure 2.6). 
Differences in the degree of price liberalization—which can broadly be understood to capture 
the level of internal liberalization of the economy—appear to have always been an important 
motivation towards higher inflation, but have grown of late to explain some 60 percent of the 
gap. Differences in the degree of external liberalization could explain a further 33 percent of 
the gap at present. Differences in the fiscal environment, once important, appear to have 
receded as a factor underlying the gap. The impact of terms of trade differences has been 
very mild to-date for the CIS as a whole (reflecting, in part, their diverse experiences with 
terms of trade shocks).  
                                                 
20 Using the actual inflation gap has no impact on the relative importance of the explanatory variables. 
 30
Figure 2.6: Factors Underlying Inflation Differentials, 1996-2004 
 
The details for individual CIS-West countries reflect these findings with some nuances 
(Figure 2.7). Belarus is very much in line with the CIS-West average. Russia and Ukraine 
differ to the extent that positive terms of trade movements are more important of late (at 30 
and 25 percent of the gap respectively). In turn, a reduction in government debt appears to 
play a much larger role in offsetting other factors and providing an incentive towards a 
smaller gap. For Moldova, differences in external liberalization appear to play a limited role, 
while issues of fiscal sustainability and internal liberalization may be crucial. 
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Figure 2.7: Factors Underlying Inflation Differences by Country, 1997-2004 
 
The model can also be used to assess whether CIS-West central banks would have been 
expected to target lower inflation beyond the estimation period. The out-of-sample values for 
variables (2005-06) reflect outturns available through the IMF’s WEO database, and EBRD 
indicators updated through 2005. The forecasts for 2007 are based on forecasts in the 
September 2006 WEO (inflation, government debt, terms of trade); for other indicator 
variables, the last available value was simply held constant. For the time dummies, they are 
assumed equal to zero over the forecast horizon (very close to their actual value during the 
last three years of the sample period). For 2005-06, the model foresaw little to no inflation 
gap reduction in Russia and Belarus (Figure 2.8, left column). The model fits the Russian 
data well and suggests that the central bank of Russia would have targeted inflation of about 
10 percent (largely in line with the outcome), reflecting especially developments with the 
terms of trade. The model does not fit the Belarusian data as well. It suggests that the central 
bank of Belarus would have been content with continued high inflation (around 25 percent 
and significantly above the outcome), reflecting very slow liberalization of the economy. The 
model suggests that the central banks in Moldova and Ukraine would have targeted a 
reduction in inflation to about 5 percent in 2005-06, closing most of the inflation differential 
(Figure 2.8, right column). In Moldova, this would have reflected the impact of reforms 
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undertaken in the context of an IMF program; for Ukraine, this would have reflected the 
impact of reforms introduced in 2005 after the Orange Revolution (especially the removal of 
import tariffs and of import and export restrictions). In the event, the inflation gap proved 
persistent for both Moldova and Ukraine. The model captures underlying inflation excluding 
administered price changes, and cannot pick up the large change in administered energy 
prices consequent on the move to market pricing for gas imports from Russia. The out-of-
sample forecast for 2007 may also provide some insight into the credibility gap that the 
central banks in these countries may yet face (Figure 2.8). The model suggests that Russia 
would reduce inflation only very gradually, consistent with the IMF’s WEO forecasts. For 
Belarus, where the model fits less precisely, the inflation choice is seen as well above 2006 
levels, and the then prevailing IMF forecast. The model suggests that if these countries 
announced near-term inflation targets at EU transition country levels, they could face a 
credibility problem. Moldova and Ukraine are projected by the model to want to reduce their 
gap considerably, even exceeding WEO forecasts. These results are again, however, subject 
to a caveat on administered prices, which for Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine would likely 
reduce the difference between model and WEO forecasts significantly.  
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Figure 2.8: Out of Sample Model Forecasts, Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, 1996-2007 
 
 
2.7 Summary and Conclusions 
The recent inflation differential between Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova and central 
European emerging market economies can be modeled reasonably well using a central bank 
incentive approach. Panel estimation based on 19 transition countries suggests that—in 
contrast to CEEC and CIS-East—central banks in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova 
appear to have reason to choose higher inflation rates due in some cases to fiscal pressures, 
but mainly to make up for, and to perhaps exploit, lagging internal and external liberalization 
in their economies. Out-of-sample forecasts, based on projected developments in the terms of 
trade, in the underlying structure of these economies, and assuming no changes in 
institutions, suggest that incentives towards inflation may be diminishing on the back of 
recent reforms, but not to the point where inflation levels below 5 percent could credibly be 
announced as targets. 
Durably closing the gap will likely require some solution to these countries’ incentive 
problems. First, moves to liberalize the economy and encourage more openness could 
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directly help reduce inflation in the medium term, consistent with experience in other 
economies, and indirectly reduce incentives for central banks to pursue inflationary policies. 
Second, the model provides some evidence that structural reforms more generally—the data 
cannot distinguish which in particular, but does suggest some importance for reforms to 
promote faster financial market development and to eliminate labor market overhangs—
could also help reduce incentives for central banks to pursue the looser monetary and credit 
policies, which lead to higher inflation. Third, as emphasized in the literature and suggested 
by the empirical model, political pressures also matter for inflation outcomes. Thus, efforts to 
improve central bank independence could also pay dividends in durably reducing CIS-West 
inflation. In this context, eliminating the multiple objectives CIS-West central banks now 
face and providing for a stronger mandate to target inflation would be a good start.  
More generally, the results also confirm that the preconditions for more ambitious inflation 
targets are given in the CEEC. It can be assumed that the process of accession to the EU 
guided reforms that provided the framework for low inflation targets and macroeconomic 
stability. It is, therefore, rather surprising that the group of CIS-East countries tamed inflation 
without being the subject of the European integration process but possibly helped by (for 
some countries) abundant availability of natural resources guaranteeing fiscal sustainability. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A2.1: Recent Studies of Inflation in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova 
 
     
Authors Technique Variables Sample Key Findings 
     
Belarus     
   Pelipas (2006) Cointegration - M1 
- real money 
- CPI 
- real industrial production 
- exchange rate 
- refinancing rate 
1992Q1–
2003Q4 
All monetary variables influence 
inflation in the short run. Monetary 
gap has a significant impact on 
inflation in the long run. 
     
Russia     
   Granville and 
   Mallick  
   (2006) 
VECM - CPI 
- exchange rate 
- refinancing rate 
- M2 
1993M5–
2004M5 
Interest rate is not the monetary 
policy instrument. For the 
subperiod 2000 2003 inflation was 
determined by exchange rate 
policy rather than fiscal policy. 
     
   Ohnsorge and 
   Oomes (2004) 
Error correction model - effective broad money (with foreign 
currency in circulation) 
- NEER 
- CPI 
- various monetary aggregates 
1996Q4–
2004Q1 
De-dollarization explains increase 
in money aggregates without 
corresponding increase in inflation 
since 2003. 
     
   Vdovichenko  
   and Voronina  
   (2006) 
- GMM (forward-looking 
monetary policy rule) 
- OLS 
- monetary policy as a 
system of intervention and 
sterilization 
- CPI 
- industrial production 
- unemployment 
- real exchange rate 
- gold reserves 
- foreign currency reserves 
- external debt payments (interventions 
are reserves minus debt payments) 
- funds placed by commercial banks on 
central bank accounts  
- government’s deposits placed with 
the central bank (both proxies for 
sterilization) 
2000M1–
2003M9 
The authors find that the central 
bank beside anti-inflationary 
communication targeted the 
exchange rate level and its 
volatility. 
     
Ukraine     
   Leheyda 
   (2006) 
Cointegration VAR - CPI and PPI 
- industrial production 
- M2 
- unit labor costs 
- NEER and REER 
- foreign price level 
- seasonal dummies 
- administrative decisions 
1997M1–
2003M12 
The author finds that inflation is 
determined by exchange rate, 
inflation inertia, and lagged money 
supply. Money supply depends on 
foreign currency inflow.  
     
   Lissovolik 
   (2003) 
Cointegration VAR - domestic wages 
- nominal exchange rate 
- CPI (headline and services) 
- base and broad money 
- interest rates 
- real GDP 
- barter transactions 
1993M1–
2002M12 
Cointegration found between CPI 
and broad money for whole 
sample but not for 1996-2002 
subsample. 
     
   Siliverstovs  
   and Bilan 
   (2005) 
VAR 
- no cointegration found 
- estimated in first 
differences 
- Granger causality 
- CPI 
- average wage per capita 
- M2 
- cash market spread as proxy for 
expected devaluation 
- seasonal dummies 
- 1998M9 dummy  
1996M1–
2003M11 
The authors find that changes in 
devaluation expectations 
determine price developments, 
while money supply growth is 
negligible. 
     
 36
Table A2.2: Recent Cross-Country Studies on Inflation. 
 
     
Authors Technique Variables Sample Key Findings 
     
Aisen and Veiga 
(2006) 
System GMM panel, 
Blundell-Bond (1998) 
- CPI 
- government crisis 
- cabinet changes 
- index of economic freedom 
- polity scale 
- agriculture 
- trade openness 
- growth in real GDP per capita 
- real overvaluation 
- growth of oil prices 
- U.S. treasury bill rate 
- seigniorage 
1960–99 
100 countries 
The authors find evidence that 
inflation and seigniorage increase 
with different measures of political 
instability.  
     
Cottarelli, Griffiths, 
and Moghadam (1998) 
Dynamic panel, 
Arellano-Bond (1991) 
- CPI 
- unemployment rate 
- EBRD transition indicators 
- IMF questionnaire on wage 
bargaining, wage indexation, banking 
sector, central bank independence, 
government debt 
- trade openness 
- current account 
- fiscal deficit 
- exchange rate regime  
- relative price changes 
- base money 
1993–96 
Countries: 
- 22 OECD 
- 10 CEEC 
- 15 CIS 
Significant variables are fiscal 
deficit, exchange rate regime, 
wage indexation, central bank 
independence and from the EBRD 
indicators only price liberalization 
and banking sector reform and in 
a smaller subsample relative price 
changes. 
     
Mafi-Kreft and Kreft 
(2006) 
Panel (fixed effects) - rate of depreciation in real value of 
money 
- central bank independence 
- exchange rate flexibility 
- hard peg dummy 
- fast track to EU dummy 
- fiscal balance 
- real GDP growth 
- trade openness 
- value added of agriculture 
1995–2001 
25 transition 
countries 
The authors find that hard pegs 
(currency board arrangements) 
reduce inflation. 
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Table A2.3: Data Sources 
 
Description Source 
Consumer prices index (annual average) EBRD and IMF WEO forecast 
Price liberalization index EBRD 
General government gross debt in percent 
of GDP 
EBRD and IMF WEO forecast 
Competition policy 
Change in labor productivity in industry 
Coarse exchange rate regime classification 
EBRD 
EBRD 
IMF 
Governance and enterprise restructuring EBRD 
Flat tax dummy Ivanova, Keen, and Klemm (2005) and 
http://www.euractiv.com/en/taxation/flat-
tax/article-136190 
Share of agriculture in percent of GDP 
Current account in percent of GDP 
EBRD and WDI 
EBRD 
Bank reform and interest rate liberalization EBRD 
Trade and foreign exchange system EBRD 
Securities markets and non-bank financial 
institutions 
Exchange rate vis-à-vis key currency 
Interest rate 
EBRD 
 
IFS 
IFS 
Weighted index of central bank 
independence 
Cukierman, Miller, and Neyapti (2002) 
Terms of trade in goods and services IMF WEO 
Change in the share of administered prices EBRD 
Government stability indicator PRS Group 
Crop production index WDI 
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Table A2.4: Data Correlation Matrices 
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Table A2.5: Robustness of Econometric Results 
 
 
3 Evaluating the Role of the Exchange Rate in Inflation Targeting 
Regimes of Latin American and European Emerging Market 
Economies 
3.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, the hypothesis is tested that exchange rate policy still matters even in inflation 
targeting regimes. Exchange rate policy in the 1990s was characterized by the reduction of 
the number of soft pegs, described in the “corner solutions” literature (Fischer 2001). 
Countries moved either towards hard pegs or, increasingly, towards flexible exchange rates. 
A second characteristic was the implementation of inflation targeting as a new monetary 
policy strategy. This strategy provided an attractive framework as it was supposed to meet 
financial markets’ criteria of prudent monetary policy. But critics called this new monetary 
policy strategy just “conservative window-dressing” (Romer 2001: 509). Others claimed that, 
independent of the label attached to monetary policy, the importance of the exchange rate for 
macroeconomic management in emerging markets demands intermediate regimes 
(Williamson 2000). Thus, there is no consensus in the literature with respect to monetary 
policy in combination with flexible exchange rate regimes. 
Latin American and eastern European Countries provide cases in point. The Latin American 
countries were disturbed by crises such as the Mexican Crisis in 1994 and the Brazilian 
Crisis in 1998. These crises lead to a change in monetary policy as the rather fixed exchange 
rate regimes were not anymore sustainable. In 1999 Brazil, Colombia, and Mexico 
introduced inflation targeting as a new monetary policy strategy—following the example of 
Chile. The Chilean central bank had announced its first inflation target in September 1990 
and subsequently built up a successful disinflation record (Morandé 2002, Schmidt-Hebbel 
and Tapia 2002, 2003).  
The central European countries had to deal with the structural change from centrally planned 
to market economies. In the beginning of the 1990s, price liberalization and the abolition of 
price controls led to hyperinflation. The situation got stabilized by pegging the exchange rate. 
When the economies were ready for a more independent monetary policy the central banks of 
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the Czech Republic (1998), Poland (1998), and Hungary (2001) introduced inflation 
targeting.  
In order to analyze the role of exchange rate policy in (de jure) inflation targeting regimes, 
the second section develops a generalized reaction function that describes four alternative 
monetary policy strategies: inflation targeting, Taylor rule, monetary conditions index, and 
managed floating. This generalized reaction function uses the short-term interest rate as the 
instrument of monetary policy. Targets of monetary policy are inflation, output, and the 
exchange rate. The generalized reaction function is estimated using a vector autoregressive 
model (VAR) for the seven Latin America and CEEC countries in the third section. As 
described above, all the selected countries mastered disinflation, moved to flexible exchange 
rates, and introduced inflation targeting as a new monetary policy strategy. The VAR 
analysis investigates the role of the pass-through of the exchange rate on prices and the 
reaction of the interest rate to shocks in inflation, output gap and the exchange rate. The 
fourth section concludes on the role of exchange rate policy in de jure inflation targeting 
regimes. 
 
3.2 A Generalized Reaction Function 
Although inflation targeting, Taylor rule, monetary conditions index, and managed floating 
are often discussed as alternative strategies for monetary policy under flexible exchange rate 
regimes, it can be shown that the reaction functions resulting for these strategies have a 
common structure. 
Svensson (1999: 626) suggests conducting “flexible inflation targeting,” which allows 
accommodating real disturbances. Hence, the reaction function of flexible inflation targeting 
does not only rely on the deviation of actual inflation from its target but also takes into 
account a term for the output gap (Svensson 1999: 628) and is, therefore, identical with the 
Taylor rule (Taylor 1993):21 
                                                 
21 Svensson’s (1999) reaction function for flexible inflation targeting is actually a forward-looking rule based on 
forecasts for inflation and output gap. Taylor’s (1993) reaction function refers to the real interest rate. The 
(continued…) 
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(3.1)  ( ) ( )tttt yyii −+−+= λππγ . 
On the left hand side of the reaction function is the short-term nominal interest rate, it, which 
depends on i , the equilibrium interest rate, as well as on deviations of the inflation rate, tπ , 
and output, yt, from their target values π  and ty , respectively. While π  is determined 
politically, ty  is potential output and, hence, tt yy −  the output gap. 
The monetary conditions index (MCI) is an indicator of the stance of monetary policy, which 
does not only consider an output target but also the influence of the exchange rate on 
inflation. The nominal interest rate, it, is set in order to equalize actual MCI and optimal 
MCI. Freedman (1996: 75) builds the MCI on the assumption of an aggregate demand 
relation, where output, y, depends essentially on the real interest rate, r, and the real exchange 
rate, q: 
(3.2)  ttt qry βα += . 
Although various measures of the MCI exist, it essentially depends on a weighted 
combination of real interest rate and real exchange rate22 deviations from some neutral levels, 
r , and, q . The MCI can then be written as 
(3.3)  ( )qqrrMCI ttt −−−= δ . 
The weight αβδ =  measures the relative demand impact of the interest rate and the 
exchange rate. The parameters α  and β  have to be estimated from a macroeconomic model 
similar to (3.2). Therefore, when setting the interest rate, the impact of the exchange rate on 
the stance of monetary policy is taken into account.23 It is also worth noting that, for instance, 
a rise in the interest rate does not only lead directly to a more restrictive monetary policy but 
leads, via the uncovered interest rate parity, to an appreciation of the exchange rate, which 
                                                                                                                                                       
Fisher equation, ttt ir π−= , allows expressing the Taylor rule in terms of the nominal interest rate, i.e., the 
policy instrument of the central bank. With respect to the empirical analysis this simplified version is used. 
22 Here, an increase corresponds to a depreciation of the exchange rate.  
23 See Gerlach and Smets (2000) for an explicit analysis of the conduct of monetary policy using an MCI. 
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also leads to a more restrictive stance of monetary policy. Consequently, both channels 
increase the actual MCI.  
Bofinger and Wollmershäuser (2001: 26) develop an expression for the optimal MCI, where 
the reaction function of the optimal MCI is given by24  
(3.4)  ( ) ( )tttoptt yyMCI −+−= λππγ . 
Now, equalizing the actual MCI (3.3) and the optimal MCI (3.4) leads to  
(3.5)  ( ) ( ) ( )ttttt yyqqrr −+−=−−− λππγδ  
and after rearranging 
(3.6)  ( ) ( ) ( )qqyyrr ttttt −+−+−+= δλππγ . 
Finally, the reaction function of a monetary conditions index in terms of the nominal interest 
rate, it, is obtained using the Fisher equation, ttt ir π−= : 
(3.7)  ( ) ( ) ( )qqyyii tttttt −+−+−+= δλππγ , 
where tt ri π+=  is the nominal equivalent to an equilibrium real interest rate r . Actually, 
equation (3.7) is an extension of the Taylor rule (3.1).25 In addition to inflation and output, it 
takes into account deviations of the exchange rate from its equilibrium value. Thus, the 
reaction function of the MCI corresponds to a Taylor rule with an exchange rate term (Romer 
2001: 503). 
Unlike an MCI regime, managed floating considers the exchange rate as an additional 
instrument of monetary policy. Nevertheless, it can be shown that reaction function (3.7) can 
serve as a generalized form also representing managed floating. Bofinger (2001: 418) sets up 
the following reaction function for the interest rate  
                                                 
24 Bofinger and Wollmershäuser (2001: 26) incorporate also a neutral level of the MCI on the right hand side. 
Here, the neutral level is assumed to be zero. 
25 See Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998: 1041) for Taylor rules extended by the exchange rate. 
  44 
 
 
 
(3.8)  ( ))(
1
1
1
* qqrerMCIi ttt
opt
ttt −+−−−−+= −δδδδπ , 
where tπ  is the domestic inflation rate, *tr  is the foreign interest rate, te  is the risk premium 
on the expected depreciation, r  is a neutral level of the real interest rate, δ  is the relative 
impact of the interest rate and the exchange rate in the monetary conditions index as in (3.3), 
and )( 1 qqt −−  is the deviation of the lagged real exchange rate from a neutral level. The 
optimal MCI (3.4) is substituted into the reaction function for the nominal interest rate (3.8)  
(3.9)  ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]qqreryyi ttttttt −++−−−+−−+= −1*1 1 δδδλππγδπ  
and after rearranging  
(3.10)  ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]ttttttt erqqyyri −−−−+−+−+−+= − *111 1 δδλππγδπ . 
Some substitutions permit to rearrange this reaction function for easier interpretation. First, 
the uncovered interest rate parity is given by 
(3.11)  *tttt iies −=+Δ , 
where tsΔ  is the targeted depreciation26 of the nominal exchange rate and et is a risk 
premium on the expected depreciation. The uncovered interest rate parity can also be written 
in real terms: 
(3.12)  tttt errq −−=Δ * . 
Second, the real exchange rate of the preceding period can be expressed as today’s exchange 
rate minus the depreciation: 
(3.13)   ttt qqq Δ−=−1 . 
Using these substitutions, the reaction function for the interest rate becomes 
                                                 
26 As the depreciation is controlled by the central bank, no expectation operator is needed. The remaining risk is 
covered by the risk premium et. 
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(3.14)  ( ) ( )[ ] ( )[ ]qqryyri tttttt −−−−−+−+−+= δ
δλππγδπ 11
1 . 
The reaction function (3.14) is simplified for 0=δ . Because αβδ =  the simplification 
corresponds to 0=β , i.e., the exchange rate has no impact on aggregate demand (3.2),27 and 
then the reaction function (3.14) is equivalent to the Taylor rule (3.1). Generally, the 
exchange rate does have some impact on aggregate demand in an open economy and, 
therefore, 0≠δ . Then, the two fractions before each term in brackets add up to unity 
(3.15)  1
11
1 =⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
−−+− δ
δ
δ . 
Hence, the reaction function (3.14) can be interpreted as a weighted mixture of the Taylor 
rule and some form of a monetary conditions index (3.3) because the term in the second 
bracket consists of the interest rate and the exchange rate. These two variables determine the 
stance of monetary policy.28  
All in all, the reaction functions of flexible inflation targeting (3.1), the MCI (3.7), and 
managed floating (3.14) show the same structure as the Taylor rule. Hence, the most 
generalized version of a reaction function is an extended Taylor rule that allows taking into 
account inflation, the output gap, and the exchange rate29  
(3.7)  ( ) ( ) ( )qqyyii tttttt −+−+−+= δλππγ . 
Managed floating does not fit as easily into this generalization as inflation targeting and the 
MCI. However, managed floating remains a close relative and equation (3.7) is taken as a 
starting point for the analysis of monetary policy. 
 
                                                 
27 This assumption could be thought of as the closed economy case. 
28 An increase in the weight β of the exchange rate in aggregate demand (3.2) leads to an increase of the weight 
of the exchange rate in the reaction function (3.14). Freedman (1996: 75) suggests δ=1/3 for the Canadian MCI. 
Hence, the first term in the reaction function (3.14) has the weight 1.5 and the second term has the weight –0.5. 
29 The reaction function may also contain lags of the interest rate, if central banks choose to smooth interest 
rates (Goodfriend 1991). 
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3.3  Empirical Evidence from Inflation Targeting Regimes 
3.3.1  VAR Models for Countries in Latin America and Central Europe 
The analysis applied in this paper builds on Gottschalk and Moore (2001) who estimated a 
vector autoregressive model (VAR) in levels for analyzing the role of instruments and targets 
in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in the case of Poland.30 VARs have 
proven to be useful for the analysis of monetary policy because they look at the dynamics 
within the economy and the relations between instruments and targets of monetary policy 
(Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 1999, von Hagen, Hayo, and Fender 2002: 8). In 
contrast to traditional empirical analysis, this method treats all variables as endogenous and 
allows analyzing dynamic responses to shocks.  
Impulse response analysis maps the adjustment path in time for a variable to a given shock 
with the size of one standard deviation. The impulse response functions are reported for 
twenty steps or for twelve steps, i.e., one year, in the case of particularly short samples. Error 
bands assess the statistical significance of the impulse responses. These error bands are 
computed by a Monte Carlo simulation following Sims and Zha (1999). These authors 
illustrate that the use of conventional error bands with one or two standard errors can be 
misleading as impulse responses have highly asymmetrical distributions. The analysis here 
follows their suggestion and uses fractiles of 0.16 and 0.84 instead of a one standard 
deviation band.  
VARs are characterized by very little a priori restrictions. This implies that they show 
correlations rather than causalities (Cooley and LeRoy 1985, Stock and Watson 2001: 102). 
However, the derivation of a generalized reaction function in Section 3.2 has shown that the 
restrictions on parameters are already rather complex if one starts with ad hoc assumptions 
about targets and instruments of monetary policy. The VAR analysis assumes that these 
restrictions are largely unknown. A priori information is only required with respect to the 
question which variables are treated as exogenous and which variables are treated as 
endogenous. 
                                                 
30 The estimation strategy builds—among others—on Sims (1992) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 
(1996). 
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Ranking all variables from the most exogenous to the most endogenous and applying the 
Choleski decomposition allows identifying the dynamic responses to a shock. It is assumed 
that the first variable responds only to its own shock, the second variable responds to the first 
variable plus to a shock to the second variable, and so on. Finally, the last variable reacts 
without delay to all shocks, but disturbances to this variable have no contemporaneous effect 
on the other variables. 
The empirical analysis builds on the estimation of two different setups. Each VAR is 
estimated ones in levels and ones in gaps.31 The estimation in levels reveals the 
interdependences of basic macro variables. More specific, it allows evaluating the pass-
through of exchange rate shocks on prices. The estimation in gaps departs from the 
generalized reaction function (3.7). All variables are expressed in gaps, i.e., as deviations 
from their respective target or equilibrium values, if the equilibrium interest rate, ti , is 
transferred to the left hand side of (3.7): 
(3.16)   ( ) ( ) ( )qqyyii tttttt −+−+−=− δλππγ . 
The interest rate gap, tt ii − , is equivalent to a change in the interest rate and, thus, a change 
in the policy instrument is determined by the gaps of inflation, output, and the exchange rate. 
According to the decomposition procedure the general setup of the models consists of a 
system of four to five equations—depending on the inclusion of a foreign shock. This system 
represents the structure of the economy. On the left hand side of each equation is 
successively one of the four to five variables, i.e., foreign shock or foreign shock gap, 
domestic prices or domestic inflation gap, domestic output or domestic output gap, exchange 
rate or exchange rate gap, and domestic interest rate or domestic interest rate gap. On the 
right hand side are always all four to five variables with their lags. In the system in gaps the 
last equation has the most endogenous variable, the interest rate gap, on the left hand side: 
(3.17) Interest Rate Gapt = Foreign Shock Gapt-n + Inflation Gapt-n + Output Gapt-n  
                                             + Exchange Rate Gapt-n + Interest Rate Gapt-n, 
                                                 
31 See Marcet (2005) on estimating VARs in first differences. 
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where n goes from zero to the chosen lag length. Thus, equation (3.17) can be interpreted as a 
variation of the generalized reaction function (3.16) augmented by a foreign shock and—due 
to the included lags—interest rate smoothing. The foreign shock is used as a proxy for 
activity in the respective trading partners of Chile, Mexico, and Poland, and, therefore, 
separates domestic shocks from foreign shocks in the VARs. In each case the target or 
equilibrium values have been approximated using Hodrick-Prescott filtered values. This 
procedure implies that the central banks react systematically to a deviation of inflation, 
output and exchange rate from their trend. Where available, the inflation gap was calculated 
as the deviation of actual inflation from the announced inflation target.32 To capture the 
disinflation process, the monthly values between two annual targets were approximated by a 
linear trend. All variables, except the interest rate, are based on logs.  
Foreign Shock is approximated by German industrial production in the case of Poland and 
U.S. industrial production in the case of Chile and Mexico. Prices and Inflation are 
constructed using the consumer price index. Output builds on the domestic industrial 
production. All price indexes and industrial production indexes are seasonally adjusted in 
order to remove autocorrelation in the VAR.33  
The last two variables of the model are considered to be potential policy instruments. 
Exchange Rate is incorporated as the exchange rate channel might be a key channel for 
monetary transmission in open economies (Fung 2002). Further, the exchange rate is 
considered a policy instrument as most countries maintain some form of peg or crawling 
band and, thus, may have managed their exchange rate during the 1990s. For the Latin 
American economies the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar and for the central 
European economies the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro and ecu is applied. As the 
Chilean and Polish exchange rate policies exercise a crawling band based on a basket of 
foreign currencies the nominal effective exchange rate is chosen.34 Finally, Interest Rate 
                                                 
32 For Brazil and the Czech Republic the inflation targets are taken form Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (2003: 
47-9) and augmented by EIU Country Profiles and EIU Country Reports. 
33 For Mexico the VAR was estimated with seasonal dummy variables. 
34 In the figures an increase in both, nominal exchange rate as well as nominal effective exchange rate, refers to 
a depreciation. 
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represents the policy instrument of the central bank and is approximated by the short-term 
interest rate.35 
The VARs have been checked for misspecifications. Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 show the 
specifications of the VARs for the countries in Latin America and central Europe, 
respectively. All VARs are estimated with a lag order between three and five to eliminate 
autocorrelation. The fact that the selected countries moved towards inflation targeting and 
more exchange rate flexibility indicates a regime change.36 Hence, for Brazil, Colombia, and 
Poland two separate VARs are estimated and evaluated with respect to the regime change. 
The inclusion of dummy variables for outliers does not change the results qualitatively. 
Rather, they improve the residual properties of the system. The full sets of all impulse 
response functions are given in the Appendix Figures A3.1 to A3.20. 
Table 3.1: VAR Specifications for Countries in Latin America 
Country Levels/Gaps Lags Sample Dummies 
   Brazil    Levels 5   9409–9812   9503, 9607, 9711, 9809 
   Brazil    Gaps 5   9409–9812   9607, 9711, 9809 
   Brazil    Levels 5   9901–0310   0007, 0012, 0204, 0210 
   Brazil    Gaps 4   9901–0310   – 
   Chile    Levels 3   9101–0212   9801, 9809, 0107 
   Chile     Gaps 3   9201–0212   9809, 0107 
   Colombia    Levels 5   9505–9906   9510, 9512, 9703, 9708, 9806 
   Colombia    Gaps 4   9505–9906   – 
   Colombia    Levels 5   9909–0303   0105, 0203, 0211 
   Colombia    Gaps 3   9909–0303   0203, 0211 
   Mexico    Levels 3   9601–0309   seasonal, 9704, 9809, 0204 
   Mexico    Gaps 3   9601–0309   seasonal, 9809 
 
                                                 
35 All data is taken from IMF International Financial Statistics, with the following exceptions. The industrial 
production of Brazil (britot.g), Colombia (cbitot.h), and Poland (poindprna) are taken from datatream. Also 
retrieved from datastream is the historic exchange rate of the euro, respectively the ecu, vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar 
(ecunit$). The Chilean industrial production and the Chilean interest rate (interbank average interest rate on 
non-indexed deposit under 30 days) are taken from the Central Bank of Chile. The Hungarian interest rate is the 
refinancing rate (1190) provided by the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies. 
36 The date for the start of inflation targeting is taken from Fracasso, Genberg, and Wyplosz (2003: 2).  
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Table 3.2: VAR Specifications for Countries in Central Europe 
Country Levels/Gaps Lags Sample Dummies 
   Czech Republic    Levels 4   9801–0309   9807, 9912 
   Czech Republic    Gaps 4   9801–0309   – 
   Hungary    Levels 4   9010–0309   9309, 9406, 9502, 0306 
   Hungary    Gaps 4   9010–0309   9309, 9406, 9502, 0306 
   Poland    Levels 3   9201–9802   – 
   Poland    Gaps 3   9201–9802   – 
   Poland    Levels 3   9803–0212   – 
   Poland    Gaps 3   9803–0212   – 
 
3.3.2  Evidence from Latin America—Case Studies 
Case Study Brazil 
Monetary policy in Brazil during the 1990s was characterized by several disinflation 
processes. In the beginning of the decade the Collor Plan, launched in March 1990, helped to 
stabilize prices for some time. But the disinflation failed and Brazil suffered under 
hyperinflation once again by 1993. In July 1994 the next disinflation process named Real 
Plan used the exchange rate as a nominal anchor. The pressure on the exchange rate 
increased and lead to the Brazilian Crisis in the second half of 1998. In January 1999 Brazil 
moved to a floating exchange rate and in June 1999 the central bank introduced inflation 
targeting as new monetary policy strategy. The test on structural breaks supports to estimate 
two separate VARs. The Chow test on structural breaks in Figure 3.1 shows a clear break 
point in January 1999. Two separate VARs have been estimated starting after the 
introduction of the Real Plan in September 1994 to December 1998 and starting with the 
floating exchange rate regime in January 1999 to October 2003.37  
                                                 
37 The starting date of the sample follows Minella (2003: 610). His VAR estimations last from September 1994 
only till December 2000. The longer dataset till October 2003 reveals a policy switch and permits to compare 
two samples of different monetary policy strategies. 
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Figure 3.1: 1-Step Chow Test for Brazil 
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Note: The graph shows the F-statistic of the 1-Step Chow test for the VAR system. The horizontal line provides 
the 1% significance level for the critical value F(4,28) = 4.084. Break points are 1997:11, 1999:01, 1999:03, 
and 2002:11. 
 
For both sample periods the VARs are estimated in levels and in gaps. The estimation in 
levels reveals significant difference in the pass-through of the exchange rate on prices 
(Figure 3.2). In the first sample period from September 1994 to December 1998 the impulse 
response of prices is insignificant. In contrast, in the second sample period from January 
1999 to October 2003 prices react strongly to shocks in the exchange rate. The response has 
its peak seven to eight months after the shock. Thus, moving to flexible exchange rates 
increased the vulnerability of domestic prices by exchange rate shocks.  
Figure 3.2: Pass-Through in Brazil 
Impulse Response Functions of Prices to Exchange Rate Shock 
Sample Sept. 1994 to Dec. 1998 Sample Mar. 1999 to Oct. 2003 
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Source: Appendix Figures A3.1 and A3.3. 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the reaction function of the central bank, i.e., the impulse response 
functions of the interest rate gap after a shock in the inflation gap, output gap, and the 
exchange rate gap. In the first sample period the interest rate does react to a positive shock in 
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inflation. However, the impulse response function remains insignificant. The response of the 
interest rate to a shock in the output gap is significant. A positive shock in the output gap 
leads to an increase in the interest rate. A depreciation of the currency, i.e., a positive shock 
in the exchange rate gap, induces an instantaneous increase in the interest rate. After the 
following drop the response becomes insignificant. The immediate interest rate response is 
driven by exchange rate policy. In its responses to inflation, output and exchange rate shocks 
the interest rate as the policy instrument supports the exchange rate peg vis-à-vis the U.S. 
dollar.  
Figure 3.3: Impulse Responses of the Interest Rate Gap in Brazil 
Shock to Sample Sept. 1994 to Dec. 1998 Sample Mar. 1999 to Oct. 2003 
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Source: Appendix Figures A3.2 and A3.4. 
 
In the second sample period the interest rate shows a clear response to a shock in inflation. A 
positive deviation of the inflation rate from the inflation target is answered by an increase in 
the interest rate. The interest rate reacts to a positive shock in the output gap with a decline in 
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the first two periods. Afterwards, the response is positive but insignificant. The first part of 
the interest rate response remains counterintuitive. A depreciation of the exchange rate leads 
to a delayed increase in the interest rate. The increase has its peak in the seventh month 
following the shock. The weak immediate response reveals that the exchange rate was not 
tried to be influenced on the short horizon. Rather, the timing of the peak in the seventh 
month coincides with the peak of the pass-through of the exchange rate shock on prices. 
Thus, the pattern suggests that the policy instrument is applied in order to fight inflation 
pressure driven by an exchange rate appreciation. Overall, the three impulse response 
functions are in line with the prevailing exchange rate policy and monetary policy. The 
exchange rate floats and the interest rate is set to accomplish the inflation target. However, 
the response to inflation as well as the exchange rate actually suggests the application of a 
monetary conditions index. 
 
Case Study Chile 
In the case of Chile the test for stability for the sample period January 1992 to December 
2002 reveals some breaks but no structural change (Figure 3.4). These break points are 
driven by outliers in the residuals and fixed by dummy variables.  
The estimation of the VAR in levels shows that the reactions of the interest rate support the 
reactions of the interest rate gap in the second VAR. The analysis of the pass-through in 
Figure 3.5 reveals some impact of the exchange rate on prices, but the impulse response fails 
to be significant.38 
                                                 
38 See also Noton (2003) on the pass-through in Chile. 
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Figure 3.4: 1-Step Chow Test for Chile 
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Note: The graph shows the F-statistic of the 1-Step Chow test for the VAR system. The horizontal line provides 
the 1% significance level for the critical value F(5,57) = 3.3655. Break points are 1998:09 and 2001:07. 
 
Figure 3.5: Pass-Through in Chile 
Impulse Response Function of Prices to Exchange Rate Shock 
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Source: Appendix Figure A3.5, inverted response. 
 
The impulse responses of the interest rate gap to shocks in the inflation gap, the output gap, 
and the exchange rate gap in Figure 3.6 show a very clear pattern. A positive shock in 
inflation leads to a clear increase in the interest rate as implied by an inflation targeting 
regime. This result together with the findings that there was no structural break in the sample 
suggests that an inflation targeting regime has been in place for the full sample period as 
claimed by the Chilean central bank, which announced its first inflation target in September 
1990. In contrast, the IMF study by Schaechter, Stone, and Zelmer (2000) classifies Chile to 
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have introduced full-fledged inflation targeting only in September 1999, when Chile 
implemented the complete framework of an inflation targeting regime.39 
Figure 3.6: Impulse Responses of the Interest Rate Gap in Chile 
Shock to   
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Source: Appendix Figure A3.6, inverted response for the exchange rate gap. 
 
A positive output shock leads to a slight increase in the interest rate. Thus, this result 
suggests some weak form of output smoothing. Schmidt-Hebbel and Tapia (2002: 140-42), 
who estimate a monetary policy reaction function in the tradition of Clarida (2001) and 
Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2000), find the coefficient of the output gap significant, similar to 
the coefficient of the inflation rate and indicating an anti-cyclical policy. 
A depreciation of the exchange rate has hardly any impact on the interest rate. Schmidt-
Hebbel and Tapia (2002: 142) find in their estimated reaction function a significant 
coefficient for a reaction of the interest rate to an exchange rate misalignment. Thus, the 
central bank reacts to an overvaluation with a lower interest rate.  
However, evaluating the role of the exchange rate has some caveats. The data contains some 
clear outliers. When the exchange rate came under pressure due to the Asian and Russian 
crises the interest rate was increased abruptly.40 This exchange rate policy is not captured 
within the VAR as the outliers are removed by dummy variables. Further, the exchange rate 
                                                 
39 Of course, this empirical analysis does not investigate whether the legal framework is consistent with formal 
inflation targeting. 
40 Jonas and Mishkin (2003) call this focus on the exchange rate in the case of the Asian crisis a “serious policy 
mistake.” The Central Bank of Chile was afraid of loosing its credibility in the face of financial turmoil. 
Actually, the Asian crisis was a terms of trade shock where the central bank should have eased monetary policy. 
Instead, the increase in the interest rate led to an undershooting of the inflation target and Chile’s first recession 
of the 1990s. 
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can be influenced by other instruments and policies (Wickham 2002: 22). Schmidt-Hebbel 
and Tapia (2002: 139) report, for instance, that sterilized foreign exchange interventions took 
place even in the second half of 2001—a long time after the exchange rate regime moved to a 
formal pure float. Actually, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005: 1618) state in their study 
on de facto exchange rate regimes: “Interestingly, in the case of Chile the classification 
indicates that it has virtually run a pure float since the early 80s, in spite of a complex system 
of crawling pegs and exchange rate bands that were finally discontinued in 1999.” As in the 
case of Poland, the properties of a pure float were fulfilled by the exchange rate much earlier 
than the official classification. This delay with respect to the announcement of flexible 
exchange rates might be due to some political economy arguments (Morandé and Tapia 
2002: 7), as each system creates pressure groups that support the status quo.  
Williamson (2000: 40-5) discusses the role of the Chilean capital controls. He concludes that 
these capital controls allowed the central bank some autonomy in setting the interest rate. 
Thus, the interest rate could be set with the target of keeping domestic inflation down and it 
was not limited in its effectiveness by capital inflows and corresponding exchange rate 
movements. 
Summing up, Chilean monetary policy is consistent with inflation targeting. There is some 
evidence for exchange rate smoothing but the lack of a short-run reaction of the interest rate 
to an exchange rate shock does not support monetary policy strategies like the monetary 
conditions index or some form of managed floating. The outliers identified in the stability 
test reveal that the interest rate instrument was used when the currency came under pressure 
from contagion crisis. Additional policy instruments, such as interventions in the foreign 
exchange market, might have been used even recently to influence the exchange rate. 
Altogether, the crawling band was not a nominal anchor; rather, it might have been a 
“parachute” that remained folded, in case contagion from crises in other countries threatened.  
 
Case Study Colombia 
In September 1999 Colombia stopped using the exchange band and introduced inflation 
targeting as new monetary policy strategy. These events motivate to split the sample at that 
date although the Chow test in Figure 3.7 does not indicate a structural break. The first 
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sample period covers May 1995 to June 1999 and the second sample period covers 
September 1999 to March 2003. Now, the estimations allow evaluating differences in the 
responses of the two sample periods. 
Figure 3.7: 1-Step Chow Test for Colombia 
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Note: The graph shows the F-statistic of the 1-Step Chow test for the VAR system. The horizontal line provides 
the 1% significance level for the critical value F(4,8) = 7.01. Break points at the 5% significance level are 
1998:06, 1998:09, and 2002:03. 
 
Figure 3.8 shows the pass-through effect derived from the estimations in levels for the two 
samples. In the first sample period from May 1994 to June 1999, the depreciation of the 
exchange rate induces a reduction of the price level. Afterwards, prices increase although this 
part of the impulse response is insignificant. In the second sample period from September 
1999 to March 2003 prices increase following an exchange rate shock. Again, this response 
is hardly significant. Overall, the conclusions on the pass-through from the evaluation of 
these impulse response functions have to remain weak. 
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Figure 3.8: Pass-Through in Colombia 
Impulse Response Functions of Prices to Exchange Rate Shock 
Sample May 1994 to June 1999 Sample Sept. 1999 to Mar. 2003 
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Source: Appendix Figures A3.7 and A3.9. 
 
Evaluating the reaction of the interest rate gap in Figure 3.9 reveals stronger results. In the 
first sample period the response of the interest rate to a shock in the inflation gap is 
insignificant. The response to the output gap is only significant between the fourth and the 
ninth period following the shock, indicating that positive output shocks are answered by an 
increase in the interest rate with a delay of about half a year. Concerning a shock in the 
deviation of the exchange rate from its trend, the interest rate drops slightly instantaneous but 
rises significantly in the following period. Afterwards, the impulse response remains 
insignificant. The increase in the interest rate supports some form of exchange rate 
management. 
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Figure 3.9: Impulse Responses of the Interest Rate Gap in Colombia 
Shock to Sample May 1995 to June 1999 Sample Sept. 1999 to Mar. 2003 
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Source: Appendix Figures A3.8 and A3.10. 
 
In the second sample period the interest rate increases immediately in case of a shock to the 
inflation rate. Subsequently, the response is insignificant. The response to the output gap has 
a clear peak in the third month, whereas the response to the exchange rate gap has its peak in 
the sixth month after the shock. The immediate response to inflation and the strong response 
to the output gap are more in line with a Taylor rule than with strict inflation targeting. Still, 
the exchange rate matters on a medium horizon. Comparing the two samples reveals an 
increase in the role of inflation and a move in the denotation of the exchange rate from the 
short to the medium horizon. Thus, Colombia heads credibly towards inflation targeting as 
long as the inflation targets are met. 
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Case Study Mexico 
Mexico was heavily disturbed by a crisis in 1994. The following years do not show a 
structural break in the Chow test in Figure 3.10 except for a strong outlier due to the 
Brazilian Crisis in September 1998. In January 1999 the central bank introduced inflation 
targeting as new monetary policy strategy. Due to the constraints on the length of the sample 
by the Mexican Crisis and the missing structural break in the Chow test only a single VAR is 
estimated. Otherwise, the sample preceding inflation targeting would have been to short. 
Therefore, the VAR covers the sample period from January 1996 to September 2003.  
Figure 3.10: 1-Step Chow Test for Mexico 
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Note: The graph shows the F-statistic of the 1-Step Chow test for the VAR system. The horizontal line provides 
the 1% significance level for the critical value F(4,56) = 3.686. Break points are 1998:09 and 2002:04. 
 
Figure 3.11 shows the reaction function of prices to a shock in the exchange rate. The pattern 
indicates a strong pass-through of the exchange rate on prices. The shock does not return to 
the zero line and die out due to non-stationarity of prices. 
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Figure 3.11: Pass-Through in Mexico 
Impulse Response Function of Prices to Exchange Rate Shock 
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Source: Appendix Figure A3.11. 
 
The impulse response functions of the interest rate gap for the VAR estimated in gaps are 
displayed in Figure 3.12. Although the interest rate does increase after a shock in the 
inflation gap this response just fails to be significant. A positive output gap shock leads to a 
reduction of the interest rate gap. This pattern is not consistent with the expected response of 
a Taylor rule. The response of the interest rate to the exchange rate shock is positive and very 
significant. The interest rate changes immediately with the shock.  
Figure 3.12: Impulse Responses of the Interest Rate Gap in Mexico 
Shock to    
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Source: Appendix Figure A3.12. 
 
Summing up, with respect to the Mexican Crisis it was not possible to spilt the sample and to 
analyze the introduction of inflation targeting in contrast to the previous monetary policy. 
The response to inflation remained weak, whereas the response to the deviation from the 
trend of the exchange rate was particularly strong. Monetary policy is highly driven by the 
development of the exchange rate. Inflation and output are not relevant. 
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3.3.3  Evidence from Central Europe—Case Studies 
Case Study Czech Republic 
The sample period for the Czech Republic starts with the introduction of inflation targeting in 
January 1998 and covers till September 2003. The Chow break point test in Figure 3.13 
reveals a single outlier in January 2000. This outlier does not coincide with changes in 
exchange rate or monetary policies. 
Figure 3.13: 1-Step Chow Test for the Czech Republic 
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Note: The graph shows the F-statistic of the 1-Step Chow test for the VAR system. The horizontal line provides 
the 1% significance level for the critical value F(4,24) = 4.22. Break point is 2000:01. 
 
Figure 3.14 shows the response of prices to an exchange rate shocks in the VAR estimation 
in levels. As in the case of other emerging market economies the exchange rate has a 
significant pass-through on prices. The impact peaks three quarters after the shock. Then the 
shock begins to die out. 
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Figure 3.14: Pass-Through in the Czech Republic 
Impulse Response Function of Prices to Exchange Rate Shock 
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Source: Appendix Figure A3.13. 
 
The impulse responses of the interest rate gap to shocks in the inflation gap, the output gap, 
and the exchange rate gap in Figure 3.15 also show a very clear pattern. A positive shock in 
the deviation of inflation from its target leads to an instantaneous increase of the interest rate. 
This response lasts only on a very short horizon and becomes insignificant in the second 
month following the shock.  
Figure 3.15: Impulse Responses of the Interest Rate Gap in the Czech Republic 
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Source: Appendix Figure A3.14. 
 
The interest rate also increases due to a shock to the output gap. Here, the peak of the 
response is a quarter of a year after the shock. A shock in the exchange rate leads to an 
increase in the interest rate on the medium horizon. The response’s peak is half a year after 
the shock. All three variables have an impact on the monetary policy instrument but not in 
the same way. The timing goes from the most instantaneous reaction of the interest rate to 
inflation over the three months delayed reaction to the output gap to the six months delayed 
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reaction to the exchange rate. Despite a strong commitment towards the inflation target, the 
central bank pays attention to the developments of output and the exchange rate.  
 
Case Study Hungary 
In Figure 3.16 the Chow break point test does not indicate a structural break when the 
Hungarian central bank introduces inflation targeting in July 2001. The period of inflation 
targeting itself remains yet to short to contrast different monetary policy strategies in 
Hungary. The estimations cover October 1990 to September 2003.  
Figure 3.16: 1-Step Chow Test for Hungary 
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Note: The graph shows the F-statistic of the 1-Step Chow test for the VAR system. The horizontal line provides 
the 1% significance level for the critical value F(4,128) = 3.479. Break points are 1993:04, 1993:09, 1993:12, 
1994:06, 2003:01, and 2003:06. 
 
The pass-through is shown in Figure 3.17. There is no immediate effect of the exchange rate 
on prices. In fact, there is a delay of half a year until prices increase due to a shock in the 
exchange rate.  
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Figure 3.17: Pass-Through in Hungary 
Impulse Response Function of Prices to Exchange Rate Shock 
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Source: Appendix Figure A3.15. 
 
Figure 3.18 shows the responses of the interest rate gap from the estimation of the VAR in 
gaps. A shock to the inflation gap is answered by an immediate decline in the interest rate 
before the response gets insignificant. This response does not suggest a strong commitment 
of the central bank to keep inflation down. The rather long sample covers only a small period 
of inflation targeting. The preceding monetary policy strategies seem to dominate the 
estimation.  
Figure 3.18: Impulse Responses of the Interest Rate Gap in Hungary 
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Source: Appendix Figure A3.16. 
 
The instantaneous reaction of the interest rate to the output gap is positive but insignificant. It 
takes almost a year till the response becomes significant again. The response of the interest 
rate to a shock in the exchange rate gap is positive and significant. The peak of the response 
is in the seventh month after the shock. The impulse responses reveal that exchange rate 
movements determine the monetary policy instrument in Hungary.  
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Case Study Poland 
The empirical analysis for Poland is in part a re-estimation of Gottschalk and Moore (2001) 
with two deviations.41 First, the VAR is also estimated using gaps and not only levels of the 
variables. Second, the VAR is estimated with an extended dataset from January 1992 to 
December 2002. The longer dataset reveals a policy switch in the sample period when 
checking the stability of the system. The Chow break point test for the equation of the 
exchange rate gap detects some breaks in the sample. Figure 3.19 shows that the first break 
point is in March 1998.  
Figure 3.19: 1-Step Chow Test for Poland 
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Note: The graph shows the F-statistic of the 1-Step Chow test for the equation of the exchange rate gap. The 
horizontal line provides the 1% significance level for the critical value F(1,55) = 7.1375. Break points are 
1998:03, 1998:09, 2001:07, and 2002:07. 
 
This finding is consistent with Polish exchange rate policy. There was a period of 
inconsistency between the de jure and the de facto exchange rate regime because the Polish 
central bank introduced the new monetary policy strategy already in 1998, but the official 
move to pure floating exchange rates took place in April 2000 as it had to be undertaken 
jointly by the Cabinet and the central bank (Kokoszczyński 2002: 201-202). However, on 
February 26th 1998 the crawling band around the exchange rate was widened and Wickham 
(2002: 22) also finds a break point on that date based on the volatility in the variance of 
returns in daily exchange rate data. Summing up, between February 1998 and March 1998 is 
a plausible break point. Two separate VARs have been estimated. The first VAR covers the 
                                                 
41 See Wróbel and Pawłowska (2002) for evidence on the monetary transmission mechanism in Poland between 
1995 and 2002. 
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sample period from January 1992 to February 1998 and the second VAR covers the sample 
period from March 1998 to December 2002. In September 1998 the Polish central bank 
announced its first inflation target. Thus, the second sample period is not only characterized 
by a flexible exchange rate regime but also by an inflation targeting regime. 
The estimations of the VARs in levels show that the pass-through significantly differs 
between the two samples (Figure 3.20). In the first sample, the exchange rate shock itself is 
more persistent than in the second sample. Prices react in the first sample sooner to the 
exchange rate shock than in the second sample. Both responses are in line with the prevailing 
exchange rate regimes. In the first sample period the currency is pegged to the nominal 
exchange rate. Under fixed exchange rates, exchange rate changes were expected to be 
permanent and have been passed on to prices. Whereas in the second sample period with 
flexible exchange rates, exchange rate changes were expected to be temporary. Hence, there 
have been moderate price adjustments, but a short-run impact of the nominal—and because 
of delayed price adjustment also real—exchange rate shock. 
Figure 3.20: Pass-Through in Poland 
Impulse Response Functions of Prices to Exchange Rate Shock 
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Source: Appendix Figures A3.17 and A3.19, inverted responses. 
 
Figure 3.21 shows the reaction function of the central bank. In the first sample the interest 
rate reacts to a positive shock in inflation. Immediately after the spike, one observes an 
insignificant drop of the interest rate before the shock then dies out smoothly. The response 
of the interest rate to a shock in the output gap is quite clear. A positive shock in output is 
answered by an increase of the interest rate. Gottschalk and Moore (2001: 32) get a 
qualitatively similar result. They interpret the output shock as a demand shock and monetary 
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policy responding with a tightening of monetary conditions. Thus, the impulse response of 
the interest rate to the shock in output suggests some form of activist monetary policy. 
Overall, these two impulse responses support the disinflation process along with output 
smoothing, but both responses are not very pronounced. 
A depreciation, i.e., a positive shock in the exchange rate gap, is answered by an immediate 
increase of the interest rate, but this response fails to be significant. Two periods later the 
interest rate moves in the opposite direction. The immediate rise in the interest rate after the 
exchange rate shock is supported by the estimations in levels and the results in Gottschalk 
and Moore (2001). Gottschalk and Moore (2001: 33) interpret the response of the interest 
rate as a reaction of the central bank to offset the loosening in the monetary conditions 
caused by the exchange rate shock. Their interpretation can be augmented to the possibility 
of managing the exchange rate by interest rate policy. The immediate increase of the interest 
rate offsets the depreciation, while the later decline of the interest rate smoothes exchange 
rate adjustment. Hence, the interest rate policy is consistent with the prevailing crawling 
band. The exchange rate is the nominal anchor during the disinflation process. Therefore, the 
interest rate is set in order to keep the exchange rate in its band. 
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Figure 3.21: Impulse Responses of the Interest Rate Gap in Poland 
Shock to Sample Jan. 1992 to Feb. 1998 Sample Mar. 1998 to Dec. 2002 
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Source: Appendix Figures A3.18 and A3.20, inverted responses for the exchange rate gap. 
 
In the second sample, the interest rate responds with a clear increase to a shock in inflation. 
The behavior is consistent with what one would expect of the new monetary policy regime, 
namely, inflation targeting. Also, the response of the interest rate to a shock in output is 
significant, although the immediate response is not significant. Based on these two impulse 
response functions the central bank might apply a Taylor rule with a strong weight on 
inflation deviations.  
A depreciation of the exchange rate is answered with an increase of the interest rate on the 
medium horizon. In contrast to the earlier sample there is no immediate reaction. The pattern 
suggests that the exchange rate is in the new regime not as important as in the earlier regime 
in the short run. Monetary policy is committed to keeping inflation down. Still, the central 
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bank pays some attention to the development of the exchange rate, as suggested by the 
delayed but persistent response. Thus, the conducted monetary policy would be also 
consistent with a monetary conditions index or some form of managed floating.  
Overall, Poland shows a remarkable regime change. Not only that there is a clear break point 
between February and March 1998, but also the impulse response functions in the two 
samples show substantial differences in their adjustment patterns. Inflation gains as a target 
of monetary policy, whereas the role of the exchange rate moves from the short run to the 
medium run. 
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3.4  Conclusions  
A generalized reaction function, where changes in the interest rate—approximated by the 
interest rate gap—are determined by the deviations of inflation rate, output, and exchange 
rate from their respective targets, has been analyzed with the help of vector autoregressive 
models (VARs) for economies in Latin America and the CEEC. All these seven emerging 
market economies have in common that they mastered disinflation and introduced inflation 
targeting. The analysis revealed the importance of different variables for monetary policy 
and, in particular, the role of the exchange rate in inflation targeting regimes.  
With respect to the empirical analysis the countries are assorted into three groups. First, there 
are those economies were it was possible to identify a structural break. Comparing the two 
different sample periods of Brazil, Colombia, and Poland reveals a change in the central 
bank’s conduct of monetary policy with the introduction of inflation targeting. Second, there 
is Chile with the most experienced inflation targeting central bank in a group on its own. 
Third, there are those economies with constraints on the length of the sample. In Mexico it is 
due to the Mexican Crisis in 1994, in the Czech Republic the currency came into existence 
only in January 1993, and in Hungary inflation targeting was introduced just in July 2001. In 
these three countries it was not possible to estimate and compare two separate samples.  
Concerning the pass-through of the exchange rate on prices, the first group of countries does 
not show a common pattern in the pass-through. Most noticeable are the differences between 
Brazil and Poland. As Brazil moved from a fixed to a flexible exchange rate regime the pass-
through of the exchange rate on prices increased. The flexible exchange rate revealed the 
importance of exchange rate movements for the economy. In contrast, the pass-through 
reduced in Poland. With the shift towards flexible exchange rates the economy become more 
mature and thus less vulnerable by exchange rate movements. In Colombia the evaluation of 
the pass-through remains weak. In the second group, i.e., in Chile, the exchange rate has only 
a weak impact on prices. This pattern indicates—similar to the second sample period of 
Poland—a stable and mature economy. In the third group, consisting of the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, and Mexico, the pass-through is strong again. Exchange rates matter for the 
development of prices. 
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Concerning the role of the exchange rate in the reaction function of the central bank, the 
countries in the first group share a similar pattern. Most prominent are the results for Brazil. 
Compared to the first sample period, the second sample period revealed an increase in the 
strength of the reaction of the interest rate gap to a shock in the inflation gap. This response 
is well in line with the introduction of inflation targeting. However, the exchange rate still 
matters. The peak of the response moved from an immediate reaction towards the medium 
horizon. Responses in Colombia and Poland are alike. In Chile, monetary policy was 
characterized by the gradual reduction of inflation with the help of announced inflation 
targets. This policy is captured well in the empirical results by the very strong response of the 
interest rate to shocks in inflation. At the same time, Chile was still operating under a 
crawling band. But this exchange rate policy is not captured by the VAR. Outliers suggest 
that only special events such as crises in other countries led to more active exchange rate 
management. In the third group, the responses of the Czech interest rate gap have a 
conspicuous timing. The impulse response functions reveal the operating horizon of the 
central bank for each variable. The response to inflation is on the very short horizon, slightly 
later is the response to output and the response to the exchange rate is on the medium 
horizon. In Hungary and Mexico, the reactions of the interest rate are dominated by a strong 
response to exchange rate shocks. In both countries, monetary policy is driven by the 
development of the exchange rate.  
Summing up, Chile’s inflation targeting framework has already a strong reputation. Poland 
and—to a weaker degree—Brazil, Colombia, and the Czech Republic changed their 
monetary policy and introduced inflation targeting. Yet, these countries track the 
development of their exchange rates, whereas monetary policy in Hungary and Mexico is still 
dominated by the exchange rate.  
The three CEEC central banks actually implemented inflation targeting regimes and—
although to different degrees—did not give up exchange rate targeting completely. As 
mentioned in Chapter 2, this is consistent with a medium-term strategy of monetary 
integration into the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). However, stabilizing 
the exchange rate against the euro may have a cost depending on integration with third 
countries. 
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Appendix 
Figure A3.1: Impulse Response Functions for Brazil, 1994:09 – 1998:12 
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Figure A3.2: IRFs for Brazil Using Gaps, 1994:09 – 1998:12 
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Figure A3.3: Impulse Response Functions for Brazil, 1999:03 – 2003:10 
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Figure A3.4: IRFs for Brazil Using Gaps, 1999:03 – 2003:10 
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Figure A3.5: Impulse Response Functions for Chile, 1991:01 – 2002:12 
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Source: Hammermann (2005: Appendix Figure A3a). 
 
Figure A3.6: IRFs for Chile Using Gaps, 1992:01 – 2002:12 
Shock to
Re
sp
on
se
 o
f
Foreign Shock Ga
Inflation Gap
Output Gap
NEER Gap
Interest Gap
Foreign Shock Ga
Foreign Shock Ga
Inflation Gap
Inflation Gap
Output Gap
Output Gap
NEER Gap
NEER Gap
Interest Gap
Interest Gap
0 5 10 15
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0 5 10 15
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0 5 10 15
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0 5 10 15
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0 5 10 15
-0.04
-0.02
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0 5 10 15
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 5 10 15
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 5 10 15
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 5 10 15
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 5 10 15
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 5 10 15
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0 5 10 15
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0 5 10 15
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0 5 10 15
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0 5 10 15
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0 5 10 15
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 5 10 15
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 5 10 15
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 5 10 15
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 5 10 15
-0.1
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0 5 10 15
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0 5 10 15
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0 5 10 15
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0 5 10 15
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0 5 10 15
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
 
  76 
 
 
 
Figure A3.7: Impulse Response Functions for Colombia, 1995:05 – 1999:06 
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Figure A3.8: IRFs for Colombia Using Gaps, 1995:05 – 1999:06 
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Figure A3.9: Impulse Response Functions for Colombia, 1999:09 – 2003:03 
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Figure A3.10: IRFs for Colombia Using Gaps, 1999:09 – 2003:03 
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Figure A3.11: Impulse Response Functions for Mexico, 1996:01 – 2003:09 
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Figure A3.12: IRFs for Mexico Using Gaps, 1996:01 – 2003:09 
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Figure A3.13: Impulse Response Functions for the Czech Republic, 1998:01 – 2003:09 
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Figure A3.14: IRFs for the Czech Republic Using Gaps, 1998:01 – 2003:09 
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Figure A3.15: Impulse Response Functions for Hungary, 1990:01 – 2003:09 
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Figure A3.16: IRFs for Hungary Using Gaps, 1990:01 – 2003:09 
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Figure A3.17: Impulse Response Functions for Poland, 1992:01 – 1998:02 
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Source: Hammermann (2005: Appendix Figure A1a). 
 
Figure A3.18: IRFs for Poland Using Gaps, 1992:01 – 1998:02 
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Figure A3.19: Impulse Response Functions for Poland, 1998:03 – 2002:12 
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Source: Hammermann (2005: Appendix Figure A2a). 
 
Figure A3.20: IRFs for Poland Using Gaps, 1998:03 – 2002:12 
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4 Inflation Targeting and Monetary Integration under ERM 2: 
Modeling Third-Country Effects from Production Sharing 
4.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we analyze the potential cost of regional monetary integration, i.e., targeting 
the exchange rate to an anchor currency, while being at the same time integrated with third 
countries. Recent empirical papers point to the relevance of outsourcing and offshoring for 
the transmission of business cycle shocks and thereby for the conduct of monetary policy 
(see, among others, Fontagné and Freudenberg 1999, Imbs 2004, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sørensen, 
and Yosha 2003, Kose, Otrok and Whiteman 2003, Kose, Prasad, and Terrones 2003, IMF 
2007). This is especially true for the countries that are about to join the European Economic 
and Monetary Union (EMU), which have to stay for two years in the European Exchange 
Rate Mechanism (ERM 2) and therefore target inflation and the exchange rate 
simultaneously. These countries are significantly integrated with third countries through the 
production chain. How do external shocks originating from a third country affect monetary 
policy under ERM 2?  
Up to now, the empirical analysis had to focus on the early years characterized by inflation 
stabilization. The central and eastern European countries (CEEC) had to deal with the 
structural change from centrally planned to market economies. In the beginning of the 1990s, 
price liberalization and the abolition of price controls led to hyperinflation. The situation got 
stabilized by pegging the exchange rate. When the economies were ready for a more 
independent monetary policy, the central banks of the Czech Republic (1998), Poland (1998), 
Hungary (2001), and Slovakia (2005)42 introduced inflation targeting. Mohanty and Klau 
(2005) and Frömmel and Schobert (2006) estimate Taylor rules in these inflation targeting 
countries. Krusec (2005) investigates the transmission mechanism under inflation targeting in 
a VECM, whereas Chapter 3 showed the reaction of the interest rate to shocks in inflation, 
output, and the exchange rate in a VAR.  
                                                 
42 Slovakia had an implicit inflation target since 1999. 
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Empirical studies could not yet analyze how central banks actually solve the trade-off 
between inflation and exchange rate stabilization under ERM 2 (see Orlowski and Rybinski 
2006).43 In November 2005, Slovakia was the first inflation targeting country to move into 
ERM 2. In the next years, other countries of the CEEC that currently target the inflation rate 
may join ERM 2 and thus target the exchange rate at the same time. ERM 2 allows only for 
exchange rate movements within a ±15 percent band. After two successful years in ERM 2 
and fulfillment of the other convergence criteria specified in the treaty of Maastricht, 
countries would adopt the euro. In any case, the results of Chapter 3 support the assumption 
that even the inflation targeters among the CEEC did not completely give up exchange rate 
targeting, which was, of course, more dominant during the initial phase of disinflation and 
structural change. Incorporating the exchange rate in the conduct of monetary policy may be 
interpreted as simulating ERM 2, while still avoiding its strictly binding rules. 
The theoretical literature looks either at the strategic role of targeting the exchange rate in 
competitive devaluations and its role as a shock absorber or rejects the role for targeting the 
exchange rate as the central bank should target domestic inflation and allow the exchange 
rate to float (Clarida, Galí, and Gertler 2001). Svensson (2000) shows in his simulations that 
a Taylor rule without an exchange rate term is a robust monetary policy strategy despite 
ignoring part of the available information. De Paoli (2006) finds only for implausibly high 
elasticities of substitution that exchange rate targeting enters the optimal monetary policy 
(see also Galí 2008).  
Nonetheless, the existing models are incomplete as they do not address any potential trade-
off between the strategic role of the exchange rate and achieving an announced inflation 
target given third-country effects. As shown in Table 4.1, central European inflation targeting 
countries are well integrated into production sharing with the euro area, documented by high 
trade shares, but a substantial share of their trade is still with the rest of the world (see also 
Crespo and Fontoura 2007).  
                                                 
43 The currency board countries Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are already in ERM 2; Slovenia adopted the euro 
in January 2007. 
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   Table 4.1: Trade Shares and Openness of Central European Inflation Targeting Countries  
                    and the Euro Area in 2006 
 Imports  Exports 
 Euro Area Rest of the World  Euro Area 
Rest of the 
World 
Openness 
Czech Republic 0.59 0.41  0.58 0.42 1.31 
Hungary 0.52 0.48  0.55 0.45 1.35 
Poland 0.56 0.44  0.53 0.47 0.69 
Slovakia 0.42 0.58  0.52 0.49 1.56 
Average IT Countries 0.52 0.48  0.54 0.46 1.23 
Euro Area 0.49 0.51  0.50 0.50 0.65 
Source: Eurostat and IFS. 
Note: Openness is measured as imports and exports over GDP. 
 
Because a two-country model cannot adequately cope with potential third-country effects, we 
develop a New Keynesian three-country model. As a starting point, we take a three-country 
model in which Teo (2005) analyzes the choice of invoice currency in Asia but that does not 
address the role of monetary policy. We, therefore, integrate Teo’s three-country framework 
into a model that analyzes monetary policy in a New Keynesian two-country model 
developed by Monacelli (2001). As a result, we are able to analyze regional monetary 
integration based on a dynamic, microfounded model allowing for third-country effects. 
Additionally, following Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini, and Tille (2000), we incorporate a nested 
consumption basket to distinguish between goods produced in two periphery countries and a 
core country. 
The model develops a set of equations for each of the three countries A, B, and C. Country A 
is the country under consideration and may represent a CEEC country integrating into EMU 
by targeting the euro as its anchor currency. Country B constitutes the third country, which is 
not directly affected by the European integration process and, therefore, stays outside 
ERM 2. Country B may represent either another transition country like Russia or the rest of 
the world. Both countries A and B together form the periphery, while country C represents 
the core country, which also provides the anchor currency for country A. Hence, country C 
features the euro area. 
We analyze monetary policy in this setting given alternative degrees of integration between 
the euro area (core country C), an inflation targeting accession country like the Czech 
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Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia (country A), and a non-EU country or the rest of 
the world as the third country (country B). As a short-cut for modeling production linkages 
we use alternative elasticities in consumption baskets. This framework allows us to trace the 
transmission mechanism of a third-country technology shock. Evaluating the central bank 
loss function for different simple rules and determining the corresponding optimal simple 
rules allows us to assess the costs of ERM 2 and derive the implications of production 
sharing for monetary policy. As a robustness check, we introduce home bias in consumption. 
Our results show that a Taylor rule extended for an exchange rate term is a good simple rule 
for different kinds of integration with a third country. Nevertheless, the costs of ERM 2 in 
terms of a traditional central bank loss function are considerable. The chapter proceeds as 
follows. In the second section, we derive the New Keynesian three-country model. In the 
third section, we present the simulation results. The fourth section concludes. 
 
4.2 A New Keynesian Three-Country Model for Analyzing Optimal Monetary Rules 
under ERM 2 
The New Keynesian three-country model incorporates explicit microfoundations with 
dynamic and intertemporal effects as well as Keynesian building blocks such as nominal 
rigidities and monopolistic competition. Following the microfoundation of the model, all 
individuals are at the same time consumers and producers. In their role as consumers, we 
look at the demand side of the economy. The representative household maximizes its utility 
by deciding about its optimal consumption. In the individuals’ role as producers, we look at 
the supply side of the economy. The representative firm maximizes its profits by deciding 
about the product’s optimal price. Putting the resulting optimality conditions together, the 
New Keynesian model is made of three core equations for each country. First, the dynamic 
IS curve stems form the household’s choice on the optimal consumption path. Second, the 
New Keynesian Phillips curve stems from the firm’s choice on the optimal price. Third, the 
model is closed with a monetary policy rule. These three equations form together with 
market clearing and international risk sharing the three-country model. The derivation 
follows along the lines of Galí and Monacelli (2005). 
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4.2.1 Households 
The representative household in country i, i=A, B, C, maximizes the expected lifetime utility 
(4.1)  ( )∑∞
=0
0 ,
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
t LCUE β , 
where β  is the subjective discount factor, C is consumption and L are hours worked, with 
the respective period utility 
(4.2)  
γμ
γμ
+−
+−−=
11
1
1
1
1 i
t
i
t
i
t LCU , 
where μ  is the risk aversion and γ  the inverse of the elasticity of labor supply. Households 
consume from a nested consumption basket as in Corsetti, Pesenti, Roubini, and Tille (2000). 
The utility-based consumption basket distinguishes between goods from the periphery P and 
the center C, where nP is the size of the periphery relative to the center  
(4.3)  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )11,11,1 1 −−− −+= θθθθθθθθ i tCPi tPPit CnCnC . 
The periphery itself is made up of the two countries A and B, where nA is the size of 
country A relative to country B. The consumption basket for the periphery is given by  
(4.4)  ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )11,11,1, 1 −−− −+= ψψψψψψψψ i tBAi tAAi tP CnCnC . 
Taken together, the size of country A is nP nA, of country B is nP (1– nA) and of the center C is 
(1– nP). The nested consumption basket for country i, i=A,B,C, is  
(4.5)  
( )[ ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( ) ] ( ).1
1
11
,
1
111
,
11
,
11
−−
−−−−
−+
−+=
θθθθθ
θθψψψψψψψψθ
i
tCP
i
tBA
i
tAAP
i
t
Cn
CnCnnC
 
Introducing home bias in consumption changes the trade shares. If consumers in each country 
prefer home goods over foreign goods, the degree of openness, η, is smaller than one. The 
nested consumption baskets for each country depend on the intratemporal elasticity of 
substitution between goods from the center versus the periphery, θ, as well as on the 
intratemporal elasticity of substitution between goods from country A versus country B, i.e., 
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between the two goods from the periphery, ψ. Thus, the nested consumption baskets with 
home bias are given by 
(4.6)  
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The consumption indexes for the three countries i, i=A,B,C, are given by 
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where the subscript refers to the country of production and the superscript refers to the 
country of consumption. The elasticity of substitution for goods of different brands z, i.e., 
“varieties” is given by φ .  
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Prices 
The utility-based price indexes are defined analogously to the consumption basket and are 
therefore broken down into the overall index 
(4.12)  ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )θθθ −−− −+= 111,1, 1 i tCPi tPPit PnPnP  
and the sub-index for prices of goods from the two periphery countries 
(4.13)  ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )ψψψ −−− −+= 111,1,, 1 i tBAi tAAi tP PnPnP . 
As with the consumption basket, introducing home bias renders the consumer price index for 
each country 
(4.14)  
( )[ ][ ( )[ ]( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )
( )( ) ] ( )θθ
θψψψ
η
ηηη
−−
−−−−
−+
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−−−−=
111
,
1111
,
1
,
1
11111
A
tCP
A
tBA
A
tAAP
A
t
Pn
PnPnnP
 
(4.15)  
( )[ ][ ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )
( )( ) ] ( )θθ
θψψψ
η
ηηη
−−
−−−−
−+
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −+−−=
111
,
1111
,
1
,
1
111
B
tCP
B
tBA
B
tAAP
B
t
Pn
PnPnnP
 
(4.16)  ( ) ( )( )[ ] ( ) ( )( ) ( )θθθψψψ ηη −−−−−− ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ −+⎟⎠⎞⎜⎝⎛ −+=
11
1
,
1111
,
1
, 11
C
tCP
C
tBA
C
tAAP
C
t PnPnPnnP  
with  
(4.17)  ( )( ) ( )φφ −− ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ∫=
11
0
1
,,
1
AP nn i tA
AP
i
tA dzzPnn
P  
(4.18)  ( ) ( )( )
( )φφ −−
⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ∫−=
111
,, 1
1
P
AP
n
nn
i
tB
AP
i
tB dzzPnn
P  
(4.19)  ( )( ) ( )φφ −− ⎥⎦⎤⎢⎣⎡ ∫−=
11
1 1
,, 1
1
Pn
i
tC
P
i
tC dzzPn
P  
where itiP ,  is the price index of domestic goods or producer price index (PPI) in country i. 
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Exchange Rates 
The terms of trade between country i and country i′  are defined as the relative price of 
imports 
(4.20)  i
ti
i
tii
ti P
P
ToT
,
,
,
′
′ = , 
i.e., the price of imported goods (produced in country i′ ) in home (country i) currency 
relative to the price of home goods.  
For convenience, we define the following CPI-PPI ratios, gi,t(ToT), for each country i. The 
expression links CPI prices and domestic prices to the terms of trade (Faia and Monacelli 
2004, 2007) 
(4.21)  
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Households maximize their lifetime utility subject to the period budget constraint,  
(4.24)  it
i
t
i
t
i
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,
1,
11
1
, 
where nominal bonds, itB , are state-contingent claims denominated only in country C’s 
currency, ',
i
tiS  is the nominal exchange rate defined as the price of currency 'i  in currency i, 
( )tttt hhQQ 11, ++ ≡  is the period-t price of one unit of country C’s currency in state ht+1 divided 
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by the probability of occurrence of that state,44 itW  is the nominal wage; 
i
tL  are hours 
worked, and itΨ  are nominal profits of the domestic monopolistic firms, which shares are 
owned by domestic residents. Complete markets ensure stationarity of bonds and 
consumption (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 2003).  
Deriving Demand Functions 
First, we derive the individual demand functions for good z as well as the aggregate demand 
functions from the intratemporal cost minimization of the household’s consumption across 
different countries i and brands z. The detailed optimization is given in the technical 
appendix. 
Individual demand functions for country i, i = A, B, C: 
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Aggregate demand functions for country i, i = A, B, C: 
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where the trade shares are given by Table 4.2. 
                                                 
44 Each asset in the portfolio itB 1+  pays one unit of country C’s currency at time t+1 and in state ht+1.  
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Table 4.2: Trade Shares for Countries A, B, and C 
Country A Country B Country C 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]APAA nnv −−−−= 1111 ηη  ( )[ ] APBA nnv ηη −−= 11  APCA nnv η=  ( )[ ] ( )APAB nnv −−−= 111 ηη  ( )[ ] ( )APBB nnv ηη −−−= 111  ( )APCB nnv −= 1η  ( )PAC nv −= 1η  ( )PBC nv −= 1η  PCC nv η−=1  
 
Second, we solve the intertemporal optimization by maximizing the lifetime utility 
function (4.1) subject to the budget constraint (4.24). Combining the first order conditions for 
consumption and labor determines the consumption labor trade-off and, thereby, the nominal 
wage 
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Combining the first order conditions for consumption and bonds leads to the familiar Euler 
equation 
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Taking expectations conditional on the information available in period t and defining the 
gross nominal interest rate, itR , on a riskless one-period bond in country i as  
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we rewrite the Euler equation as 
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The Euler equation (4.34) leads to the dynamic IS curve, where today’s consumption 
depends on tomorrow’s consumption and the interest rate. 
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International Risk Sharing 
The three countries are linked by international risk sharing. Combining the Euler equation 
(4.32) for two countries i  and 'i  
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and defining the real exchange rate as 
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the following risk sharing condition holds in every period 
(4.37)  ( ) .1,'' μi tiitit RERCC ⋅=  
The real exchange rate may be written in terms of trade 
(4.38)  ( ) ( ) .1,,',',' −⋅⋅= ToTgToTgToTRER titii tii ti  
In a three country model we have two risk sharing conditions expressed in terms of trade 
(4.39)  ( ) ( ) ( ) μμμ 1,1,1, −= ToTgToTgToTCC tAtBAtBBtAt  
and 
(4.40)  ( ) ( ) ( ) μμμ 1,1,1, −= ToTgToTgToTCC tAtCAtCCtAt . 
If purchasing power parity holds, which is the case if there is no home bias in consumption, 
the real exchange rate in (4.37) is one and international risk sharing implies perfect 
consumption smoothing across countries, i.e.,  
(4.41)  'it
i
t CC = . 
 
4.2.2 Firms 
Differences in production and thereby in economic integration along the production chain are 
modeled via the consumption basket to keep the supply side of the model simple. We also 
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abstract from capital as labor is the only input factor. Each monopolistically competitive 
firm z in country i produces  
(4.42)  ( ) ( )zLFzY ititit = , 
where ( )zY it  is the output of firm z in period t and itF  is country specific productivity that 
follows a first order autoregressive process 
(4.43)  .1
i
t
i
t
ii
t FF ερ += −  
Firms maximize profits subject to the production function, demand, and staggered producer 
currency pricing à la Calvo (1983), where α  is the degree of price stickiness. The optimal 
price of variety z is 
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where ( ) ititit FWzMC =  are nominal marginal costs given by the Lagrange multiplier 
associated with the demand constraint, ( )zY it  is total (“world”) output of country i’s firm z, 
and ( )1−φφ  is the mark-up of prices over marginal costs. The technical appendix gives the 
detailed derivation of this optimality condition and how it leads to the New Keynesian 
Phillips curve. 
Market Clearing 
Market clearing requires the demand and supply of goods to be equalized in each of the three 
countries 
(4.45)  
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(4.47)  
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4.2.3 Solving the Model 
The model cannot be solved analytically. We follow the strategy of linear approximation of 
the model’s nonlinear equations established in the real business cycle literature (e.g., 
Campbell 1994, Uhlig 1999). Kydland and Prescott (1982) proposed taking a linear- 
quadratic approximation to the true model around its steady state. This method is valid in the 
special case of Kydland and Prescott (1982) but may not be generalized. Kim and Kim 
(2007) demonstrate in a small model that loglinearizing the model before deriving the 
optimality conditions (first order conditions) leads to inaccurate results. Such a “naïve” 
(Benigno and Woodford 2007) linear-quadratic problem is not correct up to first order. King, 
Plosser, and Rebelo (1988, 2002) use instead a loglinear-quadratic approximation of the 
model’s (nonlinear) optimality conditions.  
However, the limitations of this method need to be kept in mind. Ascari and Merkl (2007) 
show the shortcomings of loglinearizations in a model with a disinflation experiment. The 
economy moves from one steady state with high inflation to a new steady state with low 
inflation. Especially with respect to inflation of the starting point (the first steady state) of the 
disinflation experiment, the economic results may differ dramatically.  
Summing up, loglinear approximations are suitable if (i) the nonlinearities are not essential 
(in contrast to models in finance where risk matters) and (ii) the model analyzes only small 
deviations from the steady state. In our model, we derived the optimality conditions for the 
household in Section 4.2.1 and for the firm in Section 4.2.2, i.e., before taking the loglinear 
approximation. Next, we loglinearize the model around a steady state with no inflation. 
Like a closed economy, the model’s core equations are an IS curve, a Phillips curve and a 
monetary policy rule for each country. In an open economy, we need additionally goods 
market clearing for each country as consumption may deviate from output and, to link the 
three economies, two international risk sharing conditions. For convenience, we use two 
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shorthand notations. First, the real marginal costs, itcmˆ , and, second, the frequently used CPI-
PPI ratio, ( )ToTg ti ,ˆ . To analyze monetary policy under ERM 2, we also back out CPI 
inflation, itπˆ , and the change in the nominal exchange rate, i tiS ,'ˆΔ , where an increase 
corresponds to a change in the rate of depreciation of the currency in country i. Country A is 
the accession country. Equations of the loglinearized model for country A: 
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Consumption in this economy is determined by expected consumption, the interest rate, 
expected domestic inflation as well as expected changes in the terms of trade between 
country A and countries B and C, the dynamic IS curve (4.48). Inflation, in turn, is 
determined by the forward-looking Phillips curve (4.49), which reflects the impact of 
marginal costs on inflation. To guarantee determinacy the monetary policy rule (4.52) needs 
to respond to inflation by more than one to one and thereby fulfill the Taylor principle 
(Woodford 2003b). A productivity shock for country A would reduce marginal costs (4.50) 
and thereby reduce inflation. The central bank would react to lower inflation with an interest 
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rate cut. Consumers would respond to a lower interest rate with increases in today’s 
consumption. In a closed economy, the changes in consumption would lead to equal changes 
in output. In an open economy, the lower interest rate improves also the terms of trade and 
thereby the increase in domestic output is shared with the rest of the world (goods market 
clearing, equation 4.53).  
The equations for countries B and C mirror those for country A except for the international 
risk sharing condition (equations 4.56 and 4.57). In a three-country model, we need two risk 
sharing conditions to link financial markets 
(4.56)  ( ) ( )ToTgToTgoTTCC tAtBAtBBtAt ,,, 11ˆ1ˆˆ μμμ −++=  
(4.57)  ( ) ( )ToTgToTgoTTCC tAtCAtCCtAt ,,, 11ˆ1ˆˆ μμμ −++= . 
Calibration 
The numerical solution requires calibrating the structural parameters of the model 
(Table 4.3). Most parameters are standard in the real business cycle literature. The discount 
factor β  equals 0.99, so that the steady state annual real interest rate is 4 percent. The period 
utility function has a risk aversion of 2 to depart from the case of logarithmic utility45 and an 
inverse of the labor supply of 3. The Calvo price staggering parameter is set to 0.75, 
implying an average frequency of price adjustment of four quarters (Galí 2003).  
In the three-country model, we explicitly consider different types of production sharing. The 
elasticity of substitution between goods from two countries follows Backus, Kehoe and 
Kydland (1995). We take this conventional assumption for the elasticity between goods from 
the core country C and the two periphery countries A and B and set θ  equal to 1.5. Within 
the two periphery countries, we distinguish two scenarios. Countries A and B producing 
complements implies vertical integration along the production chain. We follow Burstein, 
Kurz and Tesar (2008) and model complements with a relatively low elasticity of substitution 
as ψ  equals 0.05. Their calibration is based on survey data on outsourcing and offshoring in 
                                                 
45 External shocks would not affect the home country under complete markets and logarithmic utility (Ghironi 
2006: 429).  
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eastern Europe reported in Marin (2006). Horizontal production sharing implies countries 
producing substitutes. To model strong substitutes, we follow De Paoli (2006) and set ψ  
equal to 3. 
As we focus on the qualitative results, we do not calibrate the model for specific countries. In 
the benchmark calibration, each country’s size is 1/3 and there is no home bias in 
consumption, i.e., η  equals 1. We relax this assumption and introduce home bias as a 
robustness check (η  equals 0.5). 
Table 4.3: Calibration of the Model 
 
Structural Parameters Calibration 
 
α  Calvo staggering 0.75 
β  subjective discount factor 0.99 γ  inverse of the elasticity of labor supply 3 μ  risk aversion 2 
θ  elasticity of substitution between country C vs. P 1.5 ψ  elasticity of substitution between country A vs. B 0.05 (complements)  
3 (substitutes) ρ  autocorrelation of technology shock process 0.9 η  degree of openness 1 (completely open)  
0.5 (with home bias) 
nP size of country C vs. P 2/3 
nA size of country A vs. B 0.5 
 
 
4.3 Simulation Results 
4.3.1 Technology Shock in a Two-Country Model 
In order to provide a benchmark for the value added of this model, we briefly revisit a 
technology shock in a two-country model, where the two countries produce complements in 
one case and strong substitutes in the other case.46 We analyze the impulse responses with 
respect to consumption, output, and domestic inflation. The technology shock process is 
modeled by a first order autoregressive process to productivity in country B 
                                                 
46 In this two-country example both central banks target domestic inflation. 
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(4.58)  Bt
B
t
BB
t FF ερ += −1ˆˆ , 
where the persistence parameter Bρ  is set to 0.9 (see Faia 2007). 
As already pointed out by Mundell (1961), monetary policy faces difficulties of dealing with 
asymmetric shocks in a monetary union. If the two countries produce complements to each 
other, output would increase in both countries (Figure 4.1, Table 4.4). The technology shock, 
however, reduces inflation only in country B. In country A, higher consumption and a higher 
production increase marginal costs (4.50) and thereby domestic inflation increases (4.49). 
Thus, the inflation rates in the two countries would be negatively correlated. If, in contrast, 
the two countries produce strong substitutes, output would be negatively correlated 
(Figure 4.2). The technology shock would again reduce the price of products from country B. 
The consumers in country A would switch from their own products to the cheaper imports 
from country B. Consequently, output would fall only in country A, but inflation would fall in 
both countries. For both cases, we may distinguish between a central bank of the monetary 
union that is dominated by one country and a central bank of the union that targets the 
average of the two countries. Obviously, given the negative correlations in either inflation or 
output, a monetary policy in favor of one country would be inadequate for the other country. 
If the central bank bases its decisions on the union-wide aggregates, the negative correlations 
would partly offset each other and none of the two countries would benefit from an 
appropriate monetary policy. 
 
Table 4.4: Correlation Coefficients of Inflation and Output in a Two-Country Model 
 Inflation Output 
Complements -0.24 0.69                    
Substitutes 0.07 -1.10                    
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Figure 4.1: Technology Shock in a Two-Country Model, Complements 
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Figure 4.2: Technology Shock in a Two-Country Model, Substitutes 
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4.3.2 Technology Shock in a Three-Country Model 
The three-country model with a nested consumption basket studies the transmission of a 
technology shock in the third country (country B) and its implications for monetary policy in 
the accession country (country A).47 The model addresses the run up to a monetary union as 
the central bank in country A may have to target the exchange rate vis-à-vis the anchor 
country C. Further, the model emphasizes the implications of asymmetric production sharing 
among the three countries. Countries A and C are not affected by the third-country shock in 
the same way. Thus, under fully flexible exchange rates, the exchange rate between countries 
A and C would also bear part of the adjustment. In particular, this model distinguishes 
between countries A and B producing complements and strong substitutes. 
We evaluate the effects of eight different simple monetary policy rules (4.52) for country A, 
the euro area accession country. Rules 1 and 2 in Table 4.5 stand for strict inflation targeting, 
where rule 1 targets the domestic (i.e., core) inflation rate and rule 2 targets the inflation of 
the consumer price index (CPI). Their respective Taylor rule counterparts are rules 3 and 4, 
including output targeting. Rules 5 to 8 add an exchange rate term to rules 1 to 4 in order to 
investigate the implications of exchange rate targeting under ERM 2. For the impulse 
responses presented in the graphs, we focus on the traditional CPI inflation Taylor rule 
(rule 4) and adding an exchange rate term for ERM 2 (rule 8). 
Countries B and C conduct strict domestic inflation targeting, i
iπϕ  equals 1.5. The central 
bank in country B neither mitigates the effect of the technology shock on output nor second-
round effects from abroad showing up in CPI inflation. Otherwise, positive weights for 
output targeting in the monetary policy rule would reduce the shock in country B and, hence, 
also its impact on the other countries. Countries B and C are assumed to produce substitutes 
throughout the simulations. Hence, their output reactions are negatively correlated. Again, a 
positive weight for output targeting in the monetary policy rule of country C would dampen 
                                                 
47 In principle, the model could be extended to the analysis of monetary shocks. Such a shock could be 
implemented by a reduction in the third country’s interest rate, which could be interpreted as a competitive 
devaluation or contagion following a financial crisis. The evaluation of simple monetary policy rules could give 
insights on the strategic costs of ERM 2 and giving up a floating exchange rate for the accession country. We 
leave this for future research and focus on a third-country technology shock. 
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the (inverse) shock in the anchor currency country. Any weight on output targeting in the 
monetary policy rules of countries B and C would lead to biased results with respect to the 
analysis of monetary policy in country A. 
 
Table 4.5: Simple Monetary Policy Rules for Country A 
Monetary Policy Rule i
iπϕ  iπϕ  Yϕ  Sϕ  
Rule 1 domestic inflation targeting 1.5 – – – 
Rule 2 CPI inflation targeting – 1.5 – – 
Rule 3 domestic inflation Taylor rule 1.5 – 0.5 – 
Rule 4 CPI inflation Taylor rule – 1.5 0.5 – 
    
Rule 5 domestic inflation targeting under ERM 2 1.5 – – 0.5 
Rule 6 CPI inflation targeting under ERM 2 – 1.5 – 0.5 
Rule 7 domestic inflation Taylor rule under ERM 2 1.5 – 0.5 0.5 
Rule 8 CPI inflation Taylor rule under ERM 2 – 1.5 0.5 0.5 
 
As standard in the literature, we evaluate the different monetary policy rules based on the 
loss function of the central bank. The central bank wishes to minimize volatility in output and 
inflation (Monacelli 2005).48 The loss function is defined as  
(4.59)  ( )∑∞
=
+=
0
22
00
ˆˆ
t
tYt
tCB YEL λπλδ π , 
where 10 << δ  is a discount factor. Woodford (2003b) shows that such a loss function is 
consistent with maximizing a social utility function in a closed economy setup. Both, society 
as well as the Maastricht criteria specify inflation measured by the CPI. As weights in the 
loss function we take 5.0== Yλλπ .  
However, although such a loss function is meaningful as a benchmark for the evaluation of 
monetary policy, it would be incomplete for the case of regional monetary integration. If the 
central bank in country A would not give any positive weight to exchange rate smoothing, it 
would be difficult to establish the case for integrating into EMU. Hence, we assume that the 
central bank minimizes the volatility in the exchange rate as an additional objective. In case 
                                                 
48 In principle, it would be possible to calculate welfare as a second-order approximation to the representative 
agent’s utility function, see Benigno (2004), Pappa (2004), De Paoli (2006), Lipińska (2006), and Liu and 
Pappa (2008). We take the perspective of the policy maker and focus on the central bank’s loss function. 
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the central bank operates under ERM 2, the loss function with a positive weight on exchange 
rate smoothing could be defined as  
(4.60)  ( )∑∞
=
Δ++=
0
222
0
2
0
ˆˆˆ
t
tStYt
tERM SYEL λλπλδ π , 
where 1=πλ  and 5.0== SY λλ . The value of the intertemporal loss functions approaches 
the unconditional mean of the period loss functions as →δ 1, which equals the sum of the 
unconditional variances of the policy objectives.  
Thus, the two loss functions for country A are 
(4.61)  Loss CB:   ( ) ( ) 22 ˆ5.05.0 AA Y+π  
(4.62)  Loss ERM 2:   ( ) ( ) ( )222 ˆ5.0ˆ5.0 ACAA SY Δ++π . 
Technology Shock I: Countries A and B Producing Complements 
We start by analyzing the case where countries A and B, the two periphery countries, produce 
complements, while the periphery goods and country C’s goods are substitutes. A common 
feature for all countries stems from international risk sharing. Consequently, in the absence 
of home bias in consumption, the technology shock is evenly distributed and leads to equal 
increases in consumption in the three countries (see equation 4.41).  
First, we consider the impulse responses according to rule 4, when country A conducts a CPI 
inflation Taylor rule without exchange rate smoothing (Figure 4.3, left column). Following 
the technology shock in country B, output in that country increases. Country A, producing 
complements to country B, benefits by a significant increase in its output. Country C in 
contrast looses output as its consumers substitute home goods by the products from the 
periphery countries A and B, taking also upward pressure from prices. As a consequence, 
inflation decreases in all countries. However, the decline in prices is more pronounced in 
country A than in country C. The inflation differential leads to an increased appreciation of 
country A’s currency vis-à-vis country C’s currency (Figure 4.3, right column, dashed line).  
Second, we turn to the case when country A’s central bank operates under ERM 2 
(Figure 4.3, middle column). The exchange rate between country A and C is not allowed to 
adjust to the full extent as the central bank in country A conducts a CPI inflation Taylor rule 
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augmented for exchange rate smoothing (rule 8). As implicitly uncovered interest rate parity 
holds in the model, the central bank of country A has to reduce its interest rate in order to 
counter the appreciation vis-à-vis the anchor currency, thereby driving up inflation at home. 
Table 4.6 shows how volatility in domestic as well as CPI inflation increases when 
comparing the rules without an exchange rate term (rules 1 to 4) with their ERM 2 
counterparts (rules 5 to 8). Hence, with relatively stable exchange rates, domestic inflation in 
country A increases sharply, displaying the costs of an asymmetric shock under exchange rate 
targeting.  
 
Figure 4.3: Technology Shock in a Three-Country Model, Complements 
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Table 4.6: Performance of Simple Monetary Policy Rules, Complements 
  Standard Deviation  Loss 
Rule 
  AAπ  Aπ  AY  ACSΔ AC  CB ERM 2 
Rule 1 domestic inflation targeting 0.33 1.35 0.8 4.59 0.56  1.23 12.67 
Rule 2 CPI inflation targeting 0.46 0.37 1.11 4.71 0.70  0.68 11.85 
Rule 3 domestic inflation Taylor rule 0.19 1.57 0.70 5.76 0.52  1.49 19.34 
Rule 4 CPI inflation Taylor rule 0.77 1.03 0.99 5.96 0.64  1.02 19.33 
Rule 5 domestic inflation ERM 2 1.65 1.86 1.01 1.69 0.67  2.24 5.40 
Rule 6 CPI inflation ERM 2 1.51 1.43 1.10 1.91 0.71  1.63 4.48 
Rule 7 domestic Taylor ERM 2 1.39 1.71 0.96 2.28 0.65  1.92 5.98 
Rule 8 CPI Taylor ERM 2 1.24 1.22 1.05 2.44 0.68  1.30 5.02 
 
Table 4.7: Ratio of Loss for Joining ERM 2, Complements 
Ratio Rule Loss CB Loss ERM 2 
Rule 5 / Rule 1 domestic inflation targeting 1.82 0.43 
Rule 6 / Rule 2 CPI inflation targeting 2.39 0.38 
Rule 7 / Rule 3 domestic inflation Taylor rule 1.29 0.31 
Rule 8 / Rule 4 CPI inflation Taylor rule 1.28 0.26 
 
To analyze the relative change in the central bank loss of joining ERM 2, we construct the 
ratio of the loss for each monetary policy rule with an exchange rate term over its counterpart 
without that term (Table 4.7). Moving to ERM 2 more than doubles the loss for the 
traditional central bank loss function (Loss CB) as it increases up to 2.39-times. For the two 
Taylor rules 3 and 4 moving to their ERM 2 counterparts still increases the loss but by less 
than 30 percent. If the central bank adapts ERM 2 as its policy targets (Loss ERM 2), the loss 
drops when adding the exchange rate to the policy rule to half or almost a quarter of the loss 
without exchange rate term (Table 4.7, last column).  
Technology Shock II: Countries A and B Producing Substitutes 
As it was in the case with countries A and B producing complements, the technology shock in 
country B increases consumption in all three countries by the same amount due to perfect 
international risk sharing when the two periphery countries produce strong substitutes 
(Figure 4.4). This time, however, the technology shock goes one to one into country B’s 
output. As not only country A but also country C produces substitutes to country B, output 
declines in both countries. Without a reaction of monetary policy to the shock, CPI inflation 
would decline in all three countries. However, country A conducting monetary policy with a 
CPI inflation Taylor rule (rule 4), the central bank reacts evenly to inflation and output 
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(Figure 4.4, left column). Table 4.8 shows how the volatility in domestic and CPI inflation as 
well as output falls when moving from strict inflation targeting (rules 1 and 2) to a Taylor 
rule (rules 3 and 4). As a result of the central bank lowering the interest rate to accommodate 
the decline in output, inflation in country A increases slightly. In the case of substitutes, the 
technology shock in country B affects only a little the exchange rate between countries A and 
C. The magnitude of the exchange rate reaction to the external shock is small with the peak 
of the devaluation at only 0.43 standard deviations compared to the peak of the appreciation 
at 2.07 standard deviations in the case of complements. Thus, moving to a monetary policy 
rule consistent with ERM 2, where the interest rate reacts also to movements in the exchange 
rate (rule 8), exhibits less changes in the impulse responses as seen before in the case of 
complements in Figure 4.3. Table 4.8 shows that volatility in the domestic and CPI inflation 
as well as output has to increase in order to reduce volatility in the exchange rate (rules 1 to 4 
versus rules 5 to 8).  
Figure 4.4: Technology Shock in a Three-Country Model, Substitutes 
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Table 4.8: Performance of Simple Monetary Policy Rules, Substitutes 
  Standard Deviation  Loss 
Rule 
  AAπ  Aπ  AY  ACSΔ AC  CB ERM 2 
Rule 1 domestic inflation targeting 0.16 0.19 0.38 0.63 0.56  0.092 0.3104 
Rule 2 CPI inflation targeting 0.18 0.20 0.35 0.65 0.57  0.081 0.3095 
Rule 3 domestic inflation Taylor rule 0.08 0.10 0.30 0.96 0.58  0.050 0.5121 
Rule 4 CPI inflation Taylor rule 0.07 0.06 0.28 0.95 0.59  0.042 0.4992 
Rule 5 domestic inflation ERM 2 0.41 0.44 0.45 0.30 0.55  0.199 0.3403 
Rule 6 CPI inflation ERM 2 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.31 0.55  0.194 0.3423 
Rule 7 domestic Taylor ERM 2 0.26 0.28 0.40 0.51 0.56  0.121 0.2901 
Rule 8 CPI Taylor ERM 2 0.27 0.29 0.39 0.51 0.56  0.117 0.2908 
 
Table 4.9: Ratio of Loss for Joining ERM 2, Substitutes 
Ratio Rule Loss CB Loss ERM 2 
Rule 5 / Rule 1 domestic inflation targeting 2.17 1.10 
Rule 6 / Rule 2 CPI inflation targeting 2.40 1.11 
Rule 7 / Rule 3 domestic inflation Taylor rule 2.41 0.57 
Rule 8 / Rule 4 CPI inflation Taylor rule 2.79 0.58 
 
Concerning the consequences for the loss function (Loss CB), adding the exchange rate more 
than doubles the loss for all four rules (Table 4.9). However, the loss for the classical CPI 
inflation Taylor rule increases 2.79-times when the exchange rate term is incorporated. For 
the strict inflation targeting rules (rules 1 and 2), the loss for an ERM 2 central bank 
(Loss ERM 2) is virtually alike with or without the exchange rate term as the ratio is close to 
1. For the two Taylor rules (rules 3 and 4), the loss halves.  
The evaluation of simple monetary policy rules leads us to the following conclusions 
(Table 4.10). For countries A and B producing complements the CPI inflation Taylor rule 
with exchange rate smoothing (rule 8), shows in the ranking a remarkably good performance 
for Loss ERM 2. Under Loss CB, this rule even outperforms the domestic inflation Taylor 
rule (rule 3). For countries A and B producing substitutes, each of the monetary policy rules 
without an exchange rate term performs better than the rules that are in line with ERM 2 
under the traditional central bank loss function. This result does not hold when adjusting the 
central bank loss function to take into account exchange rate smoothing (Loss ERM 2). The 
last two columns of Table 4.10 serve as a robustness check in case the kind of production 
sharing is not known. Under a traditional central bank loss function (Loss CB) the best 
performance is given by rule 4, the traditional CPI inflation Taylor rule. In case the central 
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bank operates under ERM 2 (Loss ERM 2), the best results are achieved by the CPI inflation 
Taylor rule with exchange rate smoothing (rule 8).  
Table 4.10: Ranking of Simple Monetary Policy Rules 
 Complements  Substitutes  Sum 
Rule  Loss CB 
Loss 
ERM 2  
Loss 
CB 
Loss 
ERM 2  
Loss 
CB 
Loss 
ERM 2 
Rule 1 domestic inflation targeting 3 6  4 4  7 10 
Rule 2 CPI inflation targeting 1 5  3 3  4 8 
Rule 3 domestic inflation Taylor rule 5 8  2 8  7 16 
Rule 4 CPI inflation Taylor rule 2 7  1 7  3 14 
Rule 5 domestic inflation ERM 2 8 3  8 5  16 8 
Rule 6 CPI inflation ERM 2 6 1  7 6  13 7 
Rule 7 domestic Taylor ERM 2 7 4  6 1  13 5 
Rule 8 CPI Taylor ERM 2 4 2  5 2  9 4 
 
Robustness Checks 
As a robustness check, we introduce home bias in consumption in all three countries by 
setting the parameter for openness, η , equal to 0.5. The home bias affects also the nested 
consumption basket as we could think of a bias not only towards home goods but also 
towards goods from the periphery countries generally. The altered trade shares are shown in 
Table 4.11. Country A trades not anymore as much as before with countries B and C. The 
technology shock in country B affects country A less, leading to strictly lower losses for the 
central bank. The ranking of the eight monetary policy rules alters only little in the case of 
complements and not at all for substitutes (Table 4.12 and Appendix A4.1).  
Table 4.11: Trade Shares under Home Bias in Consumption  
Country A Country B Country C 
A
Av = 0.6250 
B
Av = 0.2083 
C
Av = 0.1667 
A
Bv = 0.2083 
B
Bv = 0.6250 
C
Bv = 0.1667 
A
Cv = 0.1667 
B
Cv = 0.1667 
C
Cv = 0.6667 
Note: Trade shares are based on relative country size nA = 0.5 and nP = 2/3 and degree of openness η = 0.5. 
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Table 4.12: Ranking of Simple Monetary Policy Rules, Home Bias 
 Complements  Substitutes  Sum 
Rule  Loss CB 
Loss 
ERM 2  
Loss 
CB 
Loss 
ERM 2  
Loss 
CB 
Loss 
ERM 2 
Rule 1 domestic inflation targeting 2 5  4 4  6 9 
Rule 2 CPI inflation targeting 1 6  3 3  4 9 
Rule 3 domestic inflation Taylor rule 4 7  2 8  6 15 
Rule 4 CPI inflation Taylor rule 3 8  1 7  4 15 
Rule 5 domestic inflation ERM 2 8 3  8 5  16 8 
Rule 6 CPI inflation ERM 2 7 1  7 6  14 7 
Rule 7 domestic Taylor ERM 2 6 4  6 1  12 5 
Rule 8 CPI Taylor ERM 2 5 2  5 2  10 4 
 
 
4.3.3 Optimal Simple Rules in a Three-Country Model 
In this section, we identify optimal monetary policy rules by minimizing the central bank loss 
function. The Matlab routine fminsearch is an unconstrained nonlinear optimization 
using the Simplex search method of Lagarias, Reeds, Wright, and Wright (1998). The 
method does not rely on numerical or analytical gradients and may therefore handle 
discontinuity. The search starts from initial values and may only give a local solution. We 
take the parameters of the respective simple monetary policy rules specified in Table 4.5 as 
starting values. As the method is unconstrained, it searches the entire parameter space and 
may find optimal coefficients minimizing the loss for implausible policy parameters.  
To circumvent this problem, we follow Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) and conduct 
additionally a grid search.49 Rules 3 to 6 are evaluated on a grid in 0.05 steps for i
iπϕ or iπϕ  
from 1 to 3 and for Yϕ  or Sϕ  from 0 to 1.51. The grid for rules 7 and 8 is in 0.1 steps for 
i
iπϕ or iπϕ  from 1 to 3 and for Yϕ  or Sϕ  from 0 to 1.51. Our interpretation focuses on the 
optimal simple rules based on that grid search. We limit our attention on the traditional 
Taylor rule (rule 4) and its ERM 2 counterpart with an exchange rate term (rule 8).50 
                                                 
49 Rules 1 and 2 are only one-dimensional and are therefore not evaluated on a grid. The density of the grid 
needs to be adjusted in the case of three parameters to avoid the well-known curse of dimensionality (Miranda 
and Fackler 2002). 
50 The results with home bias in consumption are extremely similar (Appendix Tables A4.5 to A4.8). 
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The traditional central bank loss function (Loss CB) minimizes the volatility in CPI inflation 
and output. All results in Tables 4.13 and 4.15, including those based on fminsearch, in 
general adhere to the Taylor principle (Woodford 2003b). Most of the time, there is no role 
for targeting the exchange rate as the respective coefficient is zero. Only in the case of 
complements, rules 6 and 8 find a positive but small coefficient for the exchange rate term 
(Table 4.13). In the analysis of simple monetary policy rules, we already saw that the 
exchange rate between countries A and C is hardly affected in the case of substitutes. 
However, in the case of complements, the exchange rate bears part of the macroeconomic 
adjustment. The exchange rate plays a more important role in the model with complements 
than in the model with substitutes. The analysis of optimal simple rules confirms the findings 
of Svensson (2003: 442), who states: “A first obvious problem for a Taylor-type rule, with or 
without interest-rate smoothing, is that, if there are other important state variables than 
inflation and the output gap, it will not be optimal.” The numerical analysis reveals that the 
exchange rate approximates other important state variables of the model in the case of 
complements but not in the case of substitutes. Having an additional policy parameter 
available pays off as even a small exchange rate coefficient of 0.1 reduces the central bank 
loss to 0.64 down from 0.67 (Table 4.13, rules 4 and 8). 
If the loss function captures the requirements of ERM 2 (Loss ERM 2) and therefore the 
central bank aims to additionally reduce volatility in the exchange rate, the monetary policy 
rules with the lowest loss include the exchange rate as a target. If the central bank includes an 
exchange rate in the monetary policy rule, the Taylor principle is occasionally violated 
(Tables 4.14 and 4.16). For a technology shock being the only disturbance, the optimal 
coefficients are in general lower for production sharing via complements than via substitutes. 
In the latter case, the exchange rate has the same weight as inflation (Table 4.16, rule 8). This 
result applies also with home bias in consumption (Appendix Table A4.8).  
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Table 4.13: Optimal Simple Rules, Complements, Loss CB 
Variance 
Rule Method i
iπϕ  iπϕ  Yϕ  Sϕ  Loss CB Aπ  AY  
Rule 1 Fminsearch 1.29565 – – – 1.219640 1.7629 0.6764 
Rule 2 Fminsearch – 2.01042 – – 0.669571 0.0508 1.2883 
Rule 3 Fminsearch 1.29552 – 8.98453e-005 – 1.219640 1.7629 0.6764 
 Grid search  1.3 – 0 – 1.219650 1.7642 0.6752 
Rule 4 Fminsearch – 1.00253 -0.162455 – 0.646189 0.0510 1.2414 
 Grid search – 2 0 – 0.669573 0.0517 1.2875 
Rule 5 Fminsearch 1.03148 – – -0.0280402 1.189650 1.7064 0.6729 
 Grid search 1.3 – – 0 1.219650 1.7642 0.6752 
Rule 6 Fminsearch – 1.15006 – 0.0268152 0.636567 0.1259 1.1472 
 Grid search – 1.6 – 0.05 0.645318 0.0692 1.2215 
Rule 7 Fminsearch 1.02709 – 0.0222517 -0.0244431 1.193740 1.7142 0.6733 
 Grid search 1.3 – 0 0 1.219650 1.7642 0.6752 
Rule 8 Fminsearch – 0.986577 -0.0645642 0.0128559 0.636252 0.1226 1.1499 
 Grid search – 2 0.3 0.1 0.637657 0.1208 1.1545 
 
 
Table 4.14: Optimal Simple Rules, Complements, Loss ERM 2 
Variance 
Rule Method i
iπϕ  iπϕ  Yϕ  Sϕ  Loss  ERM 2 Aπ  AY  ACSΔ  
Rule 1 Fminsearch 1 – – – 5.81508 2.2870 0.9289 6.1273 
Rule 2 Fminsearch – 2.06158e+012 – – 9.04763 0.0000 1.3926 16.7027 
Rule 3 Fminsearch 1.00213 – -0.0851034 – 4.90540 3.3575 1.1037 1.9921 
 Grid search  1 – 0.05 – 7.05050 1.9478 0.8415 9.3639 
Rule 4 Fminsearch – 11.3824 -8.45006 – 5.70174 1.0793 1.7714 7.4735 
 Grid search – 3 0 – 9.89654 0.0164 1.3329 18.4274 
Rule 5 Fminsearch 0.97303 – – 0.0240273 4.93290 3.3747 1.0976 2.0187 
 Grid search 1 – – 0.05 4.96559 3.3362 1.0840 2.1748 
Rule 6 Fminsearch – 0.993576 – 0.130897 4.39416 2.1007 1.3280 3.2589 
 Grid search – 1 – 0.15 4.40392 2.2836 1.3322 2.9084 
Rule 7 Fminsearch 0.848377 – 0.385686 0.12972 5.04889 3.3308 1.0636 2.3725 
 Grid search 1 – 0.1 0.1 5.04632 3.2389 1.0560 2.5589 
Rule 8 Fminsearch – 0.900737 0.0663188 0.0875105 4.39003 2.0795 1.3330 3.2880 
 Grid search – 1 0.1 0.2 4.40475 2.3042 1.2828 2.9182 
 
 
Table 4.15: Optimal Simple Rules, Substitutes, Loss CB 
Variance 
Rule Method i
iπϕ  iπϕ  Yϕ  Sϕ  Loss CB Aπ  AY  
Rule 1 Fminsearch 6.32156e+006 – – – 0.0570222 0.0055 0.1086 
Rule 2 Fminsearch – 2.47116e+012 – – 0.0401281 0.0000 0.0803 
Rule 3 Fminsearch 30.1037 – 11.853 – 0.0495594 0.0143 0.0848 
 Grid search  2.55 – 1 – 0.0495594 0.0143 0.0848 
Rule 4 Fminsearch – 1.18711e+009 736567 – 0.0401213 0.0000 0.0802 
 Grid search – 3 0.95 – 0.0405818 0.0051 0.0760 
Rule 5 Fminsearch 3.16537e+008 – – -1.25152e+006 0.0570221 0.0056 0.1085 
 Grid search 3 – – 0 0.0642976 0.0095 0.1191 
Rule 6 Fminsearch – 6.46762e+007 – -4.5584e+006 0.0371697 0.0050 0.0693 
 Grid search – 3 – 0 0.0480413 0.0035 0.0926 
Rule 7 Fminsearch 1.04055 – 0.23504 -0.046206 0.0508892 0.0146 0.0872 
 Grid search 1.1 – 1.5 0.3 0.0467120 0.0119 0.0816 
Rule 8 Fminsearch – 1.3221 -0.244637 -0.212216 0.0310472 0.0117 0.0504 
 Grid search – 3 0.9 0 0.0405892 0.0043 0.0769 
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Table 4.16: Optimal Simple Rules, Substitutes, Loss ERM 2 
Variance 
Rule Method i
iπϕ  iπϕ  Yϕ  Sϕ  Loss  ERM 2 Aπ  AY  ACSΔ  
Rule 1 Fminsearch 1.2746 – – – 0.294700 0.0774 0.1697 0.2650 
Rule 2 Fminsearch – 1.30269 – – 0.293541 0.0827 0.1439 0.2779 
Rule 3 Fminsearch 1.27441 – 0.00012667 – 0.294700 0.0774 0.1697 0.2650 
 Grid search  1.2 – 0.05 – 0.294783 0.0739 0.1679 0.2739 
Rule 4 Fminsearch – 0.99373 0.205343 – 0.290535 0.0795 0.1503 0.2717 
 Grid search – 1 0.2 – 0.290590 0.0814 0.1509 0.2675 
Rule 5 Fminsearch 2.9138 – – 0.798454 0.289506 0.0781 0.1592 0.2637 
 Grid search 2.9 – – 0.8 0.289510 0.0788 0.1596 0.2618 
Rule 6 Fminsearch – 1.36127 – 0.0319936 0.293514 0.0829 0.1442 0.2771 
 Grid search – 1.4 – 0.05 0.293536 0.0814 0.1437 0.2806 
Rule 7 Fminsearch 2.95509 – -0.0589136 0.773123 0.289506 0.0781 0.1592 0.2637 
 Grid search 2.2 – 1.1 1.3 0.289507 0.0781 0.1592 0.2636 
Rule 8 Fminsearch – 0.699423 1.64128 0.974668 0.289414 0.0783 0.1575 0.2647 
 Grid search – 1 1.5 1 0.289519 0.0771 0.1553 0.2694 
 
 
4.4 Conclusions 
In this chapter, we analyze monetary policy given alternative degrees of integration between 
the euro area, an inflation targeting accession country like the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, and Slovakia, and a non-EU country as the third country.  
The model developed in the chapter is based on Teo (2005) and Monacelli (2001) and allows 
us to simulate the impact of a technology shock originating in a third country on an accession 
country considering feedback from the euro area as well. The New Keynesian three-country 
model incorporates explicit microfoundations with dynamic and intertemporal effects as well 
as Keynesian building blocks such as nominal rigidities and monopolistic competition. The 
core equations, i.e., the IS curve, the Phillips curve, and the monetary policy rule, are derived 
following Galí and Monacelli (2005). As a short-cut for modeling production linkages, we 
use alternative elasticities in consumption baskets. This allows us to trace the transmission 
mechanism of a third-country technology shock in the alternative cases that a third country 
produces complements or substitutes, i.e., that a third country is vertically or horizontally 
integrated with the accession country.  
Evaluating the central bank loss function without ERM 2 (Loss CB) and with ERM 2 (Loss 
ERM 2) under strict inflation targeting and Taylor rules as well as both types of rules 
extended by exchange rate smoothing allows us to assess the costs of ERM 2 and derive the 
implications of production sharing for monetary policy. Optimal rules are derived by 
minimizing the central bank loss function. The Matlab routine fminsearch uses the entire 
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parameter space and therefore tends to find optimal coefficients minimizing the loss for 
implausible policy parameters. To circumvent this problem, we follow Schmitt-Grohé and 
Uribe (2007) and conduct additionally a grid search. 
The simulations reveal the following results. First, we revisit an asymmetric shock in a two-
country model. A common monetary policy cannot address the implications of a technology 
shock on inflation and output adequately. Under production sharing via complements, 
inflation in one country is negatively correlated with inflation in the other country. If the two 
countries produce strong substitutes, output is negatively correlated. 
Second, our simulation of a third-country technology shock show that the exchange rate 
between the accession country and the anchor currency country bears part of the adjustment 
if production sharing is via complements, but only little if the accession country and the 
third-country produce strong substitutes. 
Third, our evaluation of simple monetary policy rules reveals that targeting the exchange 
rate, if the central bank has no exchange rate objective (Loss CB), increases the loss. The loss 
more than doubles in case the accession country and the third country produce substitutes. If 
the loss of the central bank takes into account the volatility of the exchange rate (Loss 
ERM 2), the CPI inflation Taylor rule augmented for exchange rate smoothing performs well 
under any type of production sharing. 
Fourth, our results for optimal monetary policy rules depend on the assumed loss function of 
the central bank. For a traditional central bank loss function (Loss CB), minimizing volatility 
in CPI inflation and output, the exchange rate generally does not matter. However, having an 
additional policy parameter still pays off in the case of complements as even a small 
exchange rate coefficient of 0.1 reduces the central bank loss. If the loss function captures the 
requirements of ERM 2 (Loss ERM 2), i.e., exchange rate smoothing is an objective of the 
central bank, allowing for a reaction of the interest rate to the exchange rate lowers the loss. 
Further, the optimal coefficients are lower for production sharing via complements than via 
substitutes. In the latter case, the exchange rate has in fact the same coefficient in the optimal 
monetary policy rule as inflation.  
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All in all, the results show that a Taylor rule extended for an exchange rate term is a good 
simple rule for different kinds of integration with a third country and even in case the loss 
function does not account for a preference for exchange rate smoothing. 
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Appendix 
 
A4.1 Technology Shock with Home Bias in Consumption 
Figure A4.1: Technology Shock in a Three-Country Model, Complements, 
                                     Home Bias ( =η 0.5) 
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Table A4.1: Performance of Simple Monetary Policy Rules, Complements, Home Bias 
  Standard Deviation  Loss 
Rule 
  AAπ  Aπ  AY  ACSΔ AC  CB ERM 2 
Rule 1 domestic inflation targeting 0.20 0.60 0.48 3.06 0.09  0.2976 5.1600 
Rule 2 CPI inflation targeting 0.18 0.26 0.63 3.20 0.25  0.2342 5.3750 
Rule 3 domestic inflation Taylor rule 0.11 0.69 0.41 3.70 0.04  0.3210 7.3843 
Rule 4 CPI inflation Taylor rule 0.37 0.56 0.54 3.82 0.19  0.3039 7.7696 
Rule 5 domestic inflation ERM 2 1.15 1.18 0.67 1.19 0.26  0.9209 2.3208 
Rule 6 CPI inflation ERM 2 1.07 1.02 0.71 1.29 0.29  0.7781 2.1325 
Rule 7 domestic Taylor ERM 2 0.96 1.03 0.63 1.56 0.22  0.7278 2.4756 
Rule 8 CPI Taylor ERM 2 0.88 0.86 0.67 1.63 0.25  0.5964 2.2995 
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Table A4.2: Ratio of Loss for Joining ERM 2, Complements, Home Bias 
Ratio Rule Loss CB Loss ERM 2 
Rule 5 / Rule 1 domestic inflation targeting 3.09 0.45 
Rule 6 / Rule 2 CPI inflation targeting 3.32 0.40 
Rule 7 / Rule 3 domestic inflation Taylor rule 2.27 0.34 
Rule 8 / Rule 4 CPI inflation Taylor rule 1.96 0.30 
 
 
 
Figure A4.2: Technology Shock in a Three-Country Model, Substitutes, Home Bias ( =η 0.5) 
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Table A4.3: Performance of Simple Monetary Policy Rules, Substitutes, Home Bias 
  Standard Deviation  Loss 
Rule 
  AAπ  Aπ  AY  ACSΔ AC  CB ERM 2 
Rule 1 domestic inflation targeting 0.15 0.18 0.37 0.70 0.53  0.0842 0.3438 
Rule 2 CPI inflation targeting 0.18 0.19 0.35 0.70 0.54  0.0777 0.3423 
Rule 3 domestic inflation Taylor rule 0.08 0.09 0.29 1.02 0.56  0.0467 0.5732 
Rule 4 CPI inflation Taylor rule 0.06 0.06 0.28 1.02 0.56  0.0405 0.5603 
Rule 5 domestic inflation ERM 2 0.43 0.45 0.45 0.33 0.51  0.1993 0.3531 
Rule 6 CPI inflation ERM 2 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.33 0.51  0.1976 0.3573 
Rule 7 domestic Taylor ERM 2 0.28 0.30 0.40 0.53 0.52  0.1229 0.3097 
Rule 8 CPI Taylor ERM 2 0.29 0.30 0.39 0.54 0.53  0.1214 0.3115 
 
 
 
Table A4.4: Ratio of Loss for Joining ERM 2, Substitutes, Home Bias 
Ratio Rule Loss CB Loss ERM 2 
Rule 5 / Rule 1 domestic inflation targeting 2.37 1.03 
Rule 6 / Rule 2 CPI inflation targeting 2.54 1.04 
Rule 7 / Rule 3 domestic inflation Taylor rule 2.63 0.54 
Rule 8 / Rule 4 CPI inflation Taylor rule 3.00 0.56 
 
 
 
A4.2 Optimal Simple Rules with Home Bias in Consumption 
Table A4.5: Optimal Simple Rules, Complements, Home Bias, Loss CB 
Variance 
Rule Method i
iπϕ  iπϕ  Yϕ  Sϕ  Loss CB Aπ  AY  
Rule 1 Fminsearch 2.03489 – – – 0.293288 0.3740 0.2126 
Rule 2 Fminsearch – 1.23384 – – 0.232098 0.1003 0.3639 
Rule 3 Fminsearch 2.03205 – 0.000667867 – 0.293288 0.3740 0.2126 
 Grid search  1.4 – 0.15 – 0.293288 0.3738 0.2127 
Rule 4 Fminsearch – 1.00097 -0.0493207 – 0.223295 0.0883 0.3583 
 Grid search – 1.25 0 – 0.232109 0.0978 0.3664 
Rule 5 Fminsearch 1.03481 – – -0.0316297 0.286932 0.3597 0.2142 
 Grid search 2.05 – – 0 0.293289 0.3743 0.2123 
Rule 6 Fminsearch – 0.99373 – 0.00569856 0.222809 0.0971 0.3485 
 Grid search – 1.25 – 0 0.232109 0.0978 0.3664 
Rule 7 Fminsearch 7.59237 – -3.66024 -0.458846 0.225457 0.1097 0.3413 
 Grid search 1.2 – 0.2 0 0.293290 0.3743 0.2123 
Rule 8 Fminsearch – 0.989931 0.0432973 0.0106893 0.222696 0.1048 0.3406 
 Grid search – 1.7 0.6 0.1 0.222947 0.1062 0.3397 
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Table A4.6: Optimal Simple Rules, Complements, Home Bias, Loss ERM 2 
Variance 
Rule Method i
iπϕ  iπϕ  Yϕ  Sϕ  Loss  ERM 2 Aπ  AY  ACSΔ  
Rule 1 Fminsearch 1 – – – 2.60228 0.7560 0.3753 3.3172 
Rule 2 Fminsearch – 4.28486e+012 – – 4.29760 0.0000 0.5821 8.0131 
Rule 3 Fminsearch 1.00535 – -0.0910312 – 2.21439 1.3348 0.4734 1.2857 
 Grid search  1 – 0.05 – 3.09735 0.5607 0.3298 4.7436 
Rule 4 Fminsearch – 1.00481 -0.244666 – 2.14450 0.8653 0.6207 1.9376 
 Grid search – 3 0 – 4.75461 0.0156 0.4947 8.9833 
Rule 5 Fminsearch 0.975484 – – 0.0222794 2.22138 1.3389 0.4708 1.2942 
 Grid search 1 – – 0.05 2.23029 1.3931 0.4753 1.1992 
Rule 6 Fminsearch – 0.936282 – 0.0580603 2.10596 1.0055 0.5617 1.6393 
 Grid search – 1.05 – 0.15 2.10948 1.0482 0.5441 1.5785 
Rule 7 Fminsearch 0.887574 – 0.288784 0.0970124 2.24154 1.3328 0.4619 1.3555 
 Grid search 1 – 0.1 0.1 2.24232 1.3547 0.4645 1.3108 
Rule 8 Fminsearch – 0.935602 0.00232331 0.0584814 2.10590 1.0045 0.5610 1.6418 
 Grid search – 1 0 0.1 2.11069 0.9604 0.5437 1.7569 
 
 
Table A4.7: Optimal Simple Rules, Substitutes, Home Bias, Loss CB 
Variance 
Rule Method i
iπϕ  iπϕ  Yϕ  Sϕ  Loss CB Aπ  AY  
Rule 1 Fminsearch 5.03317e+006 – – – 0.0528229 0.0040 0.1016 
Rule 2 Fminsearch – 7.91617e+012 – – 0.0381636 0.0000 0.0763 
Rule 3 Fminsearch 31.1817 – 11.8537 – 0.0463182 0.0123 0.0803 
 Grid search  1.3 – 0.5 – 0.0463182 0.0123 0.0803 
Rule 4 Fminsearch – 3.48621e+009 2.16309e+006 – 0.0381575 0.0000 0.0763 
 Grid search – 3 0.95 – 0.0389490 0.0050 0.0729 
Rule 5 Fminsearch 2.70357e+008 – – -1.06894e+006 0.0528167 0.0041 0.1015 
 Grid search 3 – – 0 0.0593840 0.0075 0.1112 
Rule 6 Fminsearch – 2.07149e+008 – -1.30764e+007 0.0353397 0.0046 0.0661 
 Grid search – 3 – 0 0.0465716 0.0035 0.0896 
Rule 7 Fminsearch 1.03753 – 0.22828 -0.0427491 0.0474732 0.0124 0.0825 
 Grid search 1 – 1.5 0.3 0.0437715 0.0076 0.0799 
Rule 8 Fminsearch – 2.67328e+007 1.1226e+006 -1.36116e+006 0.0357505 0.0042 0.0673 
 Grid search – 3 1 0 0.0389605 0.0058 0.0721 
 
Table A4.8: Optimal Simple Rules, Substitutes, Home Bias, Loss ERM 2 
Variance 
Rule Method i
iπϕ  iπϕ  Yϕ  Sϕ  Loss ERM 2 Aπ  AY  ACSΔ  
Rule 1 Fminsearch 1.2197 – – – 0.312806 0.0894 0.1673 0.2795 
Rule 2 Fminsearch – 1.25255 – – 0.312953 0.0958 0.1477 0.2866 
Rule 3 Fminsearch 1.21923 – 0.000315802 – 0.312806 0.0894 0.1673 0.2795 
 Grid search  1.15 – 0.05 – 0.312846 0.0868 0.1661 0.2859 
Rule 4 Fminsearch – 0.99447 0.184219 – 0.310872 0.0930 0.1521 0.2837 
 Grid search – 1.05 0.15 – 0.311291 0.0886 0.1492 0.2962 
Rule 5 Fminsearch 2.40439 – – 0.61751 0.309497 0.0916 0.1575 0.2783 
 Grid search 2.45 – – 0.65 0.309506 0.0927 0.1578 0.2758 
Rule 6 Fminsearch – 1.12256 – -0.0719897 0.312789 0.0949 0.1477 0.2880 
 Grid search – 1.25 – 0 0.312962 0.0971 0.1482 0.2836 
Rule 7 Fminsearch 2.52512 – -0.149392 0.569528 0.309497 0.0916 0.1575 0.2783 
 Grid search 1.9 – 0.6 0.8 0.309497 0.0916 0.1576 0.2782 
Rule 8 Fminsearch – -5.30875 16.5453 8.96801 0.309433 0.0913 0.1587 0.2776 
 Grid search – 1 1.5 1 0.310027 0.0946 0.1555 0.2754 
 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
This study addressed a potential trade-off between inflation and exchange rate targeting in 
former transition countries, which now may be labeled emerging market economies and 
which prepare for entry into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Among this group 
of countries, some implemented inflation targeting regimes. These countries may face 
increasing macroeconomic risks when entering the possibly insecure terrain of a soft peg in 
the European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM 2). Against this background, the study 
analyzed the choice of inflation targets (Chapter 2), the (de facto) role of exchange rate 
policy in monetary strategies (Chapter 3), and the potential costs of an additional exchange 
rate target under an intermediate exchange rate regime like ERM 2 (Chapter 4). 
Chapter 2 went beyond the traditional explanations of inflation such as revealing the 
monetary transmission mechanism from monetary aggregates, interest rate, or exchange rate 
to inflation or the role of fiscal policy and central bank independence. Emerging market 
economies with flexible exchange rates that achieved low inflation tend to have indeed 
central banks where the government changed the central bank law, granted their central bank 
independence and often these central banks then adopted inflation targeting as monetary 
policy strategy. The analysis on the differences among the central and eastern European 
economies, however, allows us to conclude that these changes might in fact be the key stone 
of a successful transition from a centrally planed to a market economy. Only once these 
countries reformed their economies, abandoned administered prices and opened themselves 
to international markets, their economies were ready for persistently low inflation.  
This research on the choice of implicit inflation targets in transition countries has 
implications for other developing countries with high inflation. Once the most common 
reason for high inflation, namely unsustainable fiscal policy, is under control, other factors in 
the structure of the economy might still interfere with a market economy. The results might 
move the current focus on the implementation of certain laws that grant independence to the 
central bank with a commitment to low inflation toward the structural reforms in the 
economy. The results for transition countries emphasize for instance price liberalization and 
openness as key factors. Progress in these fields seems to be a prerequisite to the introduction 
of low inflation policies. Hence, the approach taken in Chapter 2 should be generalized to all 
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developing countries. An in-depth analysis would bring forth the individual countries’ reform 
potential and thereby help to focus structural reforms before taking the rather small step of 
granting independence to the central bank. 
Chapter 3 addressed two main issues on inflation targeting in Latin American and European 
emerging market economies. First, the estimations revealed differences in the speed of 
transmission of exchange rate shocks among the seven economies. Second, the empirical 
analysis allowed us to distinguish between what central banks announce (their de jure policy) 
and what they do (the de facto policy). All central banks adopted inflation targeting as their 
monetary strategy. The regressions showed that despite the common strategy, the actual 
conduct differs especially with respect to the reaction of the interest rate to exchange rate 
shocks. As part of the analysis, we were able to pin down whether announcement of changes 
in the strategy coincided with changes in the conduct of monetary policy. Understanding 
what is actually done in contrast to announced policy is a brick stone for central bank 
watching. The research agenda in this field is already well established. Central bank watchers 
regularly re-estimate the transmission mechanism in vector autoregressive models and trace 
changes in monetary policy with break point tests. Additionally, estimating different versions 
of Taylor rules allows them to identify the central bank’s relative weights put on inflation, 
output, and the exchange rate. All in all, this research has implications for transparency and 
accountability of central banks. The results verify central bank policies and thereby 
contribute to reliable monetary policy that stabilizes financial markets and thus the entire 
economy. 
Chapter 4 investigated the challenge of joining the euro area for central banks currently 
operating under an inflation targeting framework. Those central banks in central Europe will 
have to enter ERM 2 and target inflation and the exchange rate simultaneously. In a three-
country model, we focused on the implications of production sharing with third countries for 
monetary policy under an intermediate exchange rate regime like ERM 2. The analysis 
showed that stabilizing the exchange rate vis-à-vis the euro implies a higher loss to the 
central bank under vertical integration with a third country (producing complements) than 
under horizontal integration (producing substitutes). Among a set of simple monetary policy 
rules, the Taylor rule augmented for an exchange rate term turned out to have a reasonable 
performance under any form of integration.  
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Further research would shift modeling of production sharing via the consumption basket, i.e., 
the demand side of the economy, to the supply side by introducing internationally traded 
intermediate goods. In contrast to the present study, which shed light on qualitative 
differences, a calibrated model would allow us to quantify the implications of third-country 
effects from production sharing for monetary integration under ERM 2. 
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7 Technical Appendix to Chapter 4
7.1 Households
7.1.1 Utility Functions and Consumption Indexes
The representative household in country i, i = A,B,C (e.g., EMU accession
country, the rest of the world, euro area) maximizes the expected lifetime utility
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU it (C
i
t , L
i
t), (7.1)
with the respective period utility
U it =
1
1− µC
i
t
1−µ − 1
1 + γ
Lit
1+γ
. (7.2)
Consumption Basket
The household’s utility-based consumption basket distinguishes between goods
from the periphery, P, and the center, C,
Ci =
[
(np)
1
θ
(
CiP
) θ−1
θ + (1− nP )
1
θ
(
CiC
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
,
where nP is the size of the periphery relative to the center and θ is the in-
tratemporal elasticity of substitution between goods from the center versus the
periphery.1
The basket of goods produced in the periphery, i.e., in the two countries A
and B, is defined as
CiP =
[
(nA)
1
ψ
(
CiA
)ψ−1
ψ + (1− nA)
1
ψ
(
CiB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
,
where nA is the size of country A relative to country B and ψ is the intratemporal
elasticity of substitution between goods from country A versus country B, i.e.,
between the two goods from the periphery.
1For simplicity, we drop the time subscript.
Taken together the two consumption baskets form the nested consumption
basket
Ci =
(np) 1θ ([(nA) 1ψ (CiA)ψ−1ψ + (1− nA) 1ψ (CiB)ψ−1ψ ] ψψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+(1− nP )
1
θ
(
CiC
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
.
Consumption Basket with Home Bias
Each country prefers home goods over foreign goods, the so-called home bias in
consumption. The degree of openness, η, renders the consumption basket of each
country
CA =
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
([
[1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
)ψ−1
ψ
+ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) θ−1
θ

θ
θ−1
(7.3)
CB =
[1− η (1− nP )] 1θ ([(ηnA) 1ψ (CBA )ψ−1ψ + (1− ηnA) 1ψ (CBB )ψ−1ψ ] ψψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBC
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
(7.4)
CC =
(ηnP ) 1θ ([(nA) 1ψ (CCA)ψ−1ψ + (1− nA) 1ψ (CCB)ψ−1ψ ] ψψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+(1− ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCC
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
. (7.5)
The trade shares are given by
Country A
vAA = 1− [1− η (1− nP )] [η (1− nA)]− η (1− nP )
= [1− η (1− nP )] [1− η (1− nA)]
vAB = [1− η (1− nP )] [η (1− nA)]
vAC = η (1− nP )
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Country B
vBA = [1− η (1− nP )] ηnA
vBB = 1− [1− η (1− nP )] ηnA − η (1− nP )
= (1− ηnA) [1− η (1− nP )]
vBC = η (1− nP )
Country C
vCA = ηnPnA
vCB = ηnp (1− nA)
vCC = 1− ηnP
Consumption Index
The consumption indexes for the three countries i, i = A,B,C, are given by
CiA =
[(
1
nPnA
) 1
φ
∫ nPnA
0
(
CiA(z)
)φ−1
φ dz
] φ
φ−1
(7.6)
CiB =
[(
1
nP (1− nA)
) 1
φ
∫ nP
nPnA
(
CiB(z)
)φ−1
φ dz
] φ
φ−1
(7.7)
CiC =
[(
1
1− nP
) 1
φ
∫ 1
nP
(
CiC(z)
)φ−1
φ dz
] φ
φ−1
, (7.8)
where the subscript refers to the country of production and φ is the elasticity
of substitution for goods of different brands z, i.e., “varieties”. The size of each
country is given by
Country A Country B Country C
Size nPnA nP (1− nA) 1− nP
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7.1.2 Price Index
Consumer Price Index
The utility-based price indexes are defined analogously to the consumption basket
and are therefore broken down into the overall index
P i =
[
nP
(
P iP
)1−θ
+ (1− nP )
(
P iC
)1−θ] 11−θ
(7.9)
and the sub-index for prices of goods from the two periphery countries
P iP =
[
nA
(
P iA
)1−ψ
+ (1− nA)
(
P iB
)1−ψ] 11−ψ
. (7.10)
As with the consumption basket, introducing home bias renders the consumer
price index for each country
PA =
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
[(
[1− η (1− nA)]
(
PAA
)1−ψ
+η (1− nA)
(
PAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
PAC
)1−θ] 11−θ
(7.11)
PB =
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PBB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
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(7.12)
PC =
[
ηnP
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(
PCB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
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(
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(7.13)
and
P iA =
[
1
nPnA
∫ nPnA
0
(
P iA(z)
)1−φ
dz
] 1
1−φ
(7.14)
P iB =
[
1
nP (1− nA)
∫ nP
nPnA
(
P iB(z)
)1−φ
dz
] 1
1−φ
(7.15)
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P iC =
[
1
(1− nP )
∫ 1
nP
(
P iC(z)
)1−φ
dz
] 1
1−φ
, (7.16)
where P ii is the price index for domestic goods in country i or producer price
index, PPI.
7.1.3 Exchange Rates
Nominal Exchange Rate
The nominal exchange rate between country i and country i′ is defined as Sii′,t,
expressed as the price of currency i′ in currency i.2 Market clearing for the foreign
exchange market requires
Sii′ =
1
Si
′
i
(7.17)
and that exchange rates can be expressed in their cross rates
SAC = S
A
B · SBC . (7.18)
Real Exchange Rate
The real exchange rate between country i and country i′ is defined as the relative
CPI
RERii′,t =
Sii′,t · P i′t
P it
. (7.19)
Terms of Trade
The terms of trade between country i and country i′ are defined as the relative
price of imports
ToT ii′,t =
P ii′,t
P ii,t
, (7.20)
i.e., the price of imported goods (produced in country i′) in home (country i)
currency relative to the price of home goods (Corsetti et al. 2000: 222).
2The nominal exchange rate is not defined in terms of the two countries’ CPIs as purchasing
power parity does not hold (De Paoli 2006: 7).
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Alternatively, using the law of one price,3 P ii′,t = S
i
i′,t · P i′i′,t, it is the nominal
exchange rate times the producer price of imports (i.e., the foreign price of foreign
goods) over the home price of home goods
ToT ii′,t =
Sii′,t · P i′i′,t
P ii,t
. (7.21)
The terms of trade of one country are the inverse for the respective trade partner
country, which follows from the inverse of the nominal exchange rate (7.17)
ToT ii′,t =
Sii′,t · P i′i′,t
P ii,t
=
1
Si
′
i,t
· P
i′
i′,t
P ii,t
=
1
Si
′
i,t·P ii,t
P i
′
i′,t
=
1
ToT i
′
i,t
. (7.22)
Cross rates for the terms of trade follow from the cross rates for the nominal
exchange rate (7.18)
ToTAC,t = ToT
A
B,t · ToTBC,t (7.23)
SAC,t · PCC,t
PAA,t
=
SAB,t · PBB,t
PAA,t
· S
B
C,t · PCC,t
PBB,t
SAC,t · PCC,t
PAA,t
=
SAB,t · SBC,t · PCC,t
PAA,t
SAC,t = S
A
B,t · SBC,t.
Terms of trade relations for the periphery may be expressed in terms of the
3However, this does not imply purchasing power parity P it = S
i
i′,t · P i
′
t .
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relations of the countries A, B, and C.
ToTAP =
PAP
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+ η (1− nA)
(
SAB · PBB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ
PAA(
ToTAP
)1−ψ
= [1− η (1− nA)]
(
PAA
)1−ψ
(PAA )
1−ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+ η (1− nA)
(
SAB · PBB
)1−ψ
(PAA )
1−ψ
(
ToTAP
)1−ψ
= [1− η (1− nA)] + η (1− nA)
(
SAB · PBB
PAA
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ToTAB
1−ψ
(
ToTAP
)1−ψ
= [1− η (1− nA)] + η (1− nA)
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ
ToTAP =
[
[1− η (1− nA)] + η (1− nA)
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ] 11−ψ
(7.24)
ToTBP =
PBP
PBB
=
(
ηnA
(
PBA
)1−ψ
+ (1− ηnA)
(
PBB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ
PBB(
ToTBP
)1−ψ
= ηnA
(
SBA · PAA
)1−ψ
(PBB )
1−ψ + (1− ηnA)
(
PBB
)1−ψ
(PBB )
1−ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
1(
ToTBP
)1−ψ
= ηnA
(
SBA · PAA
PBB
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ToTBA
1−ψ
+ (1− ηnA)
ToTBP =
[
(1− ηnA) + ηnA
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ] 11−ψ
(7.25)
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ToTCP =
PCP
PCC
=
(
nA
(
PCA
)1−ψ
+ (1− nA)
(
PCB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ
PCC(
ToTCP
)1−ψ
= nA
(
PCA
)1−ψ
(PCC )
1−ψ + (1− nA)
(
PCB
)1−ψ
(PCC )
1−ψ
(
ToTCP
)1−ψ
= nA
(
PCA
PCC
)1−ψ
+ (1− nA)
(
PCB
PCC
)1−ψ
(
ToTCP
)1−ψ
= nA
(
SCA · PAA
PCC
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ToTCA
1−ψ
+ (1− nA)
(
SCB · PBB
PCC
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ToTCB
1−ψ
ToTCP =
[
nA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ (1− nA)
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ] 11−ψ
(7.26)
Taken together, the equations for the inverse of the terms of trade (7.22), the
cross rate (7.23), and the three expressions for the terms of trade related to the
periphery, (7.24), (7.25), and (7.26), reduce the number of necessary terms of
trade expressions to only two.
Purchasing Power Parity
If home bias is present, the law of one price does not imply purchasing power
parity. For simplicity, we only show this result for the center-periphery CPI (7.9).
P P 6= SPC · PC
⇔
[
(1− η (1− nP ))
(
P PP
)1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
P PC
)1−θ] 11−θ
6= SPC ·
[
ηnP
(
PCP
)1−θ
+ (1− ηnP )
(
PCC
)1−θ] 11−θ
⇔ (1− η (1− nP ))
(
P PP
)1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
P PC
)1−θ
6= (SPC )1−θ ·
[
ηnP
(
PCP
)1−θ
+ (1− ηnP )
(
PCC
)1−θ]
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⇔ (1− η (1− nP ))
(
P PP
)1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
P PC
)1−θ
6= (SPC )1−θηnP
(
PCP
)1−θ
+ (SPC )
1−θ (1− ηnP )
(
PCC
)1−θ
⇔ (1− η (1− nP ))
(
P PP
)1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
P PC
)1−θ
6= ηnP (SPC )1−θ(PCP )1−θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(PPP )
1−θ
+ (1− ηnP ) (SPC )1−θ(PCC )1−θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(PPC )
1−θ
Apply law of one price P PC = S
P
C · PCC
⇔ (1− η (1− nP ))
(
P PP
)1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
P PC
)1−θ
6= ηnP (P PP )1−θ + (1− ηnP ) (P PC )1−θ
Only if there is no home bias in consumption, η = 1,
⇔ (1− (1− nP ))
(
P PP
)1−θ
+ (1− nP )
(
P PC
)1−θ
= nP (P
P
P )
1−θ + (1− nP ) (P PC )1−θ
⇔ nP
(
P PP
)1−θ
+ (1− nP )
(
P PC
)1−θ
= nP (P
P
P )
1−θ + (1− nP ) (P PC )1−θ
are the weights equal across countries and purchasing power parity holds
P i = Sii′ · P i
′
.
CPI-PPI Ratio
For convenience, we derive the CPI-PPI ratios for each country. The expression
links CPI prices and domestic prices (PPI) to the terms of trade.
CPI-PPI Ratio for Country A Rewriting the consumer price index (7.11)
for country A
PA =
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
[(
[1− η (1− nA)]
(
PAA
)1−ψ
+η (1− nA)
(
PAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
PAC
)1−θ] 11−θ
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(
PA
)1−θ
= [1− η (1− nP )]
[(
[1− η (1− nA)]
(
PAA
)1−ψ
+η (1− nA)
(
PAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
PAC
)1−θ
.
Divide both sides by
(
PAA
)1−θ
(
PA
)1−θ
(PAA )
1−θ =
1(
PAA,t
)1−θ [1− η (1− nP )] [([1− η (1− nA)] (PAA )1−ψ
+η (1− nA)
(
PAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
PAC
)1−θ
(PAA )
1−θ
(
PA
PAA
)1−θ
= [1− η (1− nP )]
( 1
(PAA )
1−θ
) 1
1−θ (
[1− η (1− nA)]
(
PAA
)1−ψ
+η (1− nA)
(
PAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
PAC
PAA
)1−θ
(
PA
PAA
)1−θ
= [1− η (1− nP )]
[
1
PAA
(
[1− η (1− nA)]
(
PAA
)1−ψ
+η (1− nA)
(
PAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
PAC
PAA
)1−θ
(
PA
PAA
)1−θ
= [1− η (1− nP )]
[((
1
PAA
)1−ψ
[1− η (1− nA)]
(
PAA
)1−ψ
+
(
1
PAA
)1−ψ
η (1− nA)
(
PAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ1−θ + η (1− nP )(PAC
PAA
)1−θ
(
PA
PAA
)1−θ
= [1− η (1− nP )]
[(
[1− η (1− nA)]
(
PAA
PAA
)1−ψ
+η (1− nA)
(
PAB
PAA
)1−ψ) 11−ψ1−θ + η (1− nP )(PAC
PAA
)1−θ
.
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Applying the definition of the terms of trade (7.20)
(
PA
PAA
)1−θ
= [1− η (1− nP )]

[1− η (1− nA)](PAAPAA
)1−ψ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+η (1− nA)
(
PAB
PAA
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ToTAB
1−ψ

1
1−ψ

1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
PAC
PAA
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ToTAC
1−θ
(
PA
PAA
)1−θ
= [1− η (1− nP )]
[(
[1− η (1− nA)] + η (1− nA)
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+η (1− nP )
(
ToTAC
)1−θ
.
Define new function gA(ToT )
PA
PAA
=
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
[(
[1− η (1− nA)] + η (1− nA)
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+η (1− nP )
(
ToTAC
)1−θ] 11−θ ≡ gA(ToT ). (7.27)
CPI-PPI Ratio for Country B Rewriting the consumer price index (7.12)
for country B
PB =
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
[(
ηnA
(
PBA
)1−ψ
+(1− ηnA)
(
PBB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
PBC
)1−θ] 11−θ
(
PB
)1−θ
(PBB )
1−θ = [1− η (1− nP )]
( 1
(PBB )
1−θ
) 1
1−θ (
ηnA
(
PBA
)1−ψ
+(1− ηnA)
(
PBB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
PBC
)1−θ
(PBB )
1−θ
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(
PB
PBB
)1−θ
= [1− η (1− nP )]
[((
1
PBB
)1−ψ
ηnA
(
PBA
)1−ψ
+
(
1
PBB
)1−ψ
(1− ηnA)
(
PBB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ1−θ + η (1− nP )(PBC
PBB
)1−θ
(
PB
PBB
)1−θ
= [1− η (1− nP )]

ηnA
(
PBA
PBB
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ToTBA
1−ψ
+(1− ηnA)
(
PBB
PBB
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
1−ψ

1
1−ψ

1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
PBC
PBB
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ToTBC
1−θ
(
PB
PBB
)1−θ
= [1− η (1− nP )]
[(
ηnA
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ
+(1− ηnA))
1
1−ψ
]1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
ToTBC
)1−θ
.
Define new function gB(ToT )
PB
PBB
=
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
[(
ηnA
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ
+ (1− ηnA)
) 1
1−ψ
]1−θ
+η (1− nP )
(
ToTBC
)1−θ] 11−θ ≡ gB(ToT ). (7.28)
CPI-PPI Ratio for Country C Rewriting the consumer price index (7.13)
for country C
PC =
[
ηnP
[(
nA
(
PCA
)1−ψ
+(1− nA)
(
PCB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+(1− ηnP )
(
PCC
)1−θ] 11−θ
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(
PC
)1−θ
(PCC )
1−θ = ηnP
( 1
(PCC )
1−θ
) 1
1−θ (
nA
(
PCA
)1−ψ
+(1− nA)
(
PCB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+ (1− ηnP )
(
PCC
)1−θ
(PCC )
1−θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
(
PC
PCC
)1−θ
= ηnP
[((
1
PCC
)1−ψ
nA
(
PCA
)1−ψ
+
(
1
PCC
)1−ψ
(1− nA)
(
PCB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ1−θ + (1− ηnP )
(
PC
PCC
)1−θ
= ηnP

nA
(
PCA
PCC
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ToTCA
1−ψ
+(1− nA)
(
PCB
PCC
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ToTCB
1−ψ

1
1−ψ

1−θ
+ (1− ηnP ) .
Define new function gC(ToT )
PC
PCC
=
[
ηnP
[(
nA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+(1− nA)
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+(1− ηnP )]
1
1−θ ≡ gC(ToT ). (7.29)
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CPI-PPI Ratio for Periphery P Rewriting the consumer price index for
periphery P
P P =
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
(
P PP
)1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
P PC
)1−θ] 11−θ(
P P
)1−θ
= [1− η (1− nP )]
(
P PP
)1−θ
+ η (1− nP )
(
P PC
)1−θ(
P P
)1−θ
(P PP )
1−θ = [1− η (1− nP )]
(
P PP
)1−θ
(P PP )
1−θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
+ η (1− nP )
(
P PC
)1−θ
(P PP )
1−θ
(
P P
P PP
)1−θ
= [1− η (1− nP )] + η (1− nP )
(
P PC
P PP
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ToTPC
1−θ
P P
P PP
=
[
[1− η (1− nP )] + η (1− nP )
(
ToT PC
)1−θ] 11−θ ≡ gP (ToT ) .
RER-ToT Relation
Rearranging the terms of trade definition (7.21) to isolate the nominal exchange
rate
ToT ii′,t
P ii,t
P i
′
i′,t
= Sii′,t.
Substituting this nominal exchange rate expression in the definition of the real
exchange rate (7.19)
RERii′,t =
ToT ii′,t
P ii,t
P i
′
i′,t
· P i′t
P it
= ToT ii′,t
P i
′
t
P i
′
i′,t
P ii,t
P it
= ToT ii′,t
P i
′
t
P i
′
i′,t︸︷︷︸
gi′ (ToT )
(
P it
P ii,t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
gi(ToT )
−1
RERii′,t = ToT
i
i′,t · gi′(ToT ) · gi(ToT )−1 (7.30)
RERii′,t = ToT
i
i′,t
gi′(ToT )
gi(ToT )
.
See Faia and Monacelli (2004: 7, eq. 16).
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7.1.4 Budget Constraint
The household is constrained by the period budget constraint, where bonds Bit
are only denominated in country A’s currency4∑
ht+1
Qt,t+1S
i
A,tB
i
t+1 + P
i
tC
i
t = S
i
A,tB
i
t +W
i
tL
i
t +Ψ
i
t,
which corresponds to∑
ht+1
Qt,t+1
1
SAi,t
Bit+1 + P
i
tC
i
t =
1
SAi,t
Bit +W
i
tL
i
t +Ψ
i
t. (7.31)
Budget constraint for country A, i.e., the home country5∑
ht+1
Qt,t+1B
A
t+1 + P
A
t C
A
t = B
A
t +W
A
t L
A
t +Ψ
A
t . (7.32)
Budget constraint for country B, i.e., the foreign country∑
ht+1
Qt,t+1
1
SAB,t
BBt+1 + P
B
t C
B
t =
1
SAB,t
BBt +W
B
t L
B
t +Ψ
B
t . (7.33)
Budget constraint for country C, i.e., the other foreign country∑
ht+1
Qt,t+1
1
SAC,t
BCt+1 + P
C
t C
C
t =
1
SAC,t
BCt +W
C
t L
C
t +Ψ
C
t . (7.34)
Interest Rate
The gross nominal interest rate, Rit, on a riskless one-period bond in country i is
defined as (see Faia and Monacelli 2004: 6)
Rit ≡
1
Et
{
SAi,t+1
SAi,t
Qt,t+1
} (7.35)
4See Faia and Monacelli (2004). The choice of country in which the bonds are denominated
does not matter due to complete markets. The budget constraint in Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005)
is in real terms. Following Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005: 710) there is no money in the budget
constraint, nor in the utility function, as monetary policy is specified in terms of an interest rate
rule. Teo (2005) uses bond adjustment costs instead of complete markets to ensure stationarity.
5Notice that SAA,t = 1.
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Variables
Cit is aggregate consumption
Lit are labor hours
Bit+1 are nominal state contigent security denominated in country A’s currency
Qt,t+1 ≡ Q (ht+1 | ht) is the period-t price of a claim to one unit of country A’s
currency in state ht+1 divided by the probability of occurence of that state; each
asset in the portfolio Bit+1 pays one unit of country A’s currency at time t + 1
and in state ht+1 (see Faia and Monacelli 2004).
Sii′,t is the nominal exchange rate between country i and country i
′, expressed
as the price of country i′ in currency i, i.e., an increase in Sii′,t corresponds to a
depreciation of currency i against currency i′.
Rit is the gross nominal interest rate on a riskless one-period bond in country i.
W it is the nominal wage rate
P it is the consumer price index
Ψit is the dividend of domestic households from domestic firms
Elasticities
µ risk aversion: 2
γ inverse of the elasticity of labor supply: 3
θ elasticity of substitution for goods from the center versus the periphery, i. e.,
intratemporal elasticity: 1.5
ψ elasticity of substitution for goods from country A versus country B: 0.05 for
complements and 3 for substitutes
φ elasticity of substitution for goods of different brands z, i. e., “varieties”
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Parameters
β subjective discount factor: 0.99
η degree of openness: 1 (completely open) or 0.5 (with home bias)
7.1.5 Household’s Utility Maximization
Maximize (7.1) subject to (7.31)
max
{Cit(z), Lit(z)}
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtU it (C
i
t , L
i
t)
s.t.
∑
ht+1
Qt,t+1
1
SAi,t
Bit+1 + P
i
tC
i
t =
1
SAi,t
Bit +W
i
tL
i
t +Ψ
i
t
First Order Conditions (FOC)
FOCs are the same for all three countries i, i = A,B,C.
∂L
∂Cit
=
1− µ
1− µ
(
Cit
)−µ − λit P it = 0
⇔ (Cit)−µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
∂Uit
∂Cit
= λit P
i
t (7.36)
∂L
∂Lit
= − 1 + γ
1 + γ
(
Lit
)γ
+ λitW
i
t = 0
⇔ (Lit)γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
− ∂U
i
t
∂Lit
= λitW
i
t (7.37)
∂L
∂Bit
= −λit
[
− 1
SAi,t
]
− 1
β
λit−1Qt−1,t
1
SAi,t−1
= 0
⇔ λit
1
SAi,t
=
1
β
λit−1
1
SAi,t−1
Qt−1,t | ·β and iterate forward
⇔ βλit+1
1
SAi,t+1
= λit
1
SAi,t
Qt,t+1 (7.38)
⇔ βλ
i
t+1
λit
SAi,t
SAi,t+1
= Qt,t+1
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Equilibrium Equations
The equilibrium conditions stem from the first order conditions.
Consumption Labor Trade-Off Using (7.36)
∂U it
∂Cit
= λit P
i
t
⇔ λit =
∂U it
∂Cit
1
P it
=
(
Cit
)−µ 1
P it
and (7.37)
−∂U
i
t
∂Lit
= λitW
i
t
⇔ λit = −
∂U it
∂Lit
1
W it
=
(
Lit
)γ 1
W it
.
Substitute for λit (
Lit
)γ 1
W it
=
(
Cit
)−µ 1
P it(
Lit
)γ
P it =
(
Cit
)−µ
W it . (7.39)
Nominal Wage
W it =
−∂U it/∂Lit
∂U it/∂C
i
t
P it =
(Lit)
γ
(Cit)
−µ P
i
t . (7.40)
Real Wage
W it
P it
=
−∂U it/∂Lit
∂U it/∂C
i
t
=
(
Cit
)µ (
Lit
)γ
. (7.41)
Euler Equation for Bonds Deriving the Euler equation for bonds. Taking
λit from consumption FOC
λit = (C
i
t)
−µ 1
P it
.
Iterating forward one period
λit+1 = (C
i
t+1)
−µ 1
P it+1
.
151
Plugging these two λ-expressions into the FOC for bonds (7.38)
β
λit+1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Cit+1)
−µ 1
P it+1
1
SAi,t+1
=
λit︷ ︸︸ ︷
(Cit)
−µ 1
P it
1
SAi,t
Qt,t+1
β
(Cit+1)
−µ 1
SAi,t+1P
i
t+1
(Cit)
−µ 1
SAi,tP
i
t
= Qt,t+1
β
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−µ
P it
P it+1
SAi,t
SAi,t+1
= Qt,t+1 (7.42)
β
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−µ
P it
P it+1
=
SAi,t+1
SAi,t
Qt,t+1.
Applying the definition of the gross nominal interest rate in equation (7.35)
β
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−µ
P it
P it+1
=
1
Rit
. (7.43)
Deriving International Risk Sharing Euler equation (7.42) for home coun-
try A
β
(
CAt+1
CAt
)−µ
PAt
PAt+1
= Qt,t+1.
Euler equation for generic foreign country i
β
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−µ
P it
P it+1
SAi,t
SAi,t+1
= Qt,t+1.
Equalize the two Euler equations due to the existence of complete markets for
nominal state contingent securities
β
(
CAt+1
CAt
)−µ
PAt
PAt+1
= Qt,t+1 = β
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−µ SAi,tP it
SAi,t+1P
i
t+1
. (7.44)
Divide by β and PAt , multiply with P
A
t+1 and apply definition of the real exchange
rate (7.19), (
CAt+1
CAt
)−µ
=
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−µ SAi,tP it
PAt︸ ︷︷ ︸
RERAi,t
PAt+1
SAi,t+1P
i
t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(RERAi,t+1)
−1(
CAt+1
CAt
)−µ
=
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−µ(RERAi,t+1
RERAi,t
)−1
. (7.45)
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Imposing that purchasing power parity (PPP)6 holds at all times the
real exchange rate is redundant
PAt = S
A
i,tP
i
t
1 =
SAi,tP
i
t
PAt
= RERAi,t. (7.46)
Thus, there is complete risk sharing. The level of consumption is the same in all
three countries
(
CAt+1
CAt
)−µ
=
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−µ
(
Cit
CAt
)−µ
=
(
Cit+1
CAt+1
)−µ
.
By iterating this equation one period forward(
Cit+1
CAt+1
)−µ
=
(
Cit+2
CAt+2
)−µ
and substituting we obtain (
Cit
CAt
)−µ
=
(
Cit+2
CAt+2
)−µ
and in general for time t+ k(
Cit
CAt
)−µ
=
(
Cit+k
CAt+k
)−µ
.
The relation holds in every period7(
CAt
)−µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Uc(CAt )
=
(
Cit
)−µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Uc(Cit)
(7.47)
CAt = C
i
t = Ct (7.48)
6See also Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005: 713, eq. 16).
7Notice, one actually has to take into account the initial cross-country distribution of wealth.
Here, we assume symmetric initial conditions, i.e., zero net foreign asset holdings and an ex
ante identical environment. See Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005: 713) and Monacelli (2001: 391, eq.
14).
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and the level of consumption is the same in all three economies.
If PPP does not hold, due to home bias in consumption, we continue from
equation (7.45) (
CAt+1
CAt
)−µ
=
(
Cit+1
Cit
)−µ(RERAi,t+1
RERAi,t
)−1
(
Cit
CAt
)−µ
=
(
Cit+1
CAt+1
)−µ(RERAi,t+1
RERAi,t
)−1
.
By iterating this equation one period forward(
Cit+1
CAt+1
)−µ
=
(
Cit+2
CAt+2
)−µ(RERAi,t+2
RERAi,t+1
)−1
and substituting we obtain(
Cit
CAt
)−µ
=
(
Cit+2
CAt+2
)−µ(RERAi,t+2
RERAi,t+1
)−1(
RERAi,t+1
RERAi,t
)−1
(
Cit
CAt
)−µ
=
(
Cit+2
CAt+2
)−µ(RERAi,t+2
RERAi,t
)−1
and in general for time t+ k(
Cit
CAt
)−µ
=
(
Cit+k
CAt+k
)−µ(RERAi,t+k
RERAi,t
)−1
(
Cit
Cit+k
)−µ
=
(
CAt
CAt+k
)−µ RERAi,t
RERAi,t+k
.
The relation holds in every period(
Cit
)−µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Uc(Cit)
=
(
CAt
)−µ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Uc(CAt )
RERAi,t
(
CAt
)µ
=
(
Cit
)µ ·RERAi,t
CAt = C
i
t ·
(
RERAi,t
) 1
µ . (7.49)
See Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005: 713, eq. 17). Substitute expression of the real
exchange rate by equation (7.30) in terms of trade.
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For country A and B
CAt = C
B
t ·
(
RERAB,t
) 1
µ
CAt = C
B
t ·
(
ToTAB,t
gB(ToT )
gA(ToT )
) 1
µ
CAt = C
B
t
(
ToTAB,t
) 1
µ gB(ToT )
1
µ gA(ToT )
− 1
µ . (7.50)
For country A and C
CAt = C
C
t ·
(
RERAC,t
) 1
µ
CAt = C
C
t ·
(
ToTAC,t
gC(ToT )
gA(ToT )
) 1
µ
CAt = C
C
t
(
ToTAC,t
) 1
µ gC(ToT )
1
µ gA(ToT )
− 1
µ . (7.51)
7.1.6 Deriving Demand Functions
The demand functions stem from a cost minimization of the household when
consuming goods from different countries, i, and different brands, z.
Individual Demand Function A
Notice, the demand function for individual brands z depends only on the size of
the country and not on the trade share. Hence, home bias does not enter.
max
CiA(z)
CiA =
[
(nPnA)
− 1
φ
∫ nPnA
0
(
CiA(z)
)φ−1
φ dz
] φ
φ−1
s.t. Xt ≥
∫ nPnA
0
P iA(z)C
i
A(z) dz
Transform into Lagrangian L = f(x)− λ · h(x)
h(x) ≡ Xt −
∫ nPnA
0
P iA(z)C
i
A(z) dz ≥ 0
L =
[
(nPnA)
− 1
φ
∫ nPnA
0
(
CiA(z)
)φ−1
φ dz
] φ
φ−1
− λ
[
Xt −
∫ nPnA
0
P iA(z)C
i
A(z) dz
]
.
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First order condition
∂L
∂CiA(z)
=
φ
φ− 1
[
(nPnA)
− 1
φ
∫ nPnA
0
(
CiA(z)
)φ−1
φ dz
]φ−(φ−1)φ−1︷ ︸︸ ︷φ
φ−1−1
· (nPnA)−
1
φ
φ− 1
φ
(
CiA(z)
) φ−1−φφ︷ ︸︸ ︷φ−1
φ
−1 1
dCiA(z)
dz
− λ (−1) · P iA(z)
1
dCiA(z)
dz
= 0
∣∣∣∣ · dCiA(z)dz
⇔
[
(nPnA)
− 1
φ
∫ nPnA
0
(
CiA(z)
)φ−1
φ dz
] 1
φ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CiA)
1
φ
(nPnA)
− 1
φ
(
CiA(z)
)− 1
φ + λP iA(z) = 0
⇔ −λP iA(z) =
(
CiA
) 1
φ (nPnA)
− 1
φ
(
CiA(z)
)− 1
φ
⇔ −λP iA(z)CiA(z) =
(
CiA
) 1
φ (nPnA)
− 1
φ
(
CiA(z)
)φ−1
φ .
Taking integrals
⇔ −λ
∫ nPnA
0
P iA(z)C
i
A(z) dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xt=P iA C
i
A
=
∫ nPnA
0
(nPnA)
− 1
φ
(
CiA(z)
)φ−1
φ dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CiA)
φ−1
φ
(
CiA
) 1
φ
⇔ −λP iACiA = (CiA)
φ−1
φ
(
CiA
) 1
φ
⇔ −λP iA = (CiA)
φ−1+1−φ
φ =
(
CiA
)0
= 1
⇔ λ = − 1
P iA
.
Substitute λ in FOC
⇔ (−1) ·
(
− 1
P iA
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ
P iA(z) =
(
CiA
) 1
φ (nPnA)
− 1
φ
(
CiA(z)
)− 1
φ
⇔ (CiA(z)) 1φ = (P iA(z)P iA
)−1
(nPnA)
− 1
φ
(
CiA
) 1
φ
⇔ CiA(z) =
(
P iA(z)
P iA
)−φ
(nPnA)
−1 CiA. (7.52)
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Individual Demand Function B
max
CiB(z)
CiB =
[
((1− nA)nP )−
1
φ
∫ nP
nPnA
(
CiB(z)
)φ−1
φ dz
] φ
φ−1
s.t. Xt ≥
∫ nP
nPnA
P iB(z)C
i
B(z) dz
Transform into Lagrangian L = f(x)− λ · h(x)
h(x) ≡ Xt −
∫ nP
nPnA
P iB(z)C
i
B(z) dz ≥ 0
L =
[
((1− nA)nP )−
1
φ
∫ nP
nPnA
(
CiB(z)
)φ−1
φ dz
] φ
φ−1
−λ
[
Xt −
∫ nP
nPnA
P iB(z)C
i
B(z) dz
]
.
First order condition
∂L
∂CiB(z)
= φ
φ−1
[
((1− nA)nP )−
1
φ
∫ nP
nPnA
(CiB(z))
φ−1
φ dz
]φ−(φ−1)φ−1︷ ︸︸ ︷φ
φ−1−1
· ((1− nA)nP )−
1
φ φ−1
φ
(CiB(z))
φ−1−φ
φ︷ ︸︸ ︷
φ−1
φ
−1 1
dCi
B
(z)
dz
− λ (−1) · P iB(z) 1dCi
B
(z)
dz
= 0
∣∣∣ · dCiB(z)dz
⇔
[
((1− nA)nP )−
1
φ
∫ nP
nPnA
(
CiB(z)
)φ−1
φ dz
] 1
φ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CiB)
1
φ
((1− nA)nP )−
1
φ
(
CiB(z)
)− 1
φ
+λP iB(z) = 0
⇔ −λP iB(z) =
(
CiB
) 1
φ ((1− nA)nP )−
1
φ
(
CiB(z)
)− 1
φ
⇔ −λP iB(z)CiB(z) =
(
CiB
) 1
φ ((1− nA)nP )−
1
φ
(
CiB(z)
)φ−1
φ .
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Taking integrals
⇔ −λ
∫ nP
nPnA
P iB(z)C
i
B(z) dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xt=P iB C
i
B
=
∫ nP
nPnA
((1− nA)nP )−
1
φ
(
CiB(z)
)φ−1
φ dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CiB)
φ−1
φ
(
CiB
) 1
φ
⇔ −λP iB CiB = (CiB)
φ−1
φ
(
CiB
) 1
φ
⇔ −λP iB = (CiB)
φ−1+1−φ
φ =
(
CiB
)0
= 1
⇔ λ = − 1
P iB
.
Substitute λ in FOC
⇔ (−1) ·
(
− 1
P iB
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ
P iB(z) =
(
CiB
) 1
φ ((1− nA)nP )−
1
φ
(
CiB(z)
)− 1
φ
⇔ (CiB(z)) 1φ = (P iB(z)P iB
)−1
((1− nA)nP )−
1
φ
(
CiB
) 1
φ
⇔ CiB(z) =
(
P iB(z)
P iB
)−φ
((1− nA)nP )−1 CiB. (7.53)
Individual Demand Function C
max
CiC(z)
CiC =
[
(1− nP )−
1
φ
∫ 1
nP
(
CiC(z)
)φ−1
φ dz
] φ
φ−1
s.t. Xt ≥
∫ 1
nP
P iC(z)C
i
C(z) dz
Transform into Lagrangian L = f(x)− λ · h(x)
h(x) ≡ Xt −
∫ 1
nP
P iC(z)C
i
C(z) dz ≥ 0
L =
[
(1− nP )−
1
φ
∫ 1
nP
(
CiC(z)
)φ−1
φ dz
] φ
φ−1
− λ
[
Xt −
∫ 1
nP
P iC(z)C
i
C(z) dz
]
.
First order condition
∂L
∂CiC(z)
= φ
φ−1
[
(1− nP )−
1
φ
∫ 1
nP
(CiC(z))
φ−1
φ dz
]φ−(φ−1)φ−1︷ ︸︸ ︷φ
φ−1−1
· (1− nP )−
1
φ φ−1
φ
(CiC(z))
φ−1−φ
φ︷ ︸︸ ︷
φ−1
φ
−1 1
dCi
C
(z)
dz
− λ (−1) · P iC(z) 1dCi
C
(z)
dz
= 0
∣∣∣ · dCiC(z)dz
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⇔
[
(1− nP )−
1
φ
∫ 1
nP
(
CiC(z)
)φ−1
φ dz
] 1
φ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CiC)
1
φ
(1− nP )−
1
φ
(
CiC(z)
)− 1
φ + λP iC(z) = 0
⇔ −λP iC(z) =
(
CiC
) 1
φ (1− nP )−
1
φ
(
CiC(z)
)− 1
φ
⇔ −λP iC(z)CiC(z) =
(
CiC
) 1
φ (1− nP )−
1
φ
(
CiC(z)
)φ−1
φ .
Taking integrals
⇔ −λ
∫ 1
nP
P iC(z)C
i
C(z) dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
Xt=P iC C
i
C
=
∫ 1
nP
(1− nP )−
1
φ
(
CiC(z)
)φ−1
φ dz︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CiC)
φ−1
φ
(
CiC
) 1
φ
⇔ −λP iC CiC = (CiC)
φ−1
φ
(
CiC
) 1
φ
⇔ −λP iC = (CiC)
φ−1+1−φ
φ =
(
CiC
)0
= 1
⇔ λ = − 1
P iC
.
Substitute λ in FOC
⇔ (−1) ·
(
− 1
P iC
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
λ
P iC(z) =
(
CiC
) 1
φ (1− nP )−
1
φ
(
CiC(z)
)− 1
φ
⇔ (CiC(z)) 1φ = (P iC(z)P iC
)−1
(1− nP )−
1
φ
(
CiC
) 1
φ
⇔ CiC(z) =
(
P iC(z)
P iC
)−φ
(1− nP )−1 CiC . (7.54)
7.1.7 Aggregate Demand Function
Due to the nested consumption basket and the introduction of home bias in
consumption the aggregate demand functions have to be derived individually.
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Aggregate Demand Function for Country A
Maximize total expenditure, Z, consisting of country A’s CPI price index, PA,
times total consumption, CA.
max
CA
Z = CA PA
s.t. CA =
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
([
[1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
)ψ−1
ψ
+ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) θ−1
θ

θ
θ−1
Transform into Lagrangian L = f(x)− λ · h(x)
f(x) ≡ CA PA = CAA PAA + CAB PAB + CAC PAC
h(x) ≡
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
([
[1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
)ψ−1
ψ
+ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) θ−1
θ

θ
θ−1
− CA ≥ 0
L = CAA PAA + CAB PAB + CAC PAC
−λ
{[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
([
[1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
)ψ−1
ψ
+ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) θ−1
θ

θ
θ−1
− CA
 .
First order conditions for country A
Country A’s demand for periphery P ’s goods
L = CAP PAP + CAC PAC
−λ
{[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAP
) θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1 − CA
}
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∂L
∂CAP
= PAP − λ
θ
θ − 1
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAP
) θ−1
θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+[η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) θ−1
θ
]θ−(θ−1)θ−1︷︸︸︷1
θ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CA)
1
θ
·θ − 1
θ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAP
)θ−1−θθ︷︸︸︷− 1
θ = 0
⇔ PAP = λ
θ
θ − 1 (C
A)
1
θ
θ − 1
θ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAP
)− 1
θ
⇔ PAP = λ(CA)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAP
)− 1
θ
⇔ PAP CAP = λ(CA)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAP
) θ−1
θ (7.55)
PAP = λ(C
A)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAP
)− 1
θ
PAP = λ
(
CA
CAP
) 1
θ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
λ
(
CA
CAP
) 1
θ
= [1− η (1− nP )]−
1
θ PAP (7.56)
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Country A’s demand for country A’s goods
∂L
∂CAA
= PAA − λ
θ
θ − 1
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
([
[1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
)ψ−1
ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) θ−1
θ

θ−(θ−1)
θ−1︷︸︸︷
1
θ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CA)
1
θ
·θ − 1
θ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
·
([
[1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
)ψ−1
ψ + [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
)θ−1−θθ︷︸︸︷− 1
θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CAP )
− 1
θ
· ψ
ψ − 1
[
[1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
)ψ−1
ψ + [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
)ψ−1
ψ
]
ψ−(ψ−1)
ψ−1︷︸︸︷
1
ψ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CAP )
1
ψ
·ψ − 1
ψ
[1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
)ψ−1−ψψ︷︸︸︷− 1
ψ = 0
⇔ PAA = λ
θ
θ − 1 (C
A)
1
θ
θ − 1
θ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAP
)− 1
θ
· ψ
ψ − 1
(
CAP
) 1
ψ
ψ − 1
ψ
[1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PAA = λ(CA)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAP
)− 1
θ
(
CAP
) 1
ψ [1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PAA = λ(CA)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ [1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAP
) 1
ψ
− 1
θ
(
CAA
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PAACAA = λ(CA)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ [1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAP
) 1
ψ
− 1
θ
(
CAA
)ψ−1
ψ
(7.57)
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PAA = λ(C
A)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAP
)− 1
θ
(
CAP
) 1
ψ [1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
)− 1
ψ
PAA = λ
(
CA
CAP
) 1
θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(7.56)
(
CAP
CAA
) 1
ψ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ [1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
PAA = [1− η (1− nP )]−
1
θ PAP
(
CAP
CAA
) 1
ψ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ [1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
) 1
ψ = [1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
PAA
PAP
)−1 (
CAP
) 1
ψ
CAA = [1− η (1− nA)]
(
PAA
PAP
)−ψ
CAP (7.58)
Country A’s demand for country B’s goods
∂L
∂CAB
= PAB − λ
θ
θ − 1
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
([
[1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
)ψ−1
ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) θ−1
θ

θ−(θ−1)
θ−1︷︸︸︷
1
θ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CA)
1
θ
·θ − 1
θ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
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·
([
[1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
)ψ−1
ψ + [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
)θ−1−θθ︷︸︸︷− 1
θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CAP )
− 1
θ
· ψ
ψ − 1
[
[1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
)ψ−1
ψ + [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
)ψ−1
ψ
]
ψ−(ψ−1)
ψ−1︷︸︸︷
1
ψ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CAP )
1
ψ
·ψ − 1
ψ
[η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
)ψ−1−ψψ︷︸︸︷− 1
ψ = 0
⇔ PAB = λ
θ
θ − 1 (C
A)
1
θ
θ − 1
θ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAP
)− 1
θ
· ψ
ψ − 1
(
CAP
) 1
ψ
ψ − 1
ψ
[η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PAB = λ(CA)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAP
)− 1
θ
(
CAP
) 1
ψ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PAB = λ(CA)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAP
) 1
ψ
− 1
θ
(
CAB
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PABCAB = λ(CA)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAP
) 1
ψ
− 1
θ
(
CAB
)ψ−1
ψ
(7.59)
PAB = λ(C
A)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAP
)− 1
θ
(
CAP
) 1
ψ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
)− 1
ψ
PAB = λ
(
CA
CAP
) 1
θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(7.56)
(
CAP
CAB
) 1
ψ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
PAB = P
A
P [1− η (1− nP )]−
1
θ
(
CAP
CAB
) 1
ψ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
) 1
ψ = [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
PAB
PAP
)−1 (
CAP
) 1
ψ
CAB = η (1− nA)
(
PAB
PAP
)−ψ
CAP (7.60)
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Country A’s demand for country C’s goods
∂L
∂CAC
= PAC − λ
θ
θ − 1
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
([
[1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
)ψ−1
ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) θ−1
θ

θ−(θ−1)
θ−1︷︸︸︷
1
θ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CA)
1
θ
·θ − 1
θ
[η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
)θ−1−θθ︷︸︸︷− 1
θ = 0
⇔ PAC = λ
θ
θ − 1 (C
A)
1
θ
θ − 1
θ
[η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
)− 1
θ
⇔ PAC = λ(CA)
1
θ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
)− 1
θ
⇔ PACCAC = λ(CA)
1
θ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) θ−1
θ (7.61)
PAC = λ(C
A)
1
θ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
)− 1
θ
PAC = λ
(
CA
CAC
) 1
θ
[η (1− nP )]
1
θ (7.62)
Intermediate Step: Deriving the Lagrange Multiplier Using definition
of total expenditure
Z = CAPA = CAA P
A
A + C
A
B P
A
B + C
A
C P
A
C
and FOC expressions for CAAP
A
A , C
A
BP
A
B , and C
A
CP
A
C .
CAPA = λ(CA)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ [1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAP
) 1
ψ
− 1
θ
(
CAA
)ψ−1
ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(7.57)
+λ(CA)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAP
) 1
ψ
− 1
θ
(
CAB
)ψ−1
ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(7.59)
+λ(CA)
1
θ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) θ−1
θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(7.61)
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= λ(CA)
1
θ
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAP
) 1
ψ
− 1
θ
(
[1− η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAA
)ψ−1
ψ
+ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CAB
)ψ−1
ψ
)
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) θ−1
θ
]
= λ(CA)
1
θ
[1− η (1− nP )] 1θ (CAP ) 1ψ− 1θ (CAP )ψ−1ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CAP )
θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) θ−1
θ

= λ(CA)
1
θ
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAP
) θ−1
θ + [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) θ−1
θ
]
(
CAP
) 1
ψ
(
CAP
)ψ−1
ψ
(
CAP
)− 1
θ =
(
CAP
) 1+ψ−1
ψ
(
CAP
)− 1
θ =
(
CAP
)1 (
CAP
)− 1
θ =
(
CAP
) θ−1
θ
= λ (CA)
1
θ
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAP
) θ−1
θ + [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) θ−1
θ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CA)
θ−1
θ
= λ (CA)
1
θ (CA)
θ−1
θ
⇔ CAPA = λCA
⇔ PA = λ (7.63)
Holds for all consumption baskets P i = λ for i = A,B,C.
Summary: Aggregate Demand Functions for Country A Using (7.63) to
derive country A’s demand for goods from the periphery P
PA︸︷︷︸
λ
(
CA
CAP
) 1
θ
= [1− η (1− nP )]−
1
θ PAP
(
CAP
) 1
θ = [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
PAP
PA
)−1 (
CA
) 1
θ
CAP = [1− η (1− nP )]
(
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA. (7.64)
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Country A’s demand for country A’s goods
CAA = [1− η (1− nA)]
(
PAA
PAP
)−ψ
[1− η (1− nP )]
(
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA︸ ︷︷ ︸
CAP
CAA = [1− η (1− nA)] [1− η (1− nP )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
vAA
(
PAA
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA (7.65)
vAA ≡ 1− [1− η (1− nP )] [η (1− nA)]− η (1− nP )
= 1− [1− η + ηnP ] [η − ηnA]− η + ηnP
= 1− [η − ηnA − η2 + η2nA + η2nP − η2nPnA]− η + ηnP
= 1− η + ηnA + η2 − η2nA − η2nP + η2nPnA − η + ηnP
= 1− η + ηnP − η + η2 − η2nP + ηnA − η2nA + η2nPnA
= [1− η + ηnA] [1− η + ηnP ]
= [1− η (1− nP )] [1− η (1− nA)]
Country A’s demand for country B’s goods
CAB = η (1− nA)
(
PAB
PAP
)−ψ
[1− η (1− nP )]
(
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA︸ ︷︷ ︸
CAP
CAB = η (1− nA) [1− η (1− nP )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
vAB
(
PAB
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA (7.66)
Country A’s demand for country C’s goods
PAC = P
A︸︷︷︸
λ
(
CA
CAC
) 1
θ
[η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) 1θ
= [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
PAC
PA
)−1 (
CA
) 1
θ
CAC = η (1− nP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
vAC
(
PAC
PA
)−θ
CA (7.67)
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Aggregate Demand Function for Country B
Maximize total expenditure, Z, consisting of country B’s CPI price index, PB,
times total consumption, CB.
max
CB
Z = CB PB
s.t. CB =
[1− η (1− nP )] 1θ ([(ηnA) 1ψ (CBA )ψ−1ψ + (1− ηnA) 1ψ (CBB )ψ−1ψ ] ψψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBC
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
Transform into Lagrangian L = f(x)− λ · h(x)
f(x) ≡ CB PB = CBA PBA + CBB PBB + CBC PBC
h(x) ≡
[1− η (1− nP )] 1θ ([(ηnA) 1ψ (CBA )ψ−1ψ + (1− ηnA) 1ψ (CBB )ψ−1ψ ] ψψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBC
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1 − CB ≥ 0
L = CBA PBA + CBB PBB + CBC PBC
−λ

[1− η (1− nP )] 1θ ([(ηnA) 1ψ (CBA )ψ−1ψ + (1− ηnA) 1ψ (CBB )ψ−1ψ ] ψψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBC
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1 − CB
}
.
First order conditions for country B
Country B’s demand for periphery P ’s goods
L = CBP PBP + CBC PBC
−λ
{[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBP
) θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBC
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1 − CB
}
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∂L
∂CBP
= PBP − λ
θ
θ − 1
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBP
) θ−1
θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+[η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBC
) θ−1
θ
]θ−(θ−1)θ−1︷︸︸︷1
θ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CB)
1
θ
·θ − 1
θ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBP
)θ−1−θθ︷︸︸︷− 1
θ = 0
⇔ PBP = λ
θ
θ − 1 (C
B)
1
θ
θ − 1
θ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBP
)− 1
θ
⇔ PBP = λ(CB)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBP
)− 1
θ
⇔ PBP CBP = λ(CB)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBP
) θ−1
θ (7.68)
PBP = λ(C
B)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBP
)− 1
θ
PBP = λ
(
CB
CBP
) 1
θ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
λ
(
CB
CBP
) 1
θ
= [1− η (1− nP )]−
1
θ PBP (7.69)
169
Country B’s demand for country A’s goods
∂L
∂CBA
= PBA − λ
θ
θ − 1
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
([
(ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBA
)ψ−1
ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ (1− ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBC
) θ−1
θ

θ−(θ−1)
θ−1︷︸︸︷
1
θ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CB)
1
θ
·θ − 1
θ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
·
([
(ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBA
)ψ−1
ψ + (1− ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
)θ−1−θθ︷︸︸︷− 1
θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CBP )
− 1
θ
· ψ
ψ − 1
[
(ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBA
)ψ−1
ψ + (1− ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBB
)ψ−1
ψ
]
ψ−(ψ−1)
ψ−1︷︸︸︷
1
ψ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CBP )
1
ψ
·ψ − 1
ψ
(ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBA
)ψ−1−ψψ︷︸︸︷− 1
ψ = 0
⇔ PBA = λ
θ
θ − 1 (C
B)
1
θ
θ − 1
θ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBP
)− 1
θ
· ψ
ψ − 1
(
CBP
) 1
ψ
ψ − 1
ψ
(ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBA
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PBA = λ(CB)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBP
)− 1
θ
(
CBP
) 1
ψ (ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBA
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PBA = λ(CB)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ (ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBP
) 1
ψ
− 1
θ
(
CBA
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PBA CBA = λ(CB)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ (ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBP
) 1
ψ
− 1
θ
(
CBA
)ψ−1
ψ
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PBA = λ(C
B)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBP
)− 1
θ
(
CBP
) 1
ψ (ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBA
)− 1
ψ
PBA = λ
(
CB
CBP
) 1
θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(7.69)
(
CBP
CBA
) 1
ψ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ (ηnA)
1
ψ
PBA = [1− η (1− nP )]−
1
θ PBP
(
CBP
CBA
) 1
ψ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ (ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBA
) 1
ψ = (ηnA)
1
ψ
(
PBA
PBP
)−1 (
CBP
) 1
ψ
CBA = ηnA
(
PBA
PBP
)−ψ
CBP (7.70)
Country B’s demand for country B’s goods
∂L
∂CBB
= PBB − λ
θ
θ − 1
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
([
(ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBA
)ψ−1
ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ (1− ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBC
) θ−1
θ

θ−(θ−1)
θ−1︷︸︸︷
1
θ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CB)
1
θ
·θ − 1
θ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
·
([
(ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBA
)ψ−1
ψ + (1− ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
)θ−1−θθ︷︸︸︷− 1
θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CBP )
− 1
θ
· ψ
ψ − 1
[
(ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBA
)ψ−1
ψ + (1− ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBB
)ψ−1
ψ
]
ψ−(ψ−1)
ψ−1︷︸︸︷
1
ψ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CBP )
1
ψ
·ψ − 1
ψ
(1− ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBB
)ψ−1−ψψ︷︸︸︷− 1
ψ = 0
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⇔ PBB = λ
θ
θ − 1 (C
B)
1
θ
θ − 1
θ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBP
)− 1
θ
· ψ
ψ − 1
(
CBP
) 1
ψ
ψ − 1
ψ
(1− ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBB
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PBB = λ(CB)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBP
)− 1
θ
(
CBP
) 1
ψ (1− ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBB
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PBB = λ(CB)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ (1− ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBP
) 1
ψ
− 1
θ
(
CBB
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PBB CBB = λ(CB)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ (1− ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBP
) 1
ψ
− 1
θ
(
CBB
)ψ−1
ψ (7.71)
PBB = λ(C
B)
1
θ [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBP
)− 1
θ
(
CBP
) 1
ψ (1− ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBB
)− 1
ψ
PBB = λ
(
CB
CBP
) 1
θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(7.69)
(
CBP
CBB
) 1
ψ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ (1− ηnA)
1
ψ
PBB = [1− η (1− nP )]−
1
θ PBP
(
CBP
CBB
) 1
ψ
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ (1− ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBB
) 1
ψ = (1− ηnA)
1
ψ
(
PBB
PBP
)−1 (
CBP
) 1
ψ
CBB = (1− ηnA)
(
PBB
PBP
)−ψ
CBP (7.72)
Country B’s demand for country C’s goods
∂L
∂CBC
= PBC − λ
θ
θ − 1
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
([
(ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CBA
)ψ−1
ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ (1− ηnA)
1
ψ
(
CAB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CAC
) θ−1
θ

θ−(θ−1)
θ−1︷︸︸︷
1
θ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CB)
1
θ
·θ − 1
θ
[η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBC
)θ−1−θθ︷︸︸︷− 1
θ = 0
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⇔ PBC = λ
θ
θ − 1 (C
B)
1
θ
θ − 1
θ
[η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBC
)− 1
θ
⇔ PBC = λ(CB)
1
θ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBC
)− 1
θ
⇔ PBC CBC = λ(CB)
1
θ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBC
) θ−1
θ
PBC = λ(C
B)
1
θ [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBC
)− 1
θ
PBC = λ
(
CB
CBC
) 1
θ
[η (1− nP )]
1
θ
Summary: Aggregate Demand Functions for Country B Using (7.63) to
derive country B’s demand for goods from the periphery P
PB︸︷︷︸
λ
(
CB
CBP
) 1
θ
= [1− η (1− nP )]−
1
θ PBP
(
CBP
) 1
θ = [1− η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
PBP
PB
)−1 (
CB
) 1
θ
CBP = [1− η (1− nP )]
(
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB (7.73)
Country B’s demand for country A’s goods
CBA = ηnA
(
PBA
PBP
)−ψ
[1− η (1− nP )]
(
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB︸ ︷︷ ︸
CBP
CBA = ηnA [1− η (1− nP )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
vBA
(
PBA
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB (7.74)
Country B’s demand for country B’s goods
CBB = (1− ηnA)
(
PBB
PBP
)−ψ
[1− η (1− nP )]
(
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB︸ ︷︷ ︸
CBP
CBB = (1− ηnA) [1− η (1− nP )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
vBB
(
PBB
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB (7.75)
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vBB ≡ (1− ηnA) [1− η (1− nP )]
= (1− ηnA) [1− η + ηnP ]
= 1− η + ηnP − ηnA + η2nA − η2nPnA
= 1− ηnA + η2nA − η2nAnP − η + ηnP
= 1− [1− η + ηnP ] ηnA − η + ηnP
= 1− [1− η (1− nP )] ηnA − η (1− nP )
Country B’s demand for country C’s goods
PBC = P
B︸︷︷︸
λ
(
CB
CBC
) 1
θ
[η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
CBC
) 1
θ = [η (1− nP )]
1
θ
(
PBC
PB
)−1 (
CB
) 1
θ
CBC = η (1− nP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
vBC
(
PBC
PB
)−θ
CB (7.76)
Aggregate Demand Function for Country C
Maximize total expenditure, Z, consisting of country C’s CPI price index, PC ,
times total consumption, CC .
max
CC
Z = CC PC
s.t. CC =
(ηnP ) 1θ ([(nA) 1ψ (CCA)ψ−1ψ + (1− nA) 1ψ (CCB)ψ−1ψ ] ψψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+(1− ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCC
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1
Transform into Lagrangian L = f(x)− λ · h(x)
f(x) ≡ CC PC = CCA PCA + CCB PCB + CCC PCC
h(x) ≡
(ηnP ) 1θ ([(nA) 1ψ (CCA)ψ−1ψ + (1− nA) 1ψ (CCB)ψ−1ψ ] ψψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+(1− ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCC
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1 − CC ≥ 0
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L = CCA PCA + CCB PCB + CCC PCC
−λ

(ηnP ) 1θ ([(nA) 1ψ (CCA)ψ−1ψ + (1− nA) 1ψ (CCB)ψ−1ψ ] ψψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+(1− ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCC
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1 − CC
}
.
First order conditions for country C
Country C’s demand for periphery P ’s goods
L = CCP PCP + CBC PBC
−λ
{[
(ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCP
) θ−1
θ
+(1− ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCC
) θ−1
θ
] θ
θ−1 − CC
}
∂L
∂CCP
= PCP − λ
θ
θ − 1
[
(ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCP
) θ−1
θ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+(1− ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCC
) θ−1
θ
]θ−(θ−1)θ−1︷︸︸︷1
θ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CC)
1
θ
·θ − 1
θ
(ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCP
)θ−1−θθ︷︸︸︷− 1
θ = 0
⇔ PCP = λ
θ
θ − 1 (C
C)
1
θ
θ − 1
θ
(ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCP
)− 1
θ
⇔ PCP = λ(CC)
1
θ (ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCP
)− 1
θ
⇔ PCP CCP = λ(CC)
1
θ (ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCP
) θ−1
θ
PCP = λ(C
C)
1
θ (ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCP
)− 1
θ
PCP = λ
(
CC
CCP
) 1
θ
(ηnP )
1
θ
λ
(
CC
CCP
) 1
θ
= (ηnP )
− 1
θ PCP (7.77)
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Country C’s demand for country A’s goods
∂L
∂CCA
= PCA − λ
θ
θ − 1
[
(ηnP )
1
θ
([
(nA)
1
ψ
(
CCA
)ψ−1
ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CCB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ (1− ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCC
) θ−1
θ

θ−(θ−1)
θ−1︷︸︸︷
1
θ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CC)
1
θ
·θ − 1
θ
(ηnP )
1
θ
·
([
(nA)
1
ψ
(
CCA
)ψ−1
ψ + [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CCB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
)θ−1−θθ︷︸︸︷− 1
θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CCP )
− 1
θ
· ψ
ψ − 1
[
(nA)
1
ψ
(
CCA
)ψ−1
ψ + [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CCB
)ψ−1
ψ
]
ψ−(ψ−1)
ψ−1︷︸︸︷
1
ψ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CCP )
1
ψ
·ψ − 1
ψ
(nA)
1
ψ
(
CCA
)ψ−1−ψψ︷︸︸︷− 1
ψ = 0
⇔ PCA = λ
θ
θ − 1 (C
C)
1
θ
θ − 1
θ
(ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCP
)− 1
θ
· ψ
ψ − 1
(
CCP
) 1
ψ
ψ − 1
ψ
(nA)
1
ψ
(
CCA
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PCA = λ(CC)
1
θ (ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCP
)− 1
θ
(
CCP
) 1
ψ (nA)
1
ψ
(
CCA
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PCA = λ(CC)
1
θ (ηnP )
1
θ (nA)
1
ψ
(
CCP
) 1
ψ
− 1
θ
(
CCA
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PCACCA = λ(CC)
1
θ (ηnP )
1
θ (nA)
1
ψ
(
CCP
) 1
ψ
− 1
θ
(
CCA
)ψ−1
ψ
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PCA = λ(C
A)
1
θ (ηnP )
1
θ
(
CAP
)− 1
θ
(
CAP
) 1
ψ (nA)
1
ψ
(
CCA
)− 1
ψ
PCA = λ
(
CC
CCP
) 1
θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(7.77)
(
CCP
CCA
) 1
ψ
(ηnP )
1
θ (nA)
1
ψ
PCA = (ηnP )
− 1
θ PCP
(
CCP
CCA
) 1
ψ
(ηnP )
1
θ (nA)
1
ψ
(
CCA
) 1
ψ = (nA)
1
ψ
(
PCA
PCP
)−1 (
CCP
) 1
ψ
CCA = nA
(
PCA
PCP
)−ψ
CCP (7.78)
Country C’s demand for country B’s goods
∂L
∂CCB
= PCB − λ
θ
θ − 1
[
(ηnP )
1
θ
([
(nA)
1
ψ
(
CCA
)ψ−1
ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ (1− nA)
1
ψ
(
CCB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ (1− ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCC
) θ−1
θ

θ−(θ−1)
θ−1︷︸︸︷
1
θ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CC)
1
θ
·θ − 1
θ
(ηnP )
1
θ
·
([
(nA)
1
ψ
(
CCA
)ψ−1
ψ + (1− nA)
1
ψ
(
CCB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
)θ−1−θθ︷︸︸︷− 1
θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CCP )
− 1
θ
· ψ
ψ − 1
[
(nA)
1
ψ
(
CCA
)ψ−1
ψ + (1− nA)
1
ψ
(
CCB
)ψ−1
ψ
]
ψ−(ψ−1)
ψ−1︷︸︸︷
1
ψ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CCP )
1
ψ
·ψ − 1
ψ
(1− nA)
1
ψ
(
CCB
)ψ−1−ψψ︷︸︸︷− 1
ψ = 0
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⇔ PCB = λ
θ
θ − 1 (C
C)
1
θ
θ − 1
θ
(ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCP
)− 1
θ
· ψ
ψ − 1
(
CCP
) 1
ψ
ψ − 1
ψ
(1− nA)
1
ψ
(
CCB
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PCB = λ(CC)
1
θ (ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCP
)− 1
θ
(
CCP
) 1
ψ (1− nA)
1
ψ
(
CCB
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PCB = λ(CC)
1
θ (ηnP )
1
θ (1− nA)
1
ψ
(
CCP
) 1
ψ
− 1
θ
(
CCB
)− 1
ψ
⇔ PCBCCB = λ(CC)
1
θ (ηnP )
1
θ (1− nA)
1
ψ
(
CCP
) 1
ψ
− 1
θ
(
CCB
)ψ−1
ψ
PCB = λ(C
A)
1
θ (ηnP )
1
θ
(
CAP
)− 1
θ
(
CAP
) 1
ψ (1− nA)
1
ψ
(
CCB
)− 1
ψ
PCB = λ
(
CC
CCP
) 1
θ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(7.77)
(
CCP
CCB
) 1
ψ
(ηnP )
1
θ (1− nA)
1
ψ
PCB = (ηnP )
− 1
θ PCP
(
CCP
CCB
) 1
ψ
(ηnP )
1
θ (1− nA)
1
ψ
(
CCB
) 1
ψ = (1− nA)
1
ψ
(
PCB
PCP
)−1 (
CCP
) 1
ψ
CCB = (1− nA)
(
PCB
PCP
)−ψ
CCP (7.79)
Country C’s demand for country C’s goods
∂L
∂CCC
= PCC − λ
θ
θ − 1
[
(ηnP )
1
θ
([
(nA)
1
ψ
(
CCA
)ψ−1
ψ︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ [η (1− nA)]
1
ψ
(
CCB
)ψ−1
ψ
] ψ
ψ−1
) θ−1
θ
+ (1− ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCC
) θ−1
θ

θ−(θ−1)
θ−1︷︸︸︷
1
θ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(CC)
1
θ
·θ − 1
θ
(1− ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCC
)θ−1−θθ︷︸︸︷− 1
θ = 0
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⇔ PCC = λ
θ
θ − 1 (C
C)
1
θ
θ − 1
θ
(1− ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCC
)− 1
θ
⇔ PCC = λ(CC)
1
θ (1− ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCC
)− 1
θ
⇔ PCC CCC = λ(CC)
1
θ (1− ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCC
) θ−1
θ
PCC = λ(C
C)
1
θ (1− ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCC
)− 1
θ
PCC = λ
(
CC
CCC
) 1
θ
(1− ηnP )
1
θ
Summary: Aggregate Demand Functions for Country C Using (7.63) to
derive country C’s demand for goods from the periphery P
PC︸︷︷︸
λ
(
CC
CCP
) 1
θ
= (ηnP )
− 1
θ PCP
(
CCP
) 1
θ = (ηnP )
1
θ
(
PCP
PC
)−1 (
CC
) 1
θ
CCP = ηnP
(
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC (7.80)
Country C’s demand for country A’s goods
CCA = nA
(
PCA
PCP
)−ψ
ηnP
(
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC︸ ︷︷ ︸
CCP
CCA = nAηnP︸ ︷︷ ︸
vCA
(
PCA
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC (7.81)
Country C’s demand for country B’s goods
CCB = (1− nA)
(
PCB
PCP
)−ψ
ηnP
(
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC︸ ︷︷ ︸
CCP
CCB = (1− nA) ηnP︸ ︷︷ ︸
vCB
(
PCB
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC (7.82)
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Country C’s demand for country C’s goods
PCC = P
C︸︷︷︸
λ
(
CC
CCC
) 1
θ
(1− ηnP )
1
θ
(
CCC
) 1
θ = (1− ηnP )
1
θ
(
PCC
PC
)−1 (
CC
) 1
θ
CCC = (1− ηnP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
vCC
(
PCC
PC
)−θ
CC (7.83)
7.1.8 Individual Demand in Terms of CPI Basket
CAA(z) =
(
PAA (z)
PAA
)−φ
(nPnA)
−1 vAA
(
PAA
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA︸ ︷︷ ︸
CAA
CAA(z) =
1
nPnA
vAA
(
PAA (z)
PAA
)−φ(
PAA
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA (7.84)
CBA (z) =
(
PBA (z)
PBA
)−φ
(nPnA)
−1 vBA
(
PBA
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB︸ ︷︷ ︸
CBA
CBA (z) =
1
nPnA
vBA
(
PBA (z)
PBA
)−φ(
PBA
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB (7.85)
CCA (z) =
(
PCA (z)
PCA
)−φ
(nPnA)
−1 vCA
(
PCA
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC︸ ︷︷ ︸
CCA
CCA (z) =
1
nPnA
vCA
(
PCA (z)
PCA
)−φ(
PCA
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC (7.86)
CAB(z) =
(
PAB (z)
PAB
)−φ
((1− nA)nP )−1 vAB
(
PAB
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA︸ ︷︷ ︸
CAB
CAB(z) =
1
(1− nA)nP v
A
B
(
PAB (z)
PAB
)−φ (
PAB
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA (7.87)
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CBB (z) =
(
PBB (z)
PBB
)−φ
((1− nA)nP )−1 vBB
(
PBB
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB︸ ︷︷ ︸
CBB
CBB (z) =
1
(1− nA)nP v
B
B
(
PBB (z)
PBB
)−φ(
PBB
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB (7.88)
CCB (z) =
(
PCB (z)
PCB
)−φ
((1− nA)nP )−1 vCB
(
PCB
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC︸ ︷︷ ︸
CCB
CCB (z) =
1
(1− nA)nP v
C
B
(
PCB (z)
PCB
)−φ(
PCB
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC (7.89)
CAC (z) =
(
PAC (z)
PAC
)−φ
(1− nP )−1 vAC
(
PAC
PA
)−θ
CA︸ ︷︷ ︸
CAC
CAC (z) =
1
1− nP v
A
C
(
PAC (z)
PAC
)−φ(
PAC
PA
)−θ
CA (7.90)
CBC (z) =
(
PBC (z)
PBC
)−φ
(1− nP )−1 vBC
(
PBC
PB
)−θ
CB︸ ︷︷ ︸
CBC
CBC (z) =
1
1− nP v
B
C
(
PBC (z)
PBC
)−φ(
PBC
PB
)−θ
CB (7.91)
CCC (z) =
(
PCC (z)
PCC
)−φ
(1− nP )−1 vCC
(
PCC
PC
)−θ
CC︸ ︷︷ ︸
CCC
CCC (z) =
1
1− nP v
C
C
(
PCC (z)
PCC
)−φ(
PCC
PC
)−θ
CC (7.92)
7.1.9 Goods Market Clearing
Goods Market Clearing in Country A
Goods market clearing in levels in country A for variety z
Y At (z) = nPnAC
A
A,t (z) + nP (1− nA)CBA,t (z) + (1− nP )CCA,t (z)
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Y A (z) = nPnA (nPnA)
−1 vAA
(
PAA (z)
PAA
)−φ(
PAA
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA
+nP (1− nA) (nPnA)−1 vBA
(
PBA (z)
PBA
)−φ(
PBA
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB
+(1− nP ) (nPnA)−1 vCA
(
PCA (z)
PCA
)−φ(
PCA
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC
Substitute trade shares
nPnA (nPnA)
−1 vAA = v
A
A
nP (1− nA) (nPnA)−1 vBA
= nP (1− nA) (nPnA)−1 [[1− η (1− nP )] ηnA]
= [1− η (1− nP )] ηnAnP (1− nA)
nPnA
= [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA) = vAB
(1− nP ) (nPnA)−1 vCA
= (1− nP ) (nPnA)−1 [ηnAnP ]
= (1− nP ) ηnAnP
nPnA
= η (1− nP ) = vAC
Y A (z) = vAA
(
PAA (z)
PAA
)−φ(
PAA
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA
+vAB
(
PBA (z)
PBA
)−φ(
PBA
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB
+vAC
(
PCA (z)
PCA
)−φ(
PCA
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC .
Using the definition of the law of one price
PBA,t(z) =
PAA,t(z)
SAB,t
PCA,t(z) =
PAA,t(z)
SAC,t
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PBA,t =
PAA,t
SAB,t
PCA,t =
PAA,t
SAC,t
and expressing all prices in terms of country A’s currency
Y A (z) = vAA
(
PAA (z)
PAA
)−φ(
PAA
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA
+vAB
 PAA (z)SAB
PAA
SAB
−φ(PBA
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB
+vAC
 PAA (z)SAC
PAA
SAC
−φ(PCA
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC
Y A (z) = vAA
(
PAA (z)
PAA
)−φ(
PAA
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA
+vAB
(
PAA (z)
PAA
)−φ(
PBA
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB
+vAC
(
PAA (z)
PAA
)−φ(
PCA
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC
Y A (z) =
(
PAA (z)
PAA
)−φ [
vAA
(
PAA
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA
+vAB
(
PBA
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB
+ vAC
(
PCA
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC
]
.
Aggregate over all varieties z
Y A =
[∫ 1
0
(Y A (z))
φ−1
φ dz
] φ
φ−1
=
[∫ 1
0
((
PAA (z)
PAA
)−φ [
vAA
(
PAA
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA
+vAB
(
PBA
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB + vAC
(
PCA
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC
])φ−1
φ
dz

φ
φ−1
.
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Use
∫ 1
0
((
PAA (z)
PAA
)−φ
dz
)φ−1
φ
= 1
Y A = vAA
(
PAA
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA
+vAB
(
PBA
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB
+vAC
(
PCA
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC .
Use law of one price P iP = S
i
P · P PP , expand by CPI P i, and use definition of
CPI-PPI relation P
i
P ii
= gi (ToT ) to rewrite the following six expressions
PAA
PAP
=
PA·PAA
PA
PP ·
PA
P︷ ︸︸ ︷
SAP · P PP
PP
=
PA · gA (ToT )−1
P P · SAP · gP (ToT )−1
=
(
SAP · P P
PA
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RERAP
−1
gA (ToT )
−1
gP (ToT )
−1
PBA
PBP
=
PAA
SAB
SBP · P PP
=
PAA
SAB
· PA
PA
SBP P
P
P · PPPP
=
PA
SAB
SBP P
P
·
PAA
PA
PPP
PP
=
PB
PB
·
PA
SAB
SBP P
P
· gA (ToT )
−1
gP (ToT )
−1
=
PB
SBP P
P
· P
A
SABP
B
· gA (ToT )
−1
gP (ToT )
−1
=
(
SBP P
P
PB
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RERBP
−1
·
(
SABP
B
PA
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RERAB
−1
· gA (ToT )
−1
gP (ToT )
−1
=
(
RERBP
)−1 (
RERAB
)−1 gA (ToT )−1
gP (ToT )
−1
PCA
PCP
=
PAA
SAC
SCP P
P
P
=
PA
SAC
SCP P
P
PAA
PA
PPP
PP
=
PA
SACP
C
SCP P
P
PC
gA (ToT )
−1
gP (ToT )
−1
=
(
RERCP
)−1 (
RERAC
)−1 gA (ToT )−1
gP (ToT )
−1
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PAP
PA
=
PAP︷ ︸︸ ︷
SAP · P PP
PA
· P
P
P P
=
SAP · P P
PA
· P
P
p
P P
= RERAP · gP (ToT )−1
PBP
PB
=
PBP︷ ︸︸ ︷
SBP · P PP
PB
· P
P
P P
=
SBP · P P
PB
· P
P
p
P P
= RERBP · gP (ToT )−1
PCP
PC
=
PCP︷ ︸︸ ︷
SCP · P PP
PC
· P
P
P P
=
SCP · P P
PC
· P
P
p
P P
= RERCP · gP (ToT )−1 .
Plug in
Y A = vAA
((
RERAP
)−1 gA (ToT )−1
gP (ToT )
−1
)−ψ (
RERAP gP (ToT )
−1)−θ CA
+vAB
((
RERBP
)−1 (
RERAB
)−1 gA (ToT )−1
gP (ToT )
−1
)−ψ (
RERBP gP (ToT )
−1)−θ CB
+vAC
((
RERCP
)−1 (
RERAC
)−1 gA (ToT )−1
gP (ToT )
−1
)−ψ (
RERCP gP (ToT )
−1)−θ CC
Y A = vAA
(
RERAP
gA (ToT )
gP (ToT )
)ψ (
RERAP gP (ToT )
−1)−θ CA
+vAB
(
RERBP RER
A
B
gA (ToT )
gP (ToT )
)ψ (
RERBP gP (ToT )
−1)−θ CB
+vAC
(
RERCP RER
A
C
gA (ToT )
gP (ToT )
)ψ (
RERCP gP (ToT )
−1)−θ CC .
Rewrite the real exchange rate in terms of trade as in equation (7.30)
RERAP = ToT
A
P
gP (ToT )
gA(ToT )
, RERBP = ToT
B
P
gP (ToT )
gB(ToT )
, RERCP = ToT
C
P
gP (ToT )
gC(ToT )
,
RERAB = ToT
A
B
gB(ToT )
gA(ToT )
, RERAC = ToT
A
C
gC(ToT )
gA(ToT )
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Y A = vAA
(
ToTAP
gP (ToT )
gA(ToT )
gA (ToT )
gP (ToT )
)ψ (
ToTAP
gP (ToT )
gA(ToT )
1
gP (ToT )
)−θ
CA
+vAB
(
ToTBP
gP (ToT )
gB(ToT )
ToTAB
gB(ToT )
gA(ToT )
gA (ToT )
gP (ToT )
)ψ
·
(
ToTBP
gP (ToT )
gB(ToT )
1
gP (ToT )
)−θ
CB
+vAC
(
ToTCP
gP (ToT )
gC(ToT )
ToTAC
gC(ToT )
gA(ToT )
gA (ToT )
gP (ToT )
)ψ
·
(
ToTCP
gP (ToT )
gC(ToT )
1
gP (ToT )
)−θ
CC
Y A = vAA
(
ToTAP
)ψ (
ToTAP
1
gA (ToT )
)−θ
CA
+vAB
(
ToTBP ToT
A
B
)ψ (
ToTBP
1
gB (ToT )
)−θ
CB
+vAC
(
ToTCP ToT
A
C
)ψ (
ToTCP
1
gC (ToT )
)−θ
CC
Y A = vAA
(
ToTAP
)ψ−θ
(gA(ToT ))
θ CA
+vAB
(
ToTBP
)ψ−θ (
ToTAB
)ψ
(gB(ToT ))
θ CB
+vAC
(
ToTCP
)ψ−θ (
ToTAC
)ψ
(gC(ToT ))
θ CC . (7.93)
Substituting periphery terms of trade by equations (7.24), (7.25), and (7.26)
Y A = vAA
[
[1− η (1− nA)] + η (1− nA)
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ
(gA(ToT ))
θ CA
+vAB
[
(1− ηnA) + ηnA
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAB
)ψ
(gB(ToT ))
θ CB
+vAC
[
nA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ (1− nA)
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAC
)ψ
(gC(ToT ))
θ CC .
See Faia and Monacelli (2004: 12, eq. 42). Substituting the CPI-PPI relations
(7.27), (7.28) and (7.29) would be possible. It seems to be easier to define those
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relations as part of the system later.
Y A = vAA
[
[1− η (1− nA)] + η (1− nA)
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ
·
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
[(
[1− η (1− nA)] + η (1− nA)
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+η (1− nP )
(
ToTAC
)1−θ] θ1−θ
CA
+vAB
[
(1− ηnA) + ηnA
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAB
)ψ
·
[
[1− η (1− nP )]
[(
ηnA
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ
+ (1− ηnA)
) 1
1−ψ
]1−θ
+η (1− nP )
(
ToTBC
)1−θ] θ1−θ
CB
+vAC
[
nA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ (1− nA)
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAC
)ψ
·
[
ηnP
[(
nA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+(1− nA)
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+(1− ηnP )]
θ
1−θ CC
Goods Market Clearing in Country B
Goods market clearing in levels in country B for variety z
Y Bt (z) = nPnAC
A
B,t (z) + nP (1− nA)CBB,t (z) + (1− nP )CCB,t (z)
Y B (z) = nPnA ((1− nA)nP )−1 vAB︸ ︷︷ ︸
vBA
(
PAB (z)
PAB
)−φ (
PAB
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA
+nP (1− nA) ((1− nA)nP )−1 vBB︸ ︷︷ ︸
vBB
(
PBB (z)
PBB
)−φ(
PBB
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB
+(1− nP ) ((1− nA)nP )−1 vCB︸ ︷︷ ︸
vBC
(
PCB (z)
PCB
)−φ(
PCB
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC
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Substitute trade shares
Y B (z) = vBA
(
PAB (z)
PAB
)−φ (
PAB
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA
+vBB
(
PBB (z)
PBB
)−φ(
PBB
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB
+vBC
(
PCB (z)
PCB
)−φ(
PCB
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC .
Using definitions of law of one price
PAB,t(z) =
PBB,t(z)
SBA,t
= SAB,t · PBB,t(z)
PCB,t(z) =
PBB,t(z)
SBC,t
=
PBB,t(z)
SBA,t · SAC,t
=
PBB,t(z)
1
SAB,t
· SAC,t
=
SAB,t · PBB,t(z)
SAC,t
PAB,t = S
A
B,t · PBB,t
PCB,t =
SAB,t · PBB,t
SAC,t
Y B (z) = vBA
(
SAB · PBB (z)
SAB · PBB
)−φ (
PAB
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA
+vBB
(
PBB (z)
PBB
)−φ (
PBB
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB
+vBC
 SAB ·PBB (z)SAC
SAB ·PBB
SAC
−φ(PCB
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC
Y Bt (z) = v
B
A
(
PBB (z)
PBB
)−φ(
PAB
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA
+vBB
(
PBB (z)
PBB
)−φ(
PBB
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB
+vBC
(
PBB (z)
PBB
)−φ (
PCB
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC
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Y B (z) =
(
PBB (z)
PBB
)−φ [
vBA
(
PAB
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA
+ vBB
(
PBB
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB + vBC
(
PCB
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC
]
.
Aggregate over all varieties z
Y B =
[∫ 1
0
(Y B (z))
φ−1
φ dz
] φ
φ−1
=
[∫ 1
0
((
PBB (z)
PBB
)−φ [
vBA
(
PAB
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA
+vBB
(
PBB
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB + vBC
(
PCB
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC
])φ−1
φ
dz

φ
φ−1
.
Use
∫ 1
0
((
PBB (z)
PBB
)−φ
dz
)φ−1
φ
= 1
Y B = vBA
(
PAB
PAP
)−ψ (
PAP
PA
)−θ
CA + vBB
(
PBB
PBP
)−ψ (
PBP
PB
)−θ
CB
+vBC
(
PCB
PCP
)−ψ (
PCP
PC
)−θ
CC .
Use law of one price P iP = S
i
P · P PP , expand by CPI P i, and use definition of
CPI-PPI relation P
i
P ii
= gi (ToT ) to rewrite the following three expressions
PAB
PAP
=
PBB
SBA
SAPP
P
P
=
PB
SBA
SAPP
P
PBB
PB
PPP
PP
=
PB
SBAP
A
SAP P
P
PA
gB (ToT )
−1
gP (ToT )
−1
=
(
RERBA
)−1 (
RERAP
)−1 gB (ToT )−1
gP (ToT )
−1
PBB
PBP
=
PB ·PBB
PB
PP ·
PB
P︷ ︸︸ ︷
SBP · P PP
PP
=
PB · gB (ToT )−1
P P · SBP · gP (ToT )−1
=
(
SBP · P P
PB
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RERBP
−1
gB (ToT )
−1
gP (ToT )
−1
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PCB
PCP
=
PBB
SBC
SCP P
P
P
=
PB
SBC
SCP P
P
PBB
PB
PPP
PP
=
PB
SBCP
C
SCP P
P
PC
gB (ToT )
−1
gP (ToT )
−1
=
(
RERBC
)−1 (
RERCP
)−1 gB (ToT )−1
gP (ToT )
−1 .
Plug in
Y B = vBA
((
RERBA
)−1 (
RERAP
)−1 gB (ToT )−1
gP (ToT )
−1
)−ψ
· (RERAP · gP (ToT )−1)−θ CA
+vBB
((
RERBP
)−1 gB (ToT )−1
gP (ToT )
−1
)−ψ (
RERBP · gP (ToT )−1
)−θ
CB
+vBC
((
RERBC
)−1 (
RERCP
)−1 gB (ToT )−1
gP (ToT )
−1
)−ψ
· (RERCP · gP (ToT )−1)−θ CC
Y B = vBA
((
RERBA
) (
RERAP
) gB (ToT )
gP (ToT )
)ψ (
RERAP gP (ToT )
−1)−θ CA
+vBB
((
RERBP
) gB (ToT )
gP (ToT )
)ψ (
RERBP gP (ToT )
−1)−θ CB
+vBC
((
RERBC
) (
RERCP
) gB (ToT )
gP (ToT )
)ψ (
RERCP gP (ToT )
−1)−θ CC .
Substitute real exchange rates
RERAP = ToT
A
P
gP (ToT )
gA(ToT )
, RERBP = ToT
B
P
gP (ToT )
gB(ToT )
, RERCP = ToT
C
P
gP (ToT )
gC(ToT )
,
RERBA = ToT
B
A
gA(ToT )
gB(ToT )
, RERBC = ToT
B
C
gC(ToT )
gB(ToT )
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Y B = vBA
(
ToTBA
gA(ToT )
gB(ToT )
ToTAP
gP (ToT )
gA(ToT )
gB (ToT )
gP (ToT )
)ψ
·
(
ToTAP
gP (ToT )
gA(ToT )
gP (ToT )
−1
)−θ
CA
+vBB
(
ToTBP
gP (ToT )
gB(ToT )
gB (ToT )
gP (ToT )
)ψ (
ToTBP
gP (ToT )
gB(ToT )
gP (ToT )
−1
)−θ
CB
+vBC
(
ToTBC
gC(ToT )
gB(ToT )
ToTCP
gP (ToT )
gC(ToT )
gB (ToT )
gP (ToT )
)ψ
·
(
ToTCP
gP (ToT )
gC(ToT )
gP (ToT )
−1
)−θ
CC
Y B = vBA
(
ToTBA ToT
A
P
)ψ (
ToTAP gA (ToT )
−1)−θ CA
+vBB
(
ToTBP
)ψ (
ToTBP gB (ToT )
−1)−θ CB
+vBC
(
ToTBC ToT
C
P
)ψ (
ToTCP gC (ToT )
−1)−θ CC
Y B = vBA
(
ToTBA
)ψ (
ToTAP
)ψ−θ
(gA (ToT ))
θ CA
+vBB
(
ToTBP
)ψ−θ
(gB (ToT ))
θ CB
+vBC
(
ToTBC
)ψ (
ToTCP
)ψ−θ
(gC (ToT ))
θ CC . (7.94)
Goods Market Clearing in Country C
Goods market clearing in levels in country C for variety z
Y Ct (z) = nPnAC
A
C,t (z) + nP (1− nA)CBC,t (z) + (1− nP )CCC,t (z)
Y C (z) = nPnA (1− nP )−1 vAC︸ ︷︷ ︸
vCA
(
PAC (z)
PAC
)−φ(
PAC
PA
)−θ
CA
+nP (1− nA) (1− nP )−1 vBC︸ ︷︷ ︸
vCB
(
PBC (z)
PBC
)−φ(
PBC
PB
)−θ
CB
+(1− nP ) (1− nP )−1 vCC︸ ︷︷ ︸
vCC
(
PCC (z)
PCC
)−φ(
PCC
PC
)−θ
CC
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Y C (z) = vCA
(
PAC (z)
PAC
)−φ(
PAC
PA
)−θ
CA
+vCB
(
PBC (z)
PBC
)−φ(
PBC
PB
)−θ
CB
+vCC
(
PCC (z)
PCC
)−φ(
PCC
PC
)−θ
CC
Using definitions of law of one price
PAC,t(z) = S
A
C,t · PCC,t(z)
PBC,t(z) = S
B
C,t · PCC,t(z)
PAC,t = S
A
C,t · PCC,t
PBC,t = S
B
C,t · PCC,t
Y C (z) = vCA
(
SAC · PCC (z)
SAC · PCC
)−φ(
PAC
PA
)−θ
CA
+vCB
(
SBC · PCC (z)
SBC · PCC
)−φ(
PBC
PB
)−θ
CB
+vCC
(
PCC (z)
PCC
)−φ(
PCC
PC
)−θ
CC
Y C (z) =
(
PCC (z)
PCC
)−φ [
vCA
(
PAC
PA
)−θ
CA + vCB
(
PBC
PB
)−θ
CB + vCC
(
PCC
PC
)−θ
CC
]
.
Aggregate over all varieties z
Y C =
[∫ 1
0
(Y C (z))
φ−1
φ dz
] φ
φ−1
=
[∫ 1
0
((
PCC (z)
PCC
)−φ [
vCA
(
PAC
PA
)−θ
CA
+vCB
(
PBC
PB
)−θ
CB + vCC
(
PCC
PC
)−θ
CC
])φ−1
φ
dz

φ
φ−1
.
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Use
∫ 1
0
((
PCC (z)
PCC
)−φ
dz
)φ−1
φ
= 1
Y C = vCA
(
PAC
PA
)−θ
CA + vCB
(
PBC
PB
)−θ
CB + vCC
(
PCC
PC
)−θ
CC
Y C = vCA
(
SACP
C
PA
PCC
PC
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RERAC(gC(ToT ))
−1
−θ
CA + vCB
(
SBCP
C
PB
PCC
PC
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
RERBC (gC(ToT ))
−1
−θ
CB + vCC
(
PCC
PC
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(gC(ToT ))
−1
−θ
CC
Y C = vCA
(
RERAC
)−θ
(gC (ToT ))
θ CA + vCB
(
RERBC
)−θ
(gC (ToT ))
θ CB
+vCC (gC (ToT ))
θ CC .
Substitute real exchange rates
RERAC = ToT
A
C
gC(ToT )
gA(ToT )
, RERBC = ToT
B
C
gC(ToT )
gB(ToT )
Y C = vCA
(
ToTAC
gC(ToT )
gA(ToT )
)−θ
(gC (ToT ))
θ CA
+vCB
(
ToTBC
gC(ToT )
gB(ToT )
)−θ
(gC (ToT ))
θ CB + vCC (gC (ToT ))
θ CC
Y C = vCA
(
ToTAC
gA(ToT )
)−θ
CA + vCB
(
ToTBC
gB(ToT )
)−θ
CB + vCC (gC (ToT ))
θ CC
Y C = vCA
(
gA(ToT )
ToTAC
)θ
CA + vCB
(
gB(ToT )
ToTBC
)θ
CB + vCC (gC (ToT ))
θ CC . (7.95)
7.1.10 Loglinerarizations
Variables without a time subscript are variables in their steady state. Variables
with a hat are deviations from that steady state.
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Loglinearized CPI
Starting from equation (7.11), the CPI for country A
PAt =
[1− η (1− nP )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
vP
[1− η (1− nA)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
vA
(
PAA,t
)1−ψ
+η (1− nA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vB
(
PAB,t
)1−ψ 11−ψ

1−θ
+ η (1− nP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
vC
(
PAC,t
)1−θ

1
1−θ
P Pt =
[(
vA
(
PAA,t
)1−ψ
+vB
(
PAB,t
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
Use new weights vA, vB, vC , and vP to simplify algebra
PAt =
[
vP
[(
vA
(
PAA,t
)1−ψ
+vB
(
PAB,t
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+ vC
(
PAC,t
)1−θ] 11−θ
(
PAt
)1−θ
= vP
[(
vA
(
PAA,t
)1−ψ
+vB
(
PAB,t
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+ vC
(
PAC,t
)1−θ
(1− θ) (PA)1−θ−1 dPA = (1− θ) vP [(vA (PAA )1−ψ +vB (PAB )1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ−1
· 1
1− ψ
(
vA
(
PAA
)1−ψ
+vB
(
PAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ−1 · (1− ψ) vA (PAA )1−ψ−1 dPAA
+(1− θ) vP
[(
vA
(
PAA
)1−ψ
+vB
(
PAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ−1
· 1
1− ψ
(
vA
(
PAA
)1−ψ
+vB
(
PAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ−1 · (1− ψ) vB (PAB )1−ψ−1 dPAB
+(1− θ) vC
(
PAC
)1−θ−1
dPAC
194
Cancel (1− ψ)
(1− θ) (PA)1−θ PˆAt = (1− θ) vP[(vA (PAA )1−ψ +vB (PAB )1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(PP )−θ
·
(
vA
(
PAA
)1−ψ
+vB
(
PAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(PP )ψ
· vA
(
PAA
)1−ψ
PˆAA,t
+(1− θ) vP
[(
vA
(
PAA
)1−ψ
+vB
(
PAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ−1
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(PP )−θ
·
(
vA
(
PAA
)1−ψ
+vB
(
PAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ−1︸ ︷︷ ︸
(PP )ψ
· vB
(
PAB
)1−ψ
PˆAB,t
+(1− θ) vC
(
PAC
)1−θ
PˆAC,t
(1− θ) (PA)1−θ PˆAt = (1− θ) vP (P P )−θ · (P P )ψ · vA (PAA )1−ψ PˆAA,t
+(1− θ) vP
(
P P
)−θ · (P P )ψ · vB (PAB )1−ψ PˆAB,t
+(1− θ) vC
(
PAC
)1−θ
PˆAC,t
Divide by (1− θ)
(
PA
)1−θ
PˆAt = vP
(
P P
)ψ−θ · vA (PAA )1−ψ PˆAA,t
+vP
(
P P
)ψ−θ · vB (PAB )1−ψ PˆAB,t
+vC
(
PAC
)1−θ
PˆAC,t
Normalize price levels to one, P i = 1
PˆAt = vPvAPˆ
A
A,t + vPvBPˆ
A
B,t + vCPˆ
A
C,t
Substitute usual weights
PˆAt = [1− η (1− nP )] [1− η (1− nA)] PˆAA,t
+ [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA) PˆAB,t + η (1− nP ) PˆAC,t (7.96)
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PˆBt = [1− η (1− nP )] ηnAPˆBA,t
+ [1− η (1− nP )] (1− ηnA) PˆBB,t + η (1− nP ) PˆBC,t (7.97)
PˆCt = ηnPnAPˆ
C
A,t + ηnP (1− nA) PˆCB,t + (1− ηnP ) PˆCC,t (7.98)
Equations (7.96) to (7.98) are the equivalent to Monacelli (2001: 390, eq. 3).
Loglinearized CPI Inflation Using simplified weights
pˆiit = Pˆ
i
t − Pˆ it−1
= vPvAPˆ
i
A,t + vPvBPˆ
i
B,t + vCPˆ
i
C,t − vPvAPˆ iA,t−1 − vPvBPˆ iB,t−1 − vCPˆ iC,t−1
= vPvA
(
Pˆ iA,t − Pˆ iA,t−1
)
+ vPvB
(
Pˆ iB,t − Pˆ iB,t−1
)
+ vC
(
Pˆ iC,t − Pˆ iC,t−1
)
pˆiit = vPvApˆi
i
A,t + vPvBpˆi
i
B,t + vC pˆi
i
C,t (7.99)
Substitute usual weights
pˆiAt = [1− η (1− nP )] [1− η (1− nA)] pˆiAA,t
+ [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA) pˆiAB,t + η (1− nP ) pˆiAC,t (7.100)
pˆiBt = [1− η (1− nP )] ηnApˆiBA,t
+ [1− η (1− nP )] (1− ηnA) pˆiBB,t + η (1− nP ) pˆiBC,t (7.101)
pˆiCt = ηnPnApˆi
C
A,t + ηnP (1− nA) pˆiCB,t + (1− ηnP ) pˆiCC,t (7.102)
Equation (7.99) is the equivalent to Monacelli (2001: 391, eq. 5).
Loglinearized Exchange Rates
Nominal exchange rate between country i and country i′ is Sˆii′,t.
Real exchange rate between country i and country i′ is
R̂ER
i
i′,t = Sˆ
i
i′,t + Pˆ
i′
t − Pˆ it (7.103)
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Terms of trade between country i and country i′ are
T̂ oT
i
i′,t = Pˆ
i
i′,t − Pˆ ii,t = Sˆii′,t + Pˆ i
′
i′,t − Pˆ ii,t (7.104)
Summary of terms of trade definitions:
Terms of Trade Definition 1 Definition 2
T̂ oT
A
B,t = Pˆ
A
B,t − PˆAA,t = SˆAB,t + PˆBB,t − PˆAA,t
T̂ oT
A
C,t = Pˆ
A
C,t − PˆAA,t = SˆAC,t + PˆCC,t − PˆAA,t
T̂ oT
B
A,t = Pˆ
B
A,t − PˆBB,t = SˆBA,t + PˆAA,t − PˆBB,t
T̂ oT
B
C,t = Pˆ
B
C,t − PˆBB,t = SˆBC,t + PˆCC,t − PˆBB,t
T̂ oT
C
A,t = Pˆ
C
A,t − PˆCC,t = SˆCA,t + PˆAA,t − PˆCC,t
T̂ oT
C
B,t = Pˆ
C
B,t − PˆCC,t = SˆCB,t + PˆBB,t − PˆCC,t
Loglinearized CPI-PPI Ratios
Country A Substitute weights in gA(ToT ) to simplify the algebra
gA(ToT ) =
[1− η (1− nP )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
vP

[1− η (1− nA)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
vA
+ η (1− nA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vB
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ 11−ψ

1−θ
+η (1− nP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
vC
(
ToTAC
)1−θ 11−θ (7.105)
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Derive
dgA,t(ToT ) =
1
1− θ
[
vP
[(
vA + vB
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+ vC
(
ToTAC
)1−θ] 11−θ−1
· (1− θ) vP
[(
vA + vB
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ−1
· 1
1− ψ
(
vA + vB
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ−1
· (1− ψ) vB
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ−1 · dToTAB,t
+
1
1− θ
[
vP
[(
vA + vB
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+ vC
(
ToTAC
)1−θ] 11−θ−1
·vC (1− θ)
(
ToTAC
)1−θ−1 · dToTAC,t
gA(ToT ) gˆA,t(ToT ) =
[
vP
[(
vA + vB
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+ vC
(
ToTAC
)1−θ] 11−θ−1
·vP
[(
vA + vB
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ−1
·
(
vA + vB
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ−1
·vB
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ · T̂ oTAB,t
+
[
vP
[(
vA + vB
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ) 11−ψ ]1−θ
+ vC
(
ToTAC
)1−θ] 11−θ−1
·vC
(
ToTAC
)1−θ · T̂ oTAC,t
All steady state values are normalized to one
gˆA,t(ToT ) =
vP
(vA + vB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
1
1−ψ
1−θ + vC

︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
1
1−θ−1
·vP
[
(vA + vB)
1
1−ψ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
1−θ−1
· (vA + vB)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
1
1−ψ−1 · vBT̂ oT
A
B,t
+
[
vP
[
(vA + vB)
1
1−ψ
]1−θ
+ vC
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
1
1−θ−1
· vC T̂ oT
A
C,t
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gˆA,t(ToT ) = vPvBT̂ oT
A
B,t + vC T̂ oT
A
C,t
Substitute weights
gˆA,t(ToT ) = [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA) T̂ oT
A
B,t + η (1− nP ) T̂ oT
A
C,t (7.106)
Country B
gˆB (ToT ) = [1− η (1− nP )] ηnAT̂ oT
B
A,t + η (1− nP ) T̂ oT
B
C,t (7.107)
Country C
gˆC (ToT ) = ηnP nAT̂ oT
C
A,t + ηnP (1− nA) T̂ oT
C
B,t (7.108)
Loglinearized Exhange Rate Relations
We can show that
Sˆii′,t = −Sˆi
′
i,t. (7.109)
The same relation holds for the terms of trade
T̂ oT
i
i′,t = −T̂ oT
i′
i,t (7.110)
Sˆii′,t + Pˆ
i′
i′,t − Pˆ ii,t = −
(
Sˆi
′
i,t + Pˆ
i
i,t − Pˆ i
′
C,t
)
Sˆii′,t + Pˆ
i′
i′,t − Pˆ ii,t = −Sˆi
′
i,t − Pˆ ii,t + Pˆ i
′
i′,t
and following from (7.109)
Sˆii′,t + Pˆ
i′
i′,t − Pˆ ii,t = Sˆii′,t − Pˆ ii,t + Pˆ i
′
i′,t
0 = 0.
Thus, the number of terms of trade definitions reduces to three.
Further, the third nominal exchange rate is given by the other two (7.18)
SˆAB,t = Sˆ
A
C,t + Sˆ
C
B,t. (7.111)
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The same is true for the terms of trade using (7.111) and the definitions for the
terms of trade (7.104)
T̂ oT
A
B,t = T̂ oT
A
C,t + T̂ oT
C
B,t. (7.112)
Equation (7.112) reduces the number of terms of trade to two.
The real exchange rate may be expressed in terms of trade (7.30)
RERii′,t = ToT
i
i′,t · gi′,t(ToT ) · gi,t(ToT )−1
dRERii′,t = dToT
i
i′,t · gi′(ToT ) · gi(ToT )−1
+ToT ii′ · dgi′,t(ToT ) · gi(ToT )−1
−ToT ii′ · gi′(ToT ) · gi(ToT )−2dgi,t(ToT )−1
R̂ER
i
i′,t = T̂ oT
i
i′,t + gˆi′,t(ToT )− gˆi,t(ToT ). (7.113)
Backing out the nominal exchange rate from equation (7.21)
ToT ii′,t =
Sii′,t · P i′i′,t
P ii,t
Sii′,t = ToT
i
i′,t
P ii,t
P i
′
i′,t
.
Taking first differences
Sii′,t − Sii′,t−1 = ToT ii′,t
P ii,t
P i
′
i′,t
− ToT ii′,t−1
P ii,t−1
P i
′
i′,t−1
.
Loglinearizing
dSii′,t − dSii′,t−1 = dToT ii′,t
P ii
P i
′
i′
+ ToT ii′dP
i
i,t
1
P i
′
i′
− ToT ii′P ii
1(
P i
′
i′
)2dP i′i′,t
−
(
dToT ii′,t−1
P ii
P i
′
i′
+ ToT ii′dP
i
i,t−1
1
P i
′
i′
− ToT ii′P ii
1(
P i
′
i′
)2P i′i′,t−1
)
Sii′Sˆ
i
i′,t − Sii′Sˆii′,t−1 = ToT ii′
P ii
P i
′
i′
T̂ oT
i
i′,t + ToT
i
i′
P ii
P i
′
i′
Pˆ ii,t − ToT ii′
P ii
P i
′
i′
Pˆ i
′
i′,t
−ToT ii′
P ii
P i
′
i′
T̂ oT
i
i′,t−1 − ToT ii′
P ii
P i
′
i′
Pˆ ii,t−1 + ToT
i
i′
P ii
P i
′
i′
Pˆ i
′
i′,t−1
Sˆii′,t − Sˆii′,t−1 = T̂ oT
i
i′,t + Pˆ
i
i,t − Pˆ i
′
i′,t − T̂ oT
i
i′,t−1 − Pˆ ii,t−1 + Pˆ i
′
i′,t−1
∆Sˆii′,t = T̂ oT
i
i′,t − T̂ oT
i
i′,t−1 + pi
i
i,t − pii
′
i′,t (7.114)
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Loglinearized Terms of Trade for the Periphery From equation (7.24)
ToTAP,t =
[
[1− η (1− nA)] + η (1− nA)
(
ToTAB,t
)1−ψ] 11−ψ(
ToTAP,t
)1−ψ
= [1− η (1− nA)] + η (1− nA)
(
ToTAB,t
)1−ψ
(1− ψ) (ToTAP )1−ψ−1 · dToTAP,t = (1− ψ) η (1− nA) (ToTAB )1−ψ−1 · dToTAB,t(
ToTAP
)1−ψ
T̂ oT
A
P,t = η (1− nA)
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ
T̂ oT
A
B,t
T̂ oT
A
P,t = η (1− nA) T̂ oT
A
B,t (7.115)
From equation (7.25)
ToTBP =
[
(1− ηnA) + ηnA
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ] 11−ψ(
ToTBP
)1−ψ
= (1− ηnA) + ηnA
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ
(1− ψ) (ToTBP )1−ψ−1 · dToTBP,t = (1− ψ) ηnA (ToTBA )1−ψ−1 · dToTBA,t(
ToTBP
)1−ψ
T̂ oT
B
P,t = ηnA
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ
T̂ oT
B
A,t
T̂ oT
B
P,t = ηnAT̂ oT
B
A,t (7.116)
From equation (7.26)
ToTCP =
[
nA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ (1− nA)
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ] 11−ψ(
ToTCP
)1−ψ
= nA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ (1− nA)
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ
(1− ψ) (ToTCP )1−ψ−1 · dToTCP,t =
nA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ−1 · dToTCA,t + (1− nA) (ToTCB )1−ψ−1 · dToTCB,t
(
ToTCP
)1−ψ
T̂ oT
C
P,t = nA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
T̂ oT
C
A,t + (1− nA)
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ
T̂ oT
C
B,t
T̂ oT
C
P,t = nAT̂ oT
C
A,t + (1− nA) T̂ oT
C
B,t (7.117)
Rewriting the expression PˆAt −PˆAA,t by using the definition for the loglinearized
201
CPI (7.96)
PˆAt − PˆAA,t = vPvAPˆAA,t + vPvBPˆAB,t + vCPˆAC,t − PˆAA,t
= vPvB Pˆ
A
B,t + vCPˆ
A
C,t + (vPvA − 1) PˆAA,t
use (vPvA − 1) = −
(
vPvB + v
A
C
)
as vPvA + vPvB + vC = 1
= vPvB Pˆ
A
B,t + vCPˆ
A
C,t − (vPvB + vC) PˆAA,t
= vPvB
(
PˆAB,t − PˆAA,t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T̂ oT
A
B,t
+ vC
(
PˆAC,t − PˆAA,t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T̂ oT
A
C,t
PˆAt − PˆAA,t = vPvB T̂ oT
A
B,t + vC T̂ oT
A
C,t (7.118)
PˆAt = Pˆ
A
A,t + vPvB T̂ oT
A
B,t + vC T̂ oT
A
C,t
PˆAt = Pˆ
A
A,t + effective ToT A. (7.119)
Equation (7.119) corresponds to equation (13) in Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005: 712),
where α is the degree of openness, i.e., the equivalent of vPvB and vC .
Loglinearized Household Equilibrium Conditions
Consumption Labor Trade-Off
Wˆ it = µ Cˆ
i
t − γ Lˆit + Pˆ it (7.120)
Euler Equation Loglinearizing the Euler equation (7.43)
Cˆit = Cˆ
i
t+1 −
1
µ
(
Rˆit − pˆiit+1
)
(7.121)
Risk Sharing Loglinearizing the risk sharing equation (7.48)
Cˆit = Cˆ
i′
t (7.122)
Risk sharing without PPP (from equation 7.49)
Cˆit = Cˆ
i′
t +
1
µ
R̂ER
i
i′,t (7.123)
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For country A and B using equation (7.50)
CAt = C
B
t
(
ToTAB,t
) 1
µ gB(ToT )
1
µ gA(ToT )
− 1
µ
CˆAt = Cˆ
B
t +
1
µ
T̂oT
A
B,t +
1
µ
gˆB(ToT )− 1
µ
gˆA(ToT ) (7.124)
For country A and C using equation (7.51)
CAt = C
C
t
(
ToTAC,t
) 1
µ gC(ToT )
1
µ gA(ToT )
− 1
µ
CˆAt = Cˆ
C
t +
1
µ
T̂oT
A
C,t +
1
µ
gˆC(ToT )− 1
µ
gˆA(ToT ) (7.125)
Loglinearized Goods Market Clearing
Country A
Y A = vAA
[
[1− η (1− nA)] + η (1− nA)
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ
(gA(ToT ))
θ CA
+vAB
[
(1− ηnA) + ηnA
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAB
)ψ
(gB(ToT ))
θ CB
+vAC
[
nA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ (1− nA)
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAC
)ψ
(gC(ToT ))
θ CC
Y A = [1− η (1− nP )] [1− η (1− nA)]
·
[
[1− η (1− nA)] + η (1− nA)
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ
(gA(ToT ))
θ CA
+ [1− η (1− nP )] [η (1− nA)]
·
[
(1− ηnA) + ηnA
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAB
)ψ
(gB(ToT ))
θ CB
+η (1− nP )
[
nA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ (1− nA)
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAC
)ψ
(gC(ToT ))
θ CC
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Use shorthands, v˜ii′ , for weights to simlify algebra.
Y A = [1− η (1− nP )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
v˜P
[1− η (1− nA)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
v˜AA
·
[1− η (1− nA)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
v˜AA
+ η (1− nA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
v˜AB
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ
ψ−θ
1−ψ
(gA(ToT ))
θ CA
+[1− η (1− nP )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
v˜P
[η (1− nA)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
v˜AB
·
(1− ηnA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
v˜BB
+ ηnA︸︷︷︸
v˜BA
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ
ψ−θ
1−ψ (
ToTAB
)ψ
(gB(ToT ))
θ CB
+η (1− nP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
v˜C
 nA︸︷︷︸
v˜CA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ (1− nA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
v˜CB
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ
ψ−θ
1−ψ (
ToTAC
)ψ
(gC(ToT ))
θ CC
Y A = v˜P v˜
A
A
[
v˜AA + v˜
A
B
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ
(gA(ToT ))
θ CA
+v˜P v˜
A
B
[
v˜BB + v˜
B
A
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAB
)ψ
(gB(ToT ))
θ CB
+v˜C
[
v˜CA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ v˜CB
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAC
)ψ
(gC(ToT ))
θ CC
Variables are Y A, CA, CB, CC , T oTAB , T oT
B
A , T oT
C
A , T oT
C
B , T oT
A
C , gA(ToT ), gB(ToT ),
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and gC(ToT ).
dY At = v˜P v˜
A
A
[
v˜AA + v˜
A
B
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ
(gA(ToT ))
θ · dCAt
+v˜P v˜
A
A
[
v˜AA + v˜
A
B
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ
CA · θ (gA(ToT ))θ−1 · dgA,t(ToT )
+
ψ − θ
1− ψ v˜P v˜
A
A
[
v˜AA + v˜
A
B
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ−1
(gA(ToT ))
θ CA
· (1− ψ) v˜AB
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ−1 · dToTAB,t
+v˜P v˜
A
B
[
v˜BB + v˜
B
A
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAB
)ψ
(gB(ToT ))
θ · dCBt
+v˜P v˜
A
B
[
v˜BB + v˜
B
A
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAB
)ψ
CB · θ (gB(ToT ))θ−1 · dgB,t(ToT )
+v˜P v˜
A
B
[
v˜BB + v˜
B
A
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ
(gB(ToT ))
θ CB · ψ (ToTAB )ψ−1 · dToTAB,t
+
ψ − θ
1− ψ v˜P v˜
A
B
[
v˜BB + v˜
B
A
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ−1 (
ToTAB
)ψ
(gB(ToT ))
θ CB
· (1− ψ) v˜BA
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ−1 · dToTBA,t
+v˜C
[
v˜CA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ v˜CB
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAC
)ψ
(gC(ToT ))
θ · dCCt
+v˜C
[
v˜CA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ v˜CB
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAC
)ψ
CC · θ (gC(ToT ))θ−1 · dgC,t(ToT )
+v˜C
[
v˜CA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ v˜CB
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ
(gC(ToT ))
θ CC · ψ (ToTAC )ψ−1 · dToTAC,t
+
ψ − θ
1− ψ v˜C
[
v˜CA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ v˜CB
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ−1 (
ToTAC
)ψ
(gC(ToT ))
θ CC
· (1− ψ) v˜CA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ−1 · dToTCA,t
+
ψ − θ
1− ψ v˜C
[
v˜CA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ v˜CB
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ−1 (
ToTAC
)ψ
(gC(ToT ))
θ CC
· (1− ψ) v˜CB
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ−1 · dToTCB,t
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Y Yˆ At = v˜P v˜
A
A
[
v˜AA + v˜
A
B
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ
(gA(ToT ))
θ · CACˆAt
+v˜P v˜
A
A
[
v˜AA + v˜
A
B
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ
CA · θ (gA(ToT ))θ · gˆA,t(ToT )
+ (ψ − θ) v˜P v˜AA
[
v˜AA + v˜
A
B
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ−1
· (gA(ToT ))θ CA · v˜AB
(
ToTAB
)1−ψ · T̂ oTAB,t
+v˜P v˜
A
B
[
v˜BB + v˜
B
A
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAB
)ψ
(gB(ToT ))
θ · CBCˆBt
+v˜P v˜
A
B
[
v˜BB + v˜
B
A
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAB
)ψ
CB · θ (gB(ToT ))θ · gˆB,t(ToT )
+v˜P v˜
A
B
[
v˜BB + v˜
B
A
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ
(gB(ToT ))
θ CB · ψ (ToTAB )ψ · T̂ oTAB,t
+(ψ − θ) v˜P v˜AB
[
v˜BB + v˜
B
A
(
ToTBA
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ−1
· (ToTAB )ψ (gB(ToT ))θ CB · v˜BA (ToTBA )1−ψ · T̂ oTBA,t
+v˜C
[
v˜CA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ v˜CB
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAC
)ψ
(gC(ToT ))
θ · CCCˆCt
+v˜C
[
v˜CA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ v˜CB
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ (
ToTAC
)ψ
CC · θ (gC(ToT ))θ · gˆC,t(ToT )
+v˜C
[
v˜CA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ v˜CB
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ
(gC(ToT ))
θ CC · ψ (ToTAC )ψ · T̂ oTAC,t
+(ψ − θ) v˜C
[
v˜CA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ v˜CB
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ−1
· (ToTAC )ψ (gC(ToT ))θ CC · v˜CA (ToTCA )1−ψ · T̂ oTCA,t
+(ψ − θ) v˜C
[
v˜CA
(
ToTCA
)1−ψ
+ v˜CB
(
ToTCB
)1−ψ]ψ−θ1−ψ−1
· (ToTAC )ψ (gC(ToT ))θ CC · v˜CB (ToTCB )1−ψ · T̂ oTCB,t
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All steady state variables are normalized to one.
Yˆ At = v˜P v˜
A
A
[
v˜AA + v˜
A
B
]ψ−θ
1−ψ · CˆAt
+v˜P v˜
A
A
[
v˜AA + v˜
A
B
]ψ−θ
1−ψ · θ · gˆA,t(ToT )
+ (ψ − θ) v˜P v˜AA
[
v˜AA + v˜
A
B
]ψ−θ
1−ψ−1 · v˜AB · T̂ oT
A
B,t
+v˜P v˜
A
B
[
v˜BB + v˜
B
A
]ψ−θ
1−ψ · CˆBt
+v˜P v˜
A
B
[
v˜BB + v˜
B
A
]ψ−θ
1−ψ · θ · gˆB,t(ToT )
+v˜P v˜
A
B
[
v˜BB + v˜
B
A
]ψ−θ
1−ψ ψ · T̂ oTAB,t
+(ψ − θ) v˜P v˜AB
[
v˜BB + v˜
B
A
]ψ−θ
1−ψ−1 · v˜BA · T̂ oT
B
A,t
+v˜C
[
v˜CA + v˜
C
B
]ψ−θ
1−ψ · CˆCt
+v˜C
[
v˜CA + v˜
C
B
]ψ−θ
1−ψ · θ · gˆC,t(ToT )
+v˜C
[
v˜CA + v˜
C
B
]ψ−θ
1−ψ · ψ · T̂ oTAC,t
+(ψ − θ) v˜C
[
v˜CA + v˜
C
B
]ψ−θ
1−ψ−1 · v˜CA · T̂ oT
C
A,t
+(ψ − θ) v˜C
[
v˜CA + v˜
C
B
]ψ−θ
1−ψ−1 · v˜CB · T̂ oT
C
B,t
Note
v˜AA + v˜
A
B = 1− η (1− nA) + η (1− nA) = 1
v˜BA + v˜
B
B = 1− ηnA + ηnA = 1
v˜CA + v˜
C
B = nA + 1− nA = 1
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Substitute
Yˆ At = v˜P v˜
A
A · CˆAt
+θv˜P v˜
A
A · gˆA,t(ToT )
+ (ψ − θ) v˜P v˜AA v˜AB · T̂ oT
A
B,t
+v˜P v˜
A
B · CˆBt
+θv˜P v˜
A
B · gˆB,t(ToT )
+ψv˜P v˜
A
B · T̂ oT
A
B,t
+(ψ − θ) v˜P v˜AB v˜BA · T̂ oT
B
A,t
+v˜C · CˆCt
+θv˜C · gˆC,t(ToT )
+ψv˜C · T̂ oT
A
C,t
+(ψ − θ) v˜C v˜CA · T̂ oT
C
A,t
+(ψ − θ) v˜C v˜CB · T̂ oT
C
B,t
Yˆ At = v˜P v˜
A
A · CˆAt + θv˜P v˜AA · gˆA,t(ToT ) + (ψ − θ) v˜P v˜AA v˜AB · T̂ oT
A
B,t
+v˜P v˜
A
B · CˆBt + θv˜P v˜AB · gˆB,t(ToT )
+ψv˜P v˜
A
B · T̂ oT
A
B,t + (ψ − θ) v˜P v˜AB v˜BA · T̂ oT
B
A,t
+v˜C · CˆCt + θv˜C · gˆC,t(ToT ) + ψv˜C · T̂ oT
A
C,t
+(ψ − θ) v˜C v˜CA · T̂ oT
C
A,t + (ψ − θ) v˜C v˜CB · T̂ oT
C
B,t
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Yˆ At = [1− η (1− nP )] [1− η (1− nA)] CˆAt
+θ [1− η (1− nP )] [1− η (1− nA)] gˆA,t(ToT )
+ (ψ − θ) [1− η (1− nP )] [1− η (1− nA)] η (1− nA) T̂ oT
A
B,t
+ [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA) CˆBt + θ [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA) gˆB,t(ToT )
+ψ [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA) T̂ oT
A
B,t + (ψ − θ) [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA) ηnAT̂ oT
B
A,t
+η (1− nP ) CˆCt + θη (1− nP ) gˆC,t(ToT ) + ψη (1− nP ) T̂ oT
A
C,t
+(ψ − θ) η (1− nP )nAT̂ oT
C
A,t + (ψ − θ) η (1− nP ) (1− nA) T̂ oT
C
B,t (7.126)
Country B
Y B = vBA
(
ToTBA
)ψ (
ToTAP
)ψ−θ
(gA (ToT ))
θ CA
+vBB
(
ToTBP
)ψ−θ
(gB (ToT ))
θ CB
+vBC
(
ToTBC
)ψ (
ToTCP
)ψ−θ
(gC (ToT ))
θ CC
dY Bt = v
B
A
(
ToTBA
)ψ (
ToTAP
)ψ−θ
(gA (ToT ))
θ · dCAt
+vBA
(
ToTBA
)ψ (
ToTAP
)ψ−θ
θ (gA (ToT ))
θ−1 CA · dgA,t (ToT )
+vBA
(
ToTBA
)ψ
(ψ − θ) (ToTAP )ψ−θ−1 (gA (ToT ))θ CA · dToTAP,t
+vBAψ
(
ToTBA
)ψ−1 (
ToTAP
)ψ−θ
(gA (ToT ))
θ CA · dToTBA,t
+vBB
(
ToTBP
)ψ−θ
(gB (ToT ))
θ · dCBt
+vBB
(
ToTBP
)ψ−θ
θ (gB (ToT ))
θ−1CB · dgB,t (ToT )
+vBB (ψ − θ)
(
ToTBP
)ψ−θ−1
(gB (ToT ))
θ CB · dToTBP,t
+vBC
(
ToTBC
)ψ (
ToTCP
)ψ−θ
(gC (ToT ))
θ · dCCt
+vBC
(
ToTBC
)ψ (
ToTCP
)ψ−θ
θ (gC (ToT ))
θ−1 CC · dgC,t (ToT )
+vBC
(
ToTBC
)ψ
(ψ − θ) (ToTCP )ψ−θ−1 (gC (ToT ))θ CC · dToTCP,t
+vBCψ
(
ToTBC
)ψ−1 (
ToTCP
)ψ−θ
(gC (ToT ))
θ CC · dToTBC,t
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Y BYˆ Bt = v
B
A
(
ToTBA
)ψ (
ToTAP
)ψ−θ
(gA (ToT ))
θ CA · CˆAt
+vBA
(
ToTBA
)ψ (
ToTAP
)ψ−θ
θ (gA (ToT ))
θ CA · gˆA,t (ToT )
+vBA
(
ToTBA
)ψ
(ψ − θ) (ToTAP )ψ−θ (gA (ToT ))θ CA · T̂ oTAP,t
+vBAψ
(
ToTBA
)ψ (
ToTAP
)ψ−θ
(gA (ToT ))
θ CA · T̂ oTBA,t
+vBB
(
ToTBP
)ψ−θ
(gB (ToT ))
θ · CBCˆBt
+vBB
(
ToTBP
)ψ−θ
θ (gB (ToT ))
θ CB · gˆB,t (ToT )
+vBB (ψ − θ)
(
ToTBP
)ψ−θ
(gB (ToT ))
θ CB · T̂ oTBP,t
+vBC
(
ToTBC
)ψ (
ToTCP
)ψ−θ
(gC (ToT ))
θ CC · CˆCt
+vBC
(
ToTBC
)ψ (
ToTCP
)ψ−θ
θ (gC (ToT ))
θ CC · gˆC,t (ToT )
+vBC
(
ToTBC
)ψ
(ψ − θ) (ToTCP )ψ−θ (gC (ToT ))θ CC · T̂ oTCP,t
+vBCψ
(
ToTBC
)ψ (
ToTCP
)ψ−θ
(gC (ToT ))
θ CC · T̂ oTBC,t
Yˆ Bt = v
B
A Cˆ
A
t + v
B
AθgˆA,t (ToT ) + v
B
A (ψ − θ) T̂ oT
A
P,t + v
B
AψT̂oT
B
A,t
+vBB Cˆ
B
t + v
B
BθgˆB,t (ToT ) + v
B
B (ψ − θ) T̂ oT
B
P,t
+vBC Cˆ
C
t + v
B
C θgˆC,t (ToT ) + v
B
C (ψ − θ) T̂ oT
C
P,t + v
B
CψT̂oT
B
C,t
Yˆ Bt = v
B
A Cˆ
A
t + θv
B
A gˆA,t (ToT ) + (ψ − θ) vBAη (1− nA) T̂ oT
A
B,t + ψv
B
A T̂ oT
B
A,t
+vBB Cˆ
B
t + θv
B
B gˆB,t (ToT ) + (ψ − θ) vBBηnAT̂ oT
B
A,t
+vBC Cˆ
C
t + θv
B
C gˆC,t (ToT )
+ (ψ − θ) vBC
[
nAT̂ oT
C
A,t + (1− nA) T̂ oT
C
B,t
]
+ ψvBC T̂ oT
B
C,t
Yˆ Bt = v
B
A Cˆ
A
t + θv
B
A gˆA,t (ToT ) + (ψ − θ) vBAη (1− nA) T̂ oT
A
B,t + ψv
B
A T̂ oT
B
A,t
+vBB Cˆ
B
t + θv
B
B gˆB,t (ToT ) + (ψ − θ) vBBηnAT̂ oT
B
A,t
+vBC Cˆ
C
t + θv
B
C gˆC,t (ToT ) + (ψ − θ) vBCnAT̂ oT
C
A,t
+(ψ − θ) vBC (1− nA) T̂ oT
C
B,t + ψv
B
C T̂ oT
B
C,t
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Yˆ Bt = [1− η (1− nP )] ηnACˆAt + θ [1− η (1− nP )] ηnAgˆA,t (ToT )
+ (ψ − θ) [1− η (1− nP )] ηnAη (1− nA) T̂ oT
A
B,t
+ψ [1− η (1− nP )] ηnAT̂ oT
B
A,t
+(1− ηnA) [1− η (1− nP )] CˆBt + θ (1− ηnA) [1− η (1− nP )] gˆB,t (ToT )
+ (ψ − θ) (1− ηnA) [1− η (1− nP )] ηnAT̂ oT
B
A,t
+η (1− nP ) CˆCt + θη (1− nP ) gˆC,t (ToT ) + (ψ − θ) η (1− nP )nAT̂ oT
C
A,t
+(ψ − θ) η (1− nP ) (1− nA) T̂ oT
C
B,t + ψη (1− nP ) T̂ oT
B
C,t (7.127)
Country C
Y C = vCA
(
gA(ToT )
ToTAC
)θ
CA + vCB
(
gB(ToT )
ToTBC
)θ
CB + vCC (gC (ToT ))
θ CC
Y C = vCA (gA(ToT ))
θ (ToTAC )−θ CA + vCB (gB(ToT ))θ (ToTBC )−θ CB
+vCC (gC (ToT ))
θ CC
dY Ct = v
C
A (gA(ToT ))
θ (ToTAC )−θ · dCAt
+vCA (gA(ToT ))
θ CA · (−θ) (ToTAC )−θ−1 · dToTAC,t
+vCA
(
ToTAC
)−θ
CA · θ (gA(ToT ))θ−1 · dgA,t(ToT )
+vCB (gB(ToT ))
θ (ToTBC )−θ · dCBt
+vCB (gB(ToT ))
θ · (−θ) (ToTBC )−θ−1 · dToTBC,t
+vCB
(
ToTBC
)−θ · θ (gB(ToT ))θ−1 · dgB,t(ToT )
+vCC (gC (ToT ))
θ · dCCt
+vCC · θ (gC(ToT ))θ−1 · dgC,t(ToT )
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Y C Yˆ Ct = v
C
A (gA(ToT ))
θ (ToTAC )−θ · CACˆAt
+vCA (gA(ToT ))
θ CA · (−θ) (ToTAC )−θ · T̂ oTAC,t
+vCA
(
ToTAC
)−θ
CA · θ (gA(ToT ))θ · gˆA,t(ToT )
+vCB (gB(ToT ))
θ (ToTBC )−θ · CBCˆBt
+vCB (gB(ToT ))
θ · (−θ) (ToTBC )−θ · T̂ oTBC,t
+vCB
(
ToTBC
)−θ · θ (gB(ToT ))θ · gˆB,t(ToT )
+vCC (gC (ToT ))
θ · CCCˆCt
+vCC · θ (gC(ToT ))θ · gˆC,t(ToT )
Yˆ Ct = v
C
ACˆ
A
t + (−θ) vCA T̂ oT
A
C,t + θv
C
A gˆA,t(ToT )
+vCBCˆ
B
t + (−θ) vCB T̂ oT
B
C,t + θv
C
B gˆB,t(ToT )
+vCC Cˆ
C
t + θv
C
C gˆC,t(ToT )
Yˆ Ct = ηnPnACˆ
A
t + ηnPnA (−θ) T̂ oT
A
C,t + θηnPnAgˆA,t(ToT )
+ηnp (1− nA) CˆBt + (−θ) ηnp (1− nA) T̂ oT
B
C,t + θηnp (1− nA) gˆB,t(ToT )
+ (1− ηnP ) CˆCt + θ (1− ηnP ) gˆC,t(ToT ) (7.128)
7.1.11 Rewriting Some Equations
CPI Inflation in Terms of Trade
Starting from loglinearized CPI Inflation (7.99)
pˆiAt = vPvApˆi
A
A,t + vPvBpˆi
A
B,t + vC pˆi
A
C,t
pˆiAt = vPvApˆi
A
A,t + vPvBpˆi
A
B,t + vC pˆi
A
C,t(
PˆAt − PˆAt−1
)
= vPvA
(
PˆAA,t − PˆAA,t−1
)
+vPvB
(
PˆAB,t − PˆAB,t−1
)
+ vC
(
PˆAC,t − PˆAC,t−1
)
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Add and subtract ± (vPvB + vC)
(
PˆAA,t − PˆAA,t−1
)
pˆiAt = vPvB
(
PˆAB,t − PˆAB,t−1 −
(
PˆAA,t − PˆAA,t−1
))
+ vC
(
PˆAC,t − PˆAC,t−1 −
(
PˆAA,t − PˆAA,t−1
))
+(vPvA + vPvB + vC)︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
(
PˆAA,t − PˆAA,t−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
pˆiAA,t
= vPvB(Pˆ
A
B,t − PˆAA,t︸ ︷︷ ︸
T̂ oT
A
B,t
− PˆAB,t−1 + PˆAA,t−1︸ ︷︷ ︸)
T̂ oT
A
B,t−1
+ vC
(
PˆAC,t − PˆAA,t − PˆAC,t−1 + PˆAA,t−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆T̂ oT
A
C,t
+ pˆiAA,t
pˆiAt = pˆi
A
A,t + vPvB∆T̂ oT
A
B,t + vC∆T̂ oT
A
C,t (7.129)
pˆiBt = pˆi
B
B,t + vPvA∆T̂ oT
B
A,t + vC∆T̂ oT
B
C,t (7.130)
pˆiCt = pˆi
C
C,t + vPvA∆T̂ oT
C
A,t + vPvB∆T̂ oT
C
B,t (7.131)
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long version without differences and using all six terms of trade definitions
pˆiAt = pˆi
A
A,t + [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vAB
T̂ oT
A
B,t
−[1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vAB
T̂ oT
A
B,t−1
+η (1− nP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
vAC
T̂ oT
A
C,t − η (1− nP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
vAC
T̂ oT
A
C,t−1 (7.132)
pˆiBt = pˆi
B
B,t + [1− η (1− nP )] ηnA︸ ︷︷ ︸
vBA
T̂ oT
B
A,t
−[1− η (1− nP )] ηnA︸ ︷︷ ︸
vBA
T̂ oT
B
A,t−1
+η (1− nP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
vBC
T̂ oT
B
C,t − η (1− nP )︸ ︷︷ ︸
vBC
T̂ oT
B
C,t−1 (7.133)
pˆiCt = pˆi
C
C,t + [1− η (1− nP )] ηnA︸ ︷︷ ︸
vBA
T̂ oT
C
A,t
−[1− η (1− nP )] ηnA︸ ︷︷ ︸
vBA
T̂ oT
C
A,t−1
+[1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vAB
T̂ oT
C
B,t
−[1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
vAB
T̂ oT
C
B,t−1 (7.134)
Euler Equation in Terms of Trade
Country A Starting from loglinearized Euler equation (7.121) and substituting
with (7.132)
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CˆAt = Cˆ
A
t+1 −
1
µ
(
R̂At − pˆiAt+1
)
CˆAt = Cˆ
A
t+1 −
1
µ
R̂At
+
1
µ
(
pˆiAA,t+1 + [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA) T̂ oT
A
B,t+1
− [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA) T̂ oT
A
B,t
+ η (1− nP ) T̂ oT
A
C,t+1 − η (1− nP ) T̂ oT
A
C,t
)
CˆAt = Cˆ
A
t+1 −
1
µ
R̂At +
1
µ
pˆiAA,t+1
+
[1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA)
µ
T̂oT
A
B,t+1 −
[1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA)
µ
T̂oT
A
B,t
+
η (1− nP )
µ
T̂oT
A
C,t+1 −
η (1− nP )
µ
T̂oT
A
C,t (7.135)
Country B
CˆBt = Cˆ
B
t+1 −
1
µ
(
R̂Bt − pˆiBt+1
)
substituting (7.133)
CˆBt = Cˆ
B
t+1 −
1
µ
R̂Bt +
1
µ
pˆiBB,t+1
+
[1− η (1− nP )] ηnA
µ
T̂oT
B
A,t+1 −
[1− η (1− nP )] ηnA
µ
T̂oT
B
A,t
+
η (1− nP )
µ
T̂oT
B
C,t+1 −
η (1− nP )
µ
T̂oT
B
C,t (7.136)
Country C
CˆCt = Cˆ
C
t+1 −
1
µ
(
R̂Ct − pˆiCt+1
)
substituting (7.134)
CˆCt = Cˆ
C
t+1 −
1
µ
R̂Ct +
1
µ
pˆiCC,t+1
+
[1− η (1− nP )] ηnA
µ
T̂oT
C
A,t+1 −
[1− η (1− nP )] ηnA
µ
T̂oT
C
A,t
+
[1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA)
µ
T̂oT
C
B,t+1
− [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA)
µ
T̂oT
C
B,t (7.137)
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Equations (7.135), (7.136) and (7.137) are equivalent to Monacelli (2001: 393,
eq. 22 and eq. 25).
7.2 Firms
The representative firm, z, in country i, i = A,B,C produces
Y it (z) = F
i
t L
i
t(z). (7.138)
7.2.1 Variables
Y it (z) is output of firm z in period t
Lit(z) are labor hours employed by firm z
F it is the country specific productivity and follows a first order autoregressive
process
F it = ρ
F lnF it−1 + 
i
t. (7.139)
W it is the wage rate
MCit(z) are marginal cost given by the Lagrange multiplier
MCit(z) ≡ λit(z). (7.140)
7.2.2 Firm’s Cost Minimization
General approach for minimization of f(x) subject to the constraint h(x) ≥ 0,
i. e., a market clearing constraint where supply ≥ demand
L = f(x)− λ · h(x). (7.141)
min
Lih(z)
W it L
i
t(z)
s.t. F it L
i
t(z) ≥ Y i,dt (z)
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First Order Condition
∂L
∂Lit(z)
= W it − λit(z) [F it ] = 0
⇔ W it
F it
= λit(z) ≡MCit(z)
(7.142)
Equation (7.142) defines the nominal marginal cost MCit(z).
Loglinearized Production Function
Yˆ it (z) = Fˆ
i
t + Lˆ
i
t(z) (7.143)
7.2.3 Real Marginal Cost
Take definition of (nominal) marginal cost (7.142)
W it =MC
i
t(z) · F it .
Substituting W it from (7.40) and solving for MC
i
t(z)
MCit(z)F
i
t =
−∂U it/∂Lit
∂U it/∂C
i
t
· P it (7.144)
MCit(z) =
(Lit)
γ
(Cit)
−µ
1
F it
P it . (7.145)
Dividing by the domestic price index P ii,t to get real marginal cost
8
mcit(z) ≡
MCit(z)
P ii,t
(7.146)
mct =
−∂U it/∂Lit
∂U it/∂C
i
t
P it
P ii,t
1
F it
=
(Lit)
γ
(Cit)
−µ
P it
P ii,t︸︷︷︸
gi,t(ToT )
1
Ft
=
(
Cit
)µ (
Lit
)γ
F it
−1
gi,t (ToT ) .
(7.147)
Equation (17a) in Monacelli (2001: 392).
mct =
(
Cit
)µ (Lit)γ
F it
gi (ToT )
(F it )
γ
(F it )
γ
8Discounting with domestic prices in country i, P ii,t, in contrast to country i’s CPI, P
i
t , as
the firm’s production costs depend only on domestic prices (Gal´ı and Monacelli 2005: 715).
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mct =
(
Cit
)µ (
Lit F
i
t
)γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
(Y it )
γ
1
F it (F
i
t )
γ gi (ToT )
mct =
(
Cit
)µ (
Y it
)γ (
F it
)−(1+γ)
gi (ToT )
Loglinearized Real Marginal Cost
m̂ct = µ Cˆ
i
t + γ Lˆ
i
t − Fˆ it + gˆi (ToT ) (7.148)
and adding and subtracting ±γ Fˆ it
m̂ct = µ Cˆ
i
t + γ Lˆ
i
t + γ Fˆ
i
t − Fˆ it − γ Fˆt + gˆi (ToT ) (7.149)
substituting the loglinearized production function (7.143) Yˆ it = Fˆ
i
t + Lˆ
i
t
m̂ct = µ Cˆ
i
t + γ Yˆ
i
t − (1 + γ) Fˆ it + gˆi (ToT ) (7.150)
m̂cAt = µ Cˆ
A
t + γ Yˆ
A
t − (1 + γ) FˆAt + gˆA (ToT ) (7.151)
m̂cBt = µ Cˆ
B
t + γ Yˆ
B
t − (1 + γ) FˆBt + gˆB (ToT ) (7.152)
m̂cCt = µ Cˆ
C
t + γ Yˆ
C
t − (1 + γ) FˆCt + gˆC (ToT ) . (7.153)
7.2.4 Optimal Price Setting
The optimal price setting stems from maximizing profits. General formula for
(nominal) profits, NP, is revenue, RV, minus total cost, TC,
NP (z) = RV (z)− TC(z). (7.154)
Here, profits depend on good z. We are actually interested in the optimal price,
P, that maximizes profits from selling good z
NPt(P ) = P · Yt(z)−MCt(z) · Lt(z). (7.155)
In order to get the optimal price, we maximize the value of firm z, i. e., we
maximize the expected present discounted stream of profits, V (z). As profits are
the difference between revenue and total cost, we first derive these two expressions
and then maximize the firm’s value by choosing the optimal price, P . We look
at country A. Price setting in countries B and C follows the same optimization.
218
Revenue The following equations give the revenue for firm z in country A,
indicated by the subscript. The superscript of the prices refers to the currency
in which the prices are denominated. Thus, the firm in country A has to transfer
its revenue from exporting to countries B and C back to its home currency by
multiplying with the respective exchange rate, SAB,t and S
A
C,t.
RV At (z) = nPnARV
A
A,t + np (1− nA)RV BA,t + (1− nP )RV CA,t
= nPnAP
A
A,t(z) Y
A
A,t(z) + np (1− nA)SAB,t PBA,t(z)Y BA,t(z)
+ (1− nP )SAC,t PCA,t(z) Y CA,t(z) (7.156)
The general formula for the revenue in country i’s firm z is
RV i(z) = P ii,t(z)ni Y
i
i,t(z) +
∑
i′
Sii′,t P
i′
i,t(z)ni′ Y
i′
i,t(z). (7.157)
Total Cost Total cost of production for country A’s firm z
TCAt (z) =W
A
t L
A
t (z) (7.158)
is the nominal wage times labor hours. Rewriting the production function
Y At (z) = F
A
t L
A
t (z)
⇔ LAt (z) =
Y At (z)
FAt
,
where Y At (z) is output of country A’s firm z in period t and it allows us to
substitute for labor hours employed by firm z, LAt (z)
TCAt (z) =W
A
t ·
Y At (z)
FAt
=
WAt
FAt
Y At (z). (7.159)
Use FOC from cost minimization9 (7.142)
MCAt (z) =
WAt
FAt
9Marginal cost, MCit(z), depend on z as the Lagrange multiplier, λ
i
t, in the firm’s cost
minimization depends on z.
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to get total cost
TCAt (z) = MC
A
t (z) Y
A
t (z)
= MCAt (z)
(
nPnA Y
A
A,t(z) + np (1− nA) Y BA,t(z)
+ (1− nP ) Y CA,t(z)
)
, (7.160)
where total demand of country A’s firm z, Y At (z), is given by the sum of total
demand for firm z’s products in the three countries
Y At (z) = nPnA Y
B
A,t(z) + np (1− nA) Y CA,t(z) + (1− nP ) Y AA,t(z). (7.161)
We can substitute the total demand from the individual demand function (7.52)
as for individual goods z the market clearing condition
Ct(z) = Yt(z) (7.162)
holds.
Y AA,t(z) =
1
nPnA
(
PAA,t(z)
PAA,t
)−φ
Y AA,t (7.163)
Y BA,t(z) =
1
nPnA
(
PBA,t(z)
PBA,t
)−φ
Y BA,t (7.164)
Y CA,t(z) =
1
nPnA
(
PCA,t(z)
PCA,t
)−φ
Y CA,t (7.165)
Now, good z’s demand does not depend anymore on the quantities of good z but
only on aggregate variables such as price level and aggregate output, and the
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price of good z, i. e., the variable we are looking for. Total costs are
TCAt (z) = MC
A
t (z)nPnA
Y AA,t(z)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
nPnA
(
PAA,t(z)
PAA,t
)−φ
Y AA,t
+MCAt (z)np (1− nA)
Y BA,t(z)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
nPnA
(
PBA,t(z)
PBA,t
)−φ
Y BA,t
+MCAt (z) (1− nP )
Y CA,t(z)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
nPnA
(
PCA,t(z)
PCA,t
)−φ
Y CA,t . (7.166)
The general formula for the total cost of country i’s firm z is
TCit(z) =MC
i
t(z)
∑
i′=A,B,C
ni′
1
ni
(
P i
′
i,t(z)
P i
′
i,t
)−φ
Y i
′
i,t . (7.167)
Flexible Prices
Analog to the lecture notes by Monacelli (2007), we derive the optimal price in
a framework when all prices are flexible. Here, the firm’s optimization problem
is static.
Firm’s Profit Maximization under Flexible Prices Following Monacelli’s
lecture notes10 the firm (in country A) maximizes real profits, RP, i. e., revenue
and total cost are discounted with the CPI price index, PAt ,
RPt(z) =
PAt (z)
PAt
Y At (z)−
WAt
PAt
LAt (z). (7.168)
Profits are maximized under two constraints: (i) the production function (7.138),
and (ii) the demand functions for individual goods under individual good’s market
10There is no difference whether nominal or real profits are maximized as the CPI price index
drops out in the first order condition.
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clearing (7.162). Both constraints are simply substituted into the profits equation.
First, rearranging the production function to LAt (z) =
Y At (z)
FAt
and substituting
WAt L
A
t (z) =
WAt
FAt
Y At (z) =MC
A
t (z)Y
A
t (z) (7.169)
leads to
RPt(z) =
1
PAt
[
PAA,t(z)nPnA Y
A
A,t(z) + S
A
B,t P
B
A,t(z)np (1− nA) Y BA,t(z)
+SAC,t P
C
A,t(z) (1− nP ) Y CA,t(z)
−MCAt (z)
(
nPnA Y
A
A,t(z)
+np (1− nA) Y BA,t(z) + (1− nP ) Y CA,t(z)
)]
. (7.170)
Second, plugging in the demand functions (7.163) to (7.165) leads to
RPAt =
1
PAt
{
PAA,t(z)nPnA
Y AA,t(z)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
nPnA
(
PAA,t(z)
PAA,t
)−φ
Y AA,t
+SAB,t P
B
A,t(z)np (1− nA)
Y BA,t(z)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
nPnA
(
PBA,t(z)
PBA,t
)−φ
Y BA,t
+ SAC,t P
C
A,t(z) (1− nP )
Y CA,t(z)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
nPnA
(
PCA,t(z)
PCA,t
)−φ
Y CA,t
− MCAt (z)
[
nPnA
Y AA,t(z)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
nPnA
(
PAA,t(z)
PAA,t
)−φ
Y AA,t
+ np (1− nA)
Y BA,t(z)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
nPnA
(
PBA,t(z)
PBA,t
)−φ
Y BA,t
+ (1− nP )
Y CA,t(z)︷ ︸︸ ︷
1
nPnA
(
PCA,t(z)
PCA,t
)−φ
Y CA,t
]}
. (7.171)
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Derived from the first order conditions, the three prices PAA,t, P
B
A,t and P
C
A,t are
∂ RPt(z)
∂PAA,t(z)
=
1
PAt
[
(1− φ)(PAA,t(z))−φ(PAA,t)φY AA,t
−MCAt (z)Y AA,t(−φ)(PAA,t(z))−φ−1(PAA,t)φ
]
= 0
⇔ 1
PAt
Y AA,t (P
A
A,t)
φ
[
(1− φ)(PAA,t(z))−φ
− (−φ)MCAt (z) (PAA,t(z))−φ−1
]
= 0∣∣∣∣÷ [ 1PAt Y AA,t (PAA,t)φ
]
⇔ (1− φ)(PAA,t(z))−φ + φMCAt (z) (PAA,t(z))−φ−1 = 0
| ÷ (PAA,t(z))−φ
⇔ (1− φ) + φMCAt (z) (PAA,t(z))−1 = 0
| ·PAA,t(z) | −φMCAt (z)
⇔ (1− φ)PAA,t(z) = −φMCAt (z)
⇔ PAA,t(z) = −
φ
1− φ MC
A
t (z) =
φ
φ− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mark-up
MCAt (z) (7.172)
∂ RPt(z)
∂PBA,t(z)
=
1
PAt
[
(1− φ)SAB,t(PBA,t(z))−φ(PBA,t)φ
np (1− nA)
nPnA
Y BA,t
−MCAt (z)
np (1− nA)
nPnA
Y BA,t(−φ)(PBA,t(z))−φ−1(PBA,t)φ
]
= 0
⇔ 1
PAt
np (1− nA)
nPnA
Y BA,t (P
B
A,t)
φ
[
(1− φ)SAB,t(PBA,t(z))−φ
− (−φ)MCAt (z)(PBA,t(z))−φ−1
]
= 0∣∣∣∣÷ [ 1PAt np (1− nA)nPnA Y BA,t (PBA,t)φ
]
⇔ (1− φ)SAB,t(PBA,t(z))−φ + φMCAt (z) (PBA,t(z))−φ−1 = 0
| ÷ (PBA,t(z))−φ
⇔ (1− φ)SAB,t + φMCAt (z) (PBA,t(z))−1 = 0
| ·PBA,t(z) | −φMCAt (z)
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⇔ (1− φ)SAB,tPBA,t(z) = −φMCAt (z) | ÷SAB,t
⇔ PBA,t(z) = −
φ
1− φ
1
SAB,t
MCAt (z) =
φ
φ− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mark-up
1
SAB,t
MCAt (z) (7.173)
PCA,t(z) =
φ
φ− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mark-up
1
SAC,t
MCAt (z) (7.174)
Summing up, under flexible prices we find that prices are set in the producer’s
currency and then transferred into the buyer’s currency. The producer sets the
price above marginal cost as the mark-up is larger than one, when φ ≥ 1. The
mark-up stems from monopolistic competition in goods markets. Rewriting the
mark-up φ
φ−1 as
1
1− 1
φ
allows us to see easily that in a perfectly competitive goods
market when φ→∞ the mark-up goes to one and prices equal marginal cost.
Sticky Prices under Producer Currency Pricing
Calvo pricing with probability of changing the price (1− α).
Analog to Monacelli (2001) and also his lecture notes we derive the optimal price
in a New Keynesian framework when exporters’ prices are set in the producer
currency, i. e., there is full exchange rate pass-through to the buyer. Thus, firm
z sets only the price, P˜AA,t. Prices in the buyer’s currency in period t+ τ are
P˜AA,t(z) = P˜
A
A,t(z) (7.175)
P˜BA,t+τ (z) = S
B
A,t+τ · P˜AA,t(z) (7.176)
P˜CA,t+τ (z) = S
C
A,t+τ · P˜AA,t(z). (7.177)
The optimal price maximizes the expected present discounted stream of profits,
i. e., the value of firm z
Vt(z) =
∞∑
τ=0
ατ Et ρt,t+τ [Pt(z) · Yt+τ (z)−MCt+τ (z) · Yt+τ (z)]
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Vt(z) =
∞∑
τ=0
ατ Et ρ
A
t,t+τ
[
P˜AA,t(z)nPnAY
A
A,t+τ (z)
+SAB,t+τ P˜
B
A,t+τ (z)np (1− nA) Y BA,t+τ (z)
+SAC,t+τ P˜
C
A,t+τ (z) (1− nP )Y CA,t+τ (z)
−MCAt+τ (z)
(
nPnAY
A
A,t+τ (z)
+np (1− nA)Y BA,t+τ (z) + (1− nP )Y CA,t+τ (z)
)]
. (7.178)
Using the pricing rules (7.175) to (7.177) to maximize over the optimal price P˜AA,t
Vt(z) =
∞∑
τ=0
ατ Et ρ
A
t,t+τ
[(
P˜AA,t(z)−MCAt+τ (z)
)
nPnAY
A
A,t+τ (z)
+[SAB,t+τ S
B
A,t+τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
P˜AA,t(z) −MCAt+τ (z)]np (1− nA) Y BA,t+τ (z)
+ [SAC,t+τ S
C
A,t+τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
P˜AA,t(z) −MCAt+τ (z)] (1− nP )Y CA,t+τ (z)
]
(7.179)
Plug demand functions (7.163) to (7.165) under the given pricing rules (7.175)
to (7.177)
Y AA,t+τ (z) =
1
nPnA
(
P˜AA,t(z)
PAA,t+τ
)−φ
Y AA,t+τ (7.180)
Y BA,t+τ (z) =
1
nPnA
(
SBA,t+τ P˜
A
A,t(z)
PBA,t+τ
)−φ
Y BA,t+τ (7.181)
Y CA,t+τ (z) =
1
npnA
(
SCA,t+τ P˜
A
A,t (z)
PCA,t+τ
)−φ
Y CA,t+τ (7.182)
into the firm’s value
Vt(z) =
∞∑
τ=0
ατ Et ρ
A
t,t+τ
(P˜AA,t(z)−MCAt+τ (z)) nPnAnPnA
(
P˜AA,t(z)
PAA,t+τ
)−φ
Y AA,t+τ
+
(
P˜AA,t(z) −MCAt+τ (z)
) np (1− nA)
nPnA
(
SBA,t+τ P˜
A
A,t(z)
PBA,t+τ
)−φ
Y BA,t+τ
+
(
P˜AA,t(z) −MCAt+τ (z)
) (1− nP )
nPnA
(
SCA,t+τ P˜
A
A,t(z)
PCA,t+τ
)−φ
Y CA,t+τ

(7.183)
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and multiply out to get an expression, which might be derived more easily.
Vt(z) =
∞∑
τ=0
ατ Et ρ
A
t,t+τ
P˜AA,t(z) nPnAnPnA
(
P˜AA,t(z)
PAA,t+τ
)−φ
Y AA,t+τ
−MCAt+τ (z)
nPnA
nPnA
(
P˜AA,t(z)
PAA,t+τ
)−φ
Y AA,t+τ
+P˜AA,t(z)
np (1− nA)
nPnA
(
SBA,t+τ P˜
A
A,t(z)
PBA,t+τ
)−φ
Y BA,t+τ
−MCAt+τ (z)
np (1− nA)
nPnA
(
SBA,t+τ P˜
A
A,t(z)
PBA,t+τ
)−φ
Y BA,t+τ
+ P˜AA,t(z)
(1− nP )
nPnA
(
SCA,t+τ P˜
A
A,t(z)
PCA,t+τ
)−φ
Y CA,t+τ
−MCAt+τ (z)
(1− nP )
nPnA
(
SCA,t+τ P˜
A
A,t(z)
PCA,t+τ
)−φ
Y CA,t+τ

Vt(z) =
∞∑
τ=0
ατ Et ρ
A
t,t+τ
[
P˜AA,t(z) P˜
A
A,t(z)
−φ (PAA,t+τ)φ nPnAnPnAY AA,t+τ
−MCAt+τ (z)P˜AA,t(z)−φ
(
PAA,t+τ
)φ nPnA
nPnA
Y AA,t+τ
+P˜AA,t(z)
np (1− nA)
nPnA
(
SBA,t+τ
)−φ
P˜AA,t(z)
−φ [PBA,t+τ]φ Y BA,t+τ
−MCAt+τ (z)
np (1− nA)
nPnA
(
SBA,t+τ
)−φ
P˜AA,t(z)
−φ [PBA,t+τ]φ Y BA,t+τ
+ P˜AA,t(z)
(1− nP )
nPnA
(
SCA,t+τ
)−φ
P˜AA,t(z)
−φ (PCA,t+τ)φ Y CA,t+τ
−MCAt+τ (z)
(1− nP )
nPnA
(
SCA,t+τ
)−φ
P˜AA,t(z)
−φ (PCA,t+τ)φ Y CA,t+τ]
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Vt(z) =
∞∑
τ=0
ατ Et ρ
A
t,t+τ
[
P˜AA,t(z)
1−φ (PAA,t+τ)φ nPnAnPnAY AA,t+τ
−P˜AA,t(z)−φ
(
PAA,t+τ
)φ nPnA
nPnA
Y AA,t+τMC
A
t+τ (z)
+P˜AA,t(z)
1−φnp (1− nA)
nPnA
(
SBA,t+τ
)−φ [
PBA,t+τ
]φ
Y BA,t+τ
−P˜AA,t(z)−φ
np (1− nA)
nPnA
(
SBA,t+τ
)−φ[
PBA,t+τ
]φ
Y BA,t+τMC
A
t+τ (z)
+ P˜AA,t(z)
1−φ (1− nP )
nPnA
(
SCA,t+τ
)−φ (
PCA,t+τ
)φ
Y CA,t+τ
− P˜AA,t(z)−φ
(1− nP )
nPnA
(
SCA,t+τ
)−φ (
PCA,t+τ
)φ
Y CA,t+τMC
A
t+τ (z)
]
First Order Condition
∂Vt(z)
∂P˜AA,t(z)
= Et
∞∑
τ=0
ατρAt,t+τ
[
(1− φ) P˜AA,t(z)−φ PAA,t+τ φ
nPnA
nPnA
Y AA,t+τ
− (−φ) P˜AA,t(z)−φ−1
(
PAA,t+τ
)φ nPnA
nPnA
Y AA,t+τ MC
A
t+τ (z)
+ (1− φ) P˜AA,t(z)−φSBA,t+τ (z)−φPBA,t+τ φ
np (1− nA)
nPnA
Y BA,t+τ
− (−φ) P˜AA,t(z)−φ−1 SBA,t+τ (z)−φ
(
PBA,t+τ
)φ np (1− nA)
nPnA
Y BA,t+τ MC
A
t+τ (z)
+ (1− φ) P˜AA,t(z)−φ SCA,t+τ (z)−φPCA,t+τ φ
(1− nP )
nPnA
Y CA,t+τ
− (−φ) P˜AA,t(z)−φ−1 SCA,t+τ (z)−φ
(
PCA,t+τ
)φ
· (1− nP )
nPnA
Y CA,t+τ MC
A
t+τ (z)
]
= 0
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∂Vt(z)
∂P˜AA,t(z)
= Et
∞∑
τ=0
ατρAt,t+τ
[
(1− φ) P˜AA,t(z)−φ PAA,t+τ φ
nPnA
nPnA
Y AA,t+τ
+φ P˜AA,t(z)
−φ−1 (
PAA,t+τ
)φ nPnA
nPnA
Y AA,t+τ MC
A
t+τ (z)
+ (1− φ) P˜AA,t(z)−φSBA,t+τ (z)−φPBA,t+τ φ
np (1− nA)
nPnA
Y BA,t+τ
+φ P˜AA,t(z)
−φ−1
SBA,t+τ (z)
−φ (
PBA,t+τ
)φ np (1− nA)
nPnA
Y BA,t+τ MC
A
t+τ (z)
+ (1− φ) P˜AA,t(z)−φ SCA,t+τ (z)−φPCA,t+τ φ
(1− nP )
nPnA
Y CA,t+τ
+φ P˜AA,t(z)
−φ−1
SCA,t+τ (z)
−φ (
PCA,t+τ
)φ
· (1− nP )
nPnA
Y CA,t+τ MC
A
t+τ (z)
]
= 0
∂Vt(z)
∂P˜AA,t(z)
= Et
∞∑
τ=0
ατρAt,t+τ
(1− φ)nPnA
(
P˜AA,t(z)
PAA,t+τ
)−φ
1
nPnA
Y AA,t+τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y AA,t+τ (z)
+φ P˜AA,t(z)
−1
nPnA
(
P˜AA,t(z)
PAA,t+τ
)−φ
1
nPnA
Y AA,t+τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y AA,t+τ (z)
MCAt+τ (z)
+ (1− φ)np (1− nA) P˜AA,t(z)−φSBA,t+τ (z)−φPBA,t+τ φ
1
nPnA
Y BA,t+τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y BA,t+τ (z)
+φ P˜AA,t(z)
−1
np (1− nA) P˜AA,t(z)−φSBA,t+τ (z)−φ
(
PBA,t+τ
)φ 1
nPnA
Y BA,t+τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y BA,t+τ (z)
MCAt+τ (z)
+ (1− φ) (1− nP ) P˜AA,t(z)−φ SCA,t+τ (z)−φPCA,t+τ φ
1
nPnA
Y CA,t+τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y CA,t+τ (z)
+φ P˜AA,t(z)
−1
(1− nP )
·P˜AA,t(z)−φSCA,t+τ (z)−φ
(
PCA,t+τ
)φ 1
nPnA
Y CA,t+τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y CA,t+τ (z)
MCAt+τ (z)
]
= 0
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⇔ Et
∞∑
τ=0
ατρAt,t+τ
[
(1− φ)nPnA Y AA,t+τ (z) + φnPnA P˜AA,t(z)−1 Y AA,t+τ (z)MCAt+τ (z)
+ (1− φ)np (1− nA) Y BA,t+τ (z) + φnp (1− nA) P˜AA,t(z)−1 Y BA,t+τ (z)MCAt+τ (z)
+ (1− φ) (1− nP ) Y CA,t+τ (z) + φ (1− nP ) P˜AA,t(z)−1 Y CA,t+τ (z)MCAt+τ (z)
]
= 0
⇔ Et
∞∑
τ=0
ατρAt,t+τ
(1− φ) (nPnAY AA,t+τ (z) + np (1− nA)Y BA,t+τ (z) + (1− nP )Y CA,t+τ (z))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y At+τ (z)
+φ P˜AA,t(z)
−1 (
nPnAY
A
A,t+τ (z) + np (1− nA)Y BA,t+τ (z) + (1− nP )Y CA,t+τ (z)
)
·MCAt+τ (z)
]
= 0
⇔ P˜AA,t(z) = −
φ
1− φ ·
Et
∑∞
τ=0 α
τρAt,t+τ Y
A
t+τ (z)MC
A
t+τ (z)
Et
∑∞
τ=0 α
τρAt,t+τ Y
A
t+τ (z)
⇔ P˜AA,t(z) =
φ
φ− 1 ·
Et
∑∞
τ=0 α
τρAt,t+τ Y
A
t+τ (z)MC
A
t+τ (z)
Et
∑∞
τ=0 α
τρAt,t+τ Y
A
t+τ (z)
(7.184)
where Y At+τ (z) is total (“world”) output of country A’s firm z as in (7.161).
7.3 New Keynesian Model
7.3.1 Domestic Price Indexes and Inflation
Evolution of Aggregate Price Index
Following the lecture notes by Monacelli (2007)
P ii′,t =
[
α
(
P ii′,t−1
)1−φ
+ (1− α)
(
P˜ ii′,t
)1−φ] 11−φ
. (7.185)
Aggregate price level in period t loglinearized
Pˆ ii′,t = αPˆ
i
i′,t−1 + (1− α) ̂˜P ii′,t. (7.186)
Inflation loglinearized
piii′,t = (1− α)
( ̂˜
P
i
i′,t − Pˆ ii′,t−1
)
. (7.187)
Notice, that inflation is not expressed as its deviation from steady state but in
levels.
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7.3.2 Phillips Curve
Loglinearized Price-Setting Equation
Starting from the equation for the optimal price (7.184)11
P˜AA,t(z) =
φ
φ− 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
mark-up
· Et
∑∞
τ=0 α
τρAt,t+τ Y
A
t+τ (z)MC
A
t+τ (z)
Et
∑∞
τ=0 α
τρAt,t+τ Y
A
t+τ (z)
define ρ˜it,t+τ ≡
λit+τ
λit
=
(
Cit+τ
Cit
)−µ
P it
P it+τ
see (7.38 and 7.42)
and substitute ρAt,t+τ by β
τ ρ˜At,t+τ
⇔ P˜AA,t(z)Et
∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ ρ˜At,t+τ Y
A
t+τ (z) =
φ
φ− 1 Et
∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ ρ˜At,t+τ Y
A
t+τ (z)MC
A
t+τ (z). (7.188)
Since each firm z sets the same price in equilibrium we can drop the index z and
multiply both sides by
(
PAA,t+τ
)φ
⇔ P˜AA,tEt
∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ ρ˜At,t+τ Y
A
t+τ
(
PAA,t+τ
)φ
︸ ︷︷ ︸
LHS
=
φ
φ− 1 Et
∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ ρ˜At,t+τ Y
A
t+τ
(
PAA,t+τ
)φ
MCAt+τ︸ ︷︷ ︸
RHS
(7.189)
LHS: P˜AA,tEt
∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ ρ˜At,t+τ Y
A
t+τ
(
PAA,t+τ
)φ
(7.190)
RHS:
φ
φ− 1Et
∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ ρ˜At,t+τ Y
A
t+τ
(
PAA,t+τ
)φ
MCAt+τ (7.191)
11See Teo (2005, Footnote 11).
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Loglinearizing LHS (7.190)
t P˜AA,t
1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(αβ)0
1︷︸︸︷
ρ˜At,t Y
A
t
(
PAA,t
)φ
t+ 1 + P˜AA,t αβ ρ˜
A
t,t+1 Y
A
t+1
(
PAA,t+1
)φ
t+ 2 + P˜AA,t (αβ)
2 ρ˜At,t+2 Y
A
t+2
(
PAA,t+2
)φ
t+ τ + . . .
Loglinearize with steady state of P˜AA (z) = P
A
A , ρ˜
A = 1
t, P˜AA,t
̂˜
P
A
A,t P
A Y A
(
PAA
)φ
t, Y At + Yˆ
A
A,t Y
A
(
PAA
)1+φ
t, PAA,t +φ Pˆ
A
A,t Y
A
(
PAA
)1+φ
t+ 1, P˜AA,t +
̂˜
P
A
A,t P
A αβ Y A
(
PAA
)φ
t+ 1, Y At+1 + Yˆ
A
A,t+1 αβ Y
A
(
PAA
)1+φ
t+ 1, PAA,t+1 +φ Pˆ
A
A,t+1 αβ Y
A
(
PAA
)1+φ
t+ 1, ρ˜At,t+1 + ˆ˜ρ
A
t,t+1 αβ Y
A
(
PAA
)1+φ
t+ 2, P˜AA,t +
̂˜
P
A
A,t P
A αβ Y A
(
PAA
)φ
t+ 2, Y At+2 + Yˆ
A
A,t+2 (αβ)
2 Y A
(
PAA
)1+φ
t+ 2, PAA,t+2 +φ Pˆ
A
A,t+2 (αβ)
2 Y A
(
PAA
)1+φ
t+ 2, ρ˜At,t+2 + ˆ˜ρ
A
t,t+2 (αβ)
2 Y A
(
PAA
)1+φ
t+ τ + . . .
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Collecting terms
t
(
PAA
)1+φ
Y A
(̂˜
P
A
A,t + Yˆ
A
A,t + φ Pˆ
A
A,t
)
t+ 1 +
(
PAA
)1+φ
Y A αβ
(̂˜
P
A
A,t + Yˆ
A
A,t+1 + φ Pˆ
A
A,t+1 + ˆ˜ρ
A
t,t+1
)
t+ 2 +
(
PAA
)1+φ
Y A (αβ)2
(̂˜
P
A
A,t + Yˆ
A
A,t+2 + φ Pˆ
A
A,t+2 + ˆ˜ρ
A
t,t+2
)
t+ τ + . . .
Simplify
LHS:
(
PAA
)1+φ
Y A
∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ
̂˜
P
A
A,t
+
(
PAA
)1+φ
Y AEt
∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ
(
Yˆ AA,t+τ + φ Pˆ
A
A,t+τ + ˆ˜ρ
A
t,t+τ
)
LHS:
(
PAA
)1+φ
Y A
1
1− αβ
̂˜
P
A
A,t
+
(
PAA
)1+φ
Y AEt
∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ
(
Yˆ AA,t+τ + φ Pˆ
A
A,t+τ + ˆ˜ρ
A
t,t+τ
)
(7.192)
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Loglinearizing RHS (7.191)
mark-up · [
t
1︷ ︸︸ ︷
(αβ)0
1︷︸︸︷
ρ˜At,t Y
A
t
(
PAA,t
)φ
MCAt
t+ 1 + αβ ρ˜At,t+1 Y
A
t+1
(
PAA,t+1
)φ
MCAt+1
t+ 2 + (αβ)2 ρ˜At,t+2 Y
A
t+2
(
PAA,t+2
)φ
MCAt+2
t+ τ + . . . ]
Following (7.146) substitute mcAt (z) =MC
A
t (z)/P
A
A,t
mark-up · [
t Y At
(
PAA,t
)1+φ
mcAt
t+ 1 + αβ ρ˜At,t+1 Y
A
t+1
(
PAA,t+1
)1+φ
mcAt+1
t+ 2 + (αβ)2 ρ˜At,t+2 Y
A
t+2
(
PAA,t+2
)1+φ
mcAt+2
t+ τ + . . . ]
Loglinearize with steady state of P˜AA (z) = P
A
A , ρ˜
A = 1
t, Y At mark-up · [ Yˆ At Y A
(
PAA
)1+φ
mcA
t, PAA,t +(1 + φ) Pˆ
A
A,t Y
A
(
PAA
)1+φ
mcA
t, mcAt + m̂c
A
t Y
A
(
PAA
)1+φ
mcA
t+ 1, Y At+1 + Yˆ
A
t+1 αβ Y
A
(
PAA
)1+φ
mcA
t+ 1, PAA,t+1 +(1 + φ) Pˆ
A
A,t+1 αβ Y
A
(
PAA
)1+φ
mcA
t+ 1, ρ˜At,t+1 + ˆ˜ρ
A
t,t+1 αβ Y
A
(
PAA
)1+φ
mcA
t+ 1, mcAt+1 + m̂c
A
t+1 αβ Y
A
(
PAA
)1+φ
mcA
t+ 2, Y At+2 + Yˆ
A
t+2 (αβ)
2 Y A
(
PAA
)1+φ
mcA
t+ 2, PAA,t+2 +(1 + φ) Pˆ
A
A,t+2 (αβ)
2 Y A
(
PAA
)1+φ
mcA
t+ 2, ρ˜At,t+2 + ˆ˜ρ
A
t,t+2 (αβ)
2 Y A
(
PAA
)1+φ
mcA
t+ 2, mcAt+2 + m̂c
A
t+2 (αβ)
2 Y A
(
PAA
)1+φ
mcA
t+ τ + . . . ]
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Collecting terms
t mark-up · [ (PAA )1+φ Y AmcA (Yˆ At + (1 + φ) PˆAA,t + m̂cAt )
t+ 1 +
(
PAA
)1+φ
Y AmcA αβ
(
Yˆ At+1 + (1 + φ)Pˆ
A
A,t+1 + ˆ˜ρ
A
t,t+1 + m̂c
A
t+1
)
t+ 2 +
(
PAA
)1+φ
Y AmcA (αβ)2
(
Yˆ At+2 + (1 + φ)Pˆ
A
A,t+2 + ˆ˜ρ
A
t,t+2 + m̂c
A
t+2
)
t+ τ + . . . ]
Simplify
RHS:
(
PAA
)1+φ
Y AmcA · mark-up · Et
∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ
·
(
Yˆ At+τ + (1 + φ) Pˆ
A
A,t+τ + ˆ˜ρ
A
t,t+τ + m̂c
A
t+τ
)
Cancel mark-up =
1
mcA
RHS:
(
PAA
)1+φ
Y AEt
∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ
(
Yˆ At+τ + (1 + φ)Pˆ
A
A,t+τ + ˆ˜ρ
A
t,t+τ + m̂c
A
t+τ
)
(7.193)
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Putting the Two Sides together: LHS = RHS Combining (7.192) and
(7.193)(
PAA
)1+φ
Y A
1
1− αβ
̂˜
P
A
A,t
+
(
PAA
)1+φ
Y AEt
∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ
(
Yˆ At+τ + φ Pˆ
A
A,t+τ + ˆ˜ρ
A
t,t+τ
)
= (
PAA
)1+φ
Y AEt
∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ
(
Yˆ At+τ + (1 + φ)Pˆ
A
A,t+τ + ˆ˜ρ
A
t,t+τ + m̂c
A
t+τ
)
Divide both sides by
(
PAA
)1+φ
Y A
and subtract Et
∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ
(
Yˆ At+τ + φ Pˆ
A
A,t+τ + ˆ˜ρ
A
t,t+τ
)
⇔ 1
1− αβ
̂˜
P
A
A,t
= Et
∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ
(
Yˆ At+τ − Yˆ At+τ + (1 + φ)PˆAA,t+τ − φ PˆAA,t+τ + ˆ˜ρAt,t+τ − ˆ˜ρAt,t+τ + m̂cAt+τ
)
⇔ 1
1− αβ
̂˜
P
A
A,t = Et
∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ
(
PˆAA,t+τ + m̂c
A
t+τ
)
⇔ ̂˜PAA,t = (1− αβ)Et ∞∑
τ=0
(αβ)τ
(
PˆAA,t+τ + m̂c
A
t+τ
)
(7.194)
Equation for Inflation
Rewrite (7.194) in first differences
̂˜
P
A
A,t = (1− αβ)
(
m̂cAt + Pˆ
A
A,t
)
+ αβ (1− αβ)
(
m̂cAt+1 + Pˆ
A
A,t+1
)
. (7.195)
Recall (7.186)
PˆAA,t = αPˆ
A
A,t−1 + (1− α) ̂˜PAA,t. (7.196)
Rearrange for later use to
̂˜
P
A
A,t =
PˆAA,t − α PˆAA,t−1
1− α . (7.197)
Combine (7.195) with (7.196)
PˆAA,t = αPˆ
A
A,t−1 + (1− α) (1− αβ)
(
m̂cAt + Pˆ
A
A,t
)
+ (1− α)αβ ̂˜PAA,t+1. (7.198)
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Substitute PˆAt+1 by (7.197)
PˆAA,t = αPˆ
A
A,t−1 + (1− α) (1− αβ)
(
m̂cAt + Pˆ
A
A,t
)
+ (1− α)αβ Pˆ
A
A,t+1 − α PˆAA,t
1− α
= αPˆAA,t−1 + (1− α) (1− αβ)
(
m̂cAt + Pˆ
A
A,t
)
+ αβ
(
PˆAA,t+1 − α PˆAA,t
)
(7.199)
PˆAA,t − αPˆAA,t−1 = (1− α) (1− αβ) m̂cAt + (1− α) (1− αβ) PˆAA,t
+αβ PˆAA,t+1 − α2β PˆAA,t.
Add α PˆAA,t and subtract Pˆ
A
A,t
α PˆAA,t − αPˆAA,t−1 = (1− α) (1− αβ) m̂cAt + αβ PˆAA,t+1
+(1− α− αβ + α2β) PˆAA,t − α2β PˆAA,t − α PˆAA,t + PˆAA,t
α
(
PˆAA,t − PˆAA,t−1
)
= (1− α) (1− αβ) m̂cAt + αβ PˆAA,t+1 − αβ PˆAA,t
α
(
PˆAA,t − PˆAA,t−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
piAA,t
= (1− α) (1− αβ) m̂cAt + αβ
(
PˆAA,t+1 − PˆAA,t
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
piAA,t+1
.
Equation for inflation
αpiAA,t = (1− α) (1− αβ) m̂cAt + αβ piAA,t+1
piAA,t = β Et
{
piAA,t+1
}
+
(1− α) (1− αβ)
α
m̂cAt . (7.200)
Equation (7.200) is the equivalent to Monacelli (2001: 393, eq. 23).
piAA,t = β Et
{
piAA,t+1
}
+
(1− α) (1− αβ)
α
m̂cAt (7.201)
piBB,t = β Et
{
piBB,t+1
}
+
(1− α) (1− αβ)
α
m̂cBt (7.202)
piCC,t = β Et
{
piCC,t+1
}
+
(1− α) (1− αβ)
α
m̂cCt (7.203)
7.3.3 Monetary Policy
Following Woodford (2003: 24) the central bank conducts monetary policy by
setting the interest rate. The interest rate policy rule is exogenous. The central
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bank follows a so-called Taylor rule by reacting to deviations of inflation, output
and terms of trade
Rˆt = ϕpipit + ϕY Yˆt + ϕToT T̂ oT t (7.204)
where ϕpi, ϕY and ϕToT are parameters with ϕpi > 1 to fulfill the Taylor principle
and guarantee determinancy (Woodford 2003: 91).
7.3.4 Summary
Summary of Equations
Equation Country A Country B Country C
Euler (7.135) (7.136) (7.137)
Phillips (7.201) (7.202) (7.203)
Marginal Cost (7.151) (7.152) (7.153)
CPI PPI Ratio (7.106) (7.107) (7.108)
Monetary Policy Rule (7.204) (7.204) (7.204)
Goods Market Clearing (7.126) (7.127) (7.128)
Risk Sharing (7.124) (7.125)
Exog. Shock (7.139) (7.139) (7.139)
Σ 7 8 8 23
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Country A Equation
Euler (7.135) CˆAt = Cˆ
A
t+1 − 1µRˆAt + 1µ pˆiAA,t+1
+ [1−η(1−nP )]η(1−nA)
µ
T̂ oT
A
B,t+1 − [1−η(1−nP )]η(1−nA)µ T̂ oT
A
B,t
+η(1−nP )
µ
T̂ oT
A
C,t+1 − η(1−nP )µ T̂ oT
A
C,t
Phillips (7.201) piAA,t = β Et
{
piAA,t+1
}
+ (1−α) (1−αβ)
α
m̂cAt
Marg.Cost (7.151) m̂cAt = µ Cˆ
A
t + γ Yˆ
A
t − (1 + γ) FˆAt + gˆA (ToT )
gA (ToT ) (7.106) gˆA,t(ToT ) = [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA) T̂ oT
A
B,t
+η (1− nP ) T̂ oT
A
C,t
Mon. Pol. (7.204) RˆAt = ϕpipi
A
A,t + ϕY Yˆ
A
t + ϕToT T̂ oT t
Output (7.126) Yˆ At = [1− η (1− nP )] [1− η (1− nA)] CˆAt
+θ [1− η (1− nP )] [1− η (1− nA)] gˆA,t(ToT )
+ (ψ − θ) [1− η (1− nP )] [1− η (1− nA)] η (1− nA) T̂ oT
A
B,t
+ [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA) CˆBt
+θ [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA) gˆB,t(ToT )
+ψ [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA) T̂ oT
A
B,t
+(ψ − θ) [1− η (1− nP )] η (1− nA) ηnAT̂ oT
B
A,t
+η (1− nP ) CˆCt + θη (1− nP ) gˆC,t(ToT )
+ψη (1− nP ) T̂ oT
A
C,t
+(ψ − θ) η (1− nP )nAT̂ oT
C
A,t
+(ψ − θ) η (1− nP ) (1− nA) T̂ oT
C
B,t
Shock (7.139) FAt = ρ
F lnFAt−1 + 
A
t
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Country B Equation
Euler (7.136) CˆBt = Cˆ
B
t+1 − 1µRˆBt + 1µ pˆiBB,t+1
+ [1−η(1−nP )] ηnA
µ
T̂ oT
B
A,t+1 − [1−η(1−nP )] ηnAµ T̂ oT
B
A,t
+η(1−nP )
µ
T̂ oT
B
C,t+1 − η(1−nP )µ T̂ oT
B
C,t
Phillips (7.202) pˆiBB,t = β Et
{
pˆiBB,t+1
}
+ (1−α) (1−αβ)
α
m̂cBt
Marg.Cost (7.152) m̂cBt = µ Cˆ
B
t + γ Yˆ
B
t − (1 + γ) FˆBt + gˆB (ToT )
gB (ToT ) (7.107) gˆB (ToT ) = [1− η (1− nP )] ηnAT̂ oT
B
A,t
+η (1− nP ) T̂ oT
B
C,t
Mon. Pol. (7.204) RˆBt = ϕpipˆi
B
B,t + ϕY Yˆ
B
t + ϕToT T̂ oT t
Output (7.127) Yˆ Bt = [1− η (1− nP )] ηnACˆAt
+θ [1− η (1− nP )] ηnAgˆA,t (ToT )
+ (ψ − θ) [1− η (1− nP )] ηnAη (1− nA) T̂ oT
A
B,t
+ψ [1− η (1− nP )] ηnAT̂ oT
B
A,t
+(1− ηnA) [1− η (1− nP )] CˆBt
+θ (1− ηnA) [1− η (1− nP )] gˆB,t (ToT )
+ (ψ − θ) (1− ηnA) [1− η (1− nP )] ηnAT̂ oT
B
A,t
+η (1− nP ) CˆCt + θη (1− nP ) gˆC,t (ToT )
+ (ψ − θ) η (1− nP )nAT̂ oT
C
A,t
+(ψ − θ) η (1− nP ) (1− nA) T̂ oT
C
B,t
+ψη (1− nP ) T̂ oT
B
C,t
Risk Sharing (7.124) CˆAt = Cˆ
B
t +
1
µ
T̂ oT
A
B,t +
1
µ
gˆB(ToT )− 1µ gˆA(ToT )
Shock (7.139) FBt = ρ
F lnFBt−1 + 
B
t
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Country C Equation
Euler (7.137) CˆCt = Cˆ
C
t+1 − 1µRˆCt + 1µ pˆiCC,t+1
+ [1−η(1−nP )] ηnA
µ
T̂ oT
C
A,t+1 − [1−η(1−nP )] ηnAµ T̂ oT
C
A,t
+ [1−η(1−nP )]η(1−nA)
µ
T̂ oT
C
B,t+1 − [1−η(1−nP )]η(1−nA)µ T̂ oT
C
B,t
Phillips (7.203) pˆiCC,t = β Et
{
pˆiCC,t+1
}
+ (1−α) (1−αβ)
α
m̂cCt
Marg.Cost (7.153) m̂cCt = µ Cˆ
C
t + γ Yˆ
C
t − (1 + γ) FˆCt + gˆC (ToT )
gC (ToT ) (7.108) gˆC (ToT ) = ηnP nAT̂ oT
C
A,t + ηnP (1− nA) T̂ oT
C
B,t
Mon. Pol. (7.204) RˆCt = ϕpipˆi
C
C,t + ϕY Yˆ
C
t + ϕToT T̂ oT t
Output (7.128) Yˆ Ct = ηnPnACˆ
A
t
+ηnPnA (−θ) T̂ oT
A
C,t + θηnPnAgˆA,t(ToT )
+ηnp (1− nA) CˆBt + (−θ) ηnp (1− nA) T̂ oT
B
C,t
+θηnp (1− nA) gˆB,t(ToT )
+ (1− ηnP ) CˆCt + θ (1− ηnP ) gˆC,t(ToT )
Risk Sharing (7.125) CˆAt = Cˆ
C
t +
1
µ
T̂ oT
A
C,t +
1
µ
gˆC(ToT )− 1µ gˆA(ToT )
Shock (7.139) FCt = ρ
F lnFCt−1 + 
C
t
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Using Shorthands for Trade Shares
Country A Equation
Euler (7.135) CˆAt = Cˆ
A
t+1 − 1µRˆAt + 1µ pˆiAA,t+1
+
vAB
µ
T̂ oT
A
B,t+1 − v
A
B
µ
T̂ oT
A
B,t
+
vAC
µ
T̂ oT
A
C,t+1 − v
A
C
µ
T̂ oT
A
C,t
Phillips (7.201) piAA,t = β Et
{
piAA,t+1
}
+ (1−α) (1−αβ)
α
m̂cAt
Marg.Cost (7.151) m̂cAt = µ Cˆ
A
t + γ Yˆ
A
t − (1 + γ) FˆAt + gˆA (ToT )
gA (ToT ) (7.106) gˆA,t(ToT ) = v
A
BT̂ oT
A
B,t
+vAC T̂ oT
A
C,t
Mon. Pol. (7.204) RˆAt = ϕpipi
A
A,t + ϕY Yˆ
A
t + ϕToT T̂ oT t
Output (7.126) Yˆ At = v
A
ACˆ
A
t
+θvAA gˆA,t(ToT )
+ (ψ − θ) vAB · [1− η (1− nA)] · T̂ oT
A
B,t
+vABCˆ
B
t
+θvAB gˆB,t(ToT )
+ψvABT̂ oT
A
B,t
+(ψ − θ) vAB · ηnA · T̂ oT
B
A,t
+vACCˆ
C
t + θv
A
C gˆC,t(ToT )
+ψvAC T̂ oT
A
C,t
+(ψ − θ) vAC · nA · T̂ oT
C
A,t
+(ψ − θ) vAC · (1− nA) · T̂ oT
C
B,t
Shock (7.139) FAt = ρ
F lnFAt−1 + 
A
t
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Country B Equation
Euler (7.136) CˆBt = Cˆ
B
t+1 − 1µRˆBt + 1µ pˆiBB,t+1
+
vBA
µ
T̂ oT
B
A,t+1 − v
B
A
µ
T̂ oT
B
A,t
+
vBC
µ
T̂ oT
B
C,t+1 − v
B
C
µ
T̂ oT
B
C,t
Phillips (7.202) pˆiBB,t = β Et
{
pˆiBB,t+1
}
+ (1−α) (1−αβ)
α
m̂cBt
Marg.Cost (7.152) m̂cBt = µ Cˆ
B
t + γ Yˆ
B
t − (1 + γ) FˆBt + gˆB (ToT )
gB (ToT ) (7.107) gˆB (ToT ) = v
B
A T̂ oT
B
A,t
+vBC T̂ oT
B
C,t
Mon. Pol. (7.204) RˆBt = ϕpipˆi
B
B,t + ϕY Yˆ
B
t + ϕToT T̂ oT t
Output (7.127) Yˆ Bt = v
B
A Cˆ
A
t
+θvBA gˆA,t (ToT )
+ (ψ − θ) vBA · η (1− nA) · T̂ oT
A
B,t
+ψvBA T̂ oT
B
A,t
+vBB Cˆ
B
t
+θvBB gˆB,t (ToT )
+ (ψ − θ) vBA · (1− ηnA) · T̂ oT
B
A,t
+vBC Cˆ
C
t + θv
B
C gˆC,t (ToT )
+ (ψ − θ) vBC · nA · T̂ oT
C
A,t
+(ψ − θ) vBC · (1− nA) · T̂ oT
C
B,t
+ψvBC T̂ oT
B
C,t
Risk Sharing (7.124) CˆAt = Cˆ
B
t +
1
µ
T̂ oT
A
B,t +
1
µ
gˆB(ToT )− 1µ gˆA(ToT )
Shock (7.139) FBt = ρ
F lnFBt−1 + 
B
t
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Country C Equation
Euler (7.137) CˆCt = Cˆ
C
t+1 − 1µRˆCt + 1µ pˆiCC,t+1
+
vBA
µ
T̂ oT
C
A,t+1 − v
B
A
µ
T̂ oT
C
A,t
+
vAB
µ
T̂ oT
C
B,t+1 − v
A
B
µ
T̂ oT
C
B,t
Phillips (7.203) pˆiCC,t = β Et
{
pˆiCC,t+1
}
+ (1−α) (1−αβ)
α
m̂cCt
Marg.Cost (7.153) m̂cCt = µ Cˆ
C
t + γ Yˆ
C
t − (1 + γ) FˆCt + gˆC (ToT )
gC (ToT ) (7.108) gˆC (ToT ) = v
C
A T̂ oT
C
A,t + v
C
B T̂ oT
C
B,t
Mon. Pol. (7.204) RˆCt = ϕpipˆi
C
C,t + ϕY Yˆ
C
t + ϕToT T̂ oT t
Output (7.128) Yˆ Ct = v
C
ACˆ
A
t
−θvCA T̂ oT
A
C,t + θv
C
A gˆA,t(ToT )
+vCBCˆ
B
t − θvCB T̂ oT
B
C,t
+θvCB gˆB,t(ToT )
+vCC Cˆ
C
t + θv
C
C gˆC,t(ToT )
Risk Sharing (7.125) CˆAt = Cˆ
C
t +
1
µ
T̂ oT
A
C,t +
1
µ
gˆC(ToT )− 1µ gˆA(ToT )
Shock (7.139) FCt = ρ
F lnFCt−1 + 
C
t
Additional equations for terms of trade using inverse (7.110) and cross rates
(7.112).
T̂ oT
C
A,t = −T̂ oT
A
C,t
T̂ oT
B
A,t = −T̂ oT
A
B,t
T̂ oT
B
C,t = T̂ oT
B
A,t + T̂ oT
A
C,t
T̂ oT
C
B,t = −T̂ oT
B
C,t
Back out CPI inflation based on equations (7.132) to (7.134)
pˆiAt = pˆi
A
A,t + v
A
BT̂ oT
A
B,t − vABT̂ oT
A
B,t−1 + v
A
C T̂ oT
A
C,t − vAC T̂ oT
A
C,t−1
pˆiBt = pˆi
B
B,t + v
B
A T̂ oT
B
A,t − vBA T̂ oT
B
A,t−1 + v
B
C T̂ oT
B
C,t − vBC T̂ oT
B
C,t−1
pˆiCt = pˆi
C
C,t + v
B
A T̂ oT
C
A,t − vBA T̂ oT
C
A,t−1 + v
A
BT̂ oT
C
B,t − vABT̂ oT
C
B,t−1
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Back out real exchange rate using (7.113)
R̂ER
i
i′,t = T̂ oT
i
i′,t + gˆi′,t(ToT )− gˆi,t(ToT )
Trade weighted real effective exchange rates
̂REERAt = vABvAB + vAC R̂ERAB,t + v
A
C
vAB + v
A
C
R̂ER
A
C,t
̂REERBt = vBAvBA + vBC R̂ERBA,t + v
B
C
vBB + v
B
C
R̂ER
B
C,t
̂REERCt = vCAvCA + vCB R̂ERCA,t + v
C
B
vCA + v
C
B
R̂ER
C
B,t
Backing out change in nominal exchange rate (7.114)
∆Sˆii′,t = T̂ oT
i
i′,t − T̂ oT
i
i′,t−1 + pi
i
i,t − pii
′
i′,t
∆SˆAB,t = T̂ oT
A
B,t − T̂ oT
A
B,t−1 + pi
A
A,t − piBB,t
∆SˆAC,t = T̂ oT
A
C,t − T̂ oT
A
C,t−1 + pi
A
A,t − piCC,t
∆SˆBC,t = T̂ oT
B
C,t − T̂ oT
B
C,t−1 + pi
B
B,t − piCC,t
Summary of Variables
Variable Country A Country B Country C
Consumption CˆA CˆB CˆC
Domestic Inflation pˆiAA pˆi
B
B pˆi
C
C
Marginal Cost m̂cA m̂cB m̂cC
CPI PPI Ratio gˆA (ToT ) gˆB (ToT ) gˆC (ToT )
Interest Rate RˆA RˆB RˆC
Output Yˆ A Yˆ B Yˆ C
Terms of Trade T̂ oT
A
B T̂ oT
A
C
Exog. Shock FˆA FˆB FˆC
Σ 6+1 7+1 7+1 20+3 = 23
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